Proclus — Elements of Theology

Proposition 1 (I)

1All multitude participates in a certain respect of the one.

2For if it in no respect participates of the one, neither will the whole be one whole, nor each of the many of which the multitude consists; but there will also be a certain multitude arising from each of these, and this will be the case to infinity. Each of these infinites, likewise, will again be infinite multitude. For participating in no respect of any one, neither according to the whole of itself, nor according to each of the many which it contains, it will be in every respect, and according to the whole, infinite. For each of the many which you may assume, will either be one, or not one, will either be many or nothing. But if each is nothing, that also which consists of these will be nothing. And if each is many, each will consist of infinites infinitely: [and this not in capacity, but in energy]. These things, however, are impossible. For neither does any being consist of infinites infinitely assumed; since there is not more than the infinite; but that which consists of all is more than each. Nor is it

3possible for any thing to be composed from nothing. All multitude, therefore, participates in a certain respect of the one.

Proposition 2 (II)

4Every thing which participates of the one , is both one and not one.

5For if it is not the one itself (since it participates of the one) being something else besides the one , it suffers, or is passive to it according to participation, and sustains to become one. If, therefore, it is nothing besides the one , it is one alone, and does not participate of the one , but will be the one itself. But if it is something besides the one y which is not the one , but its participant, it is both not one, and one, not indeed such a one as the one itself, but one being , as participating of the one. This, therefore, is not one, nor is it that which the one is. But it is one, and at the same time a participant of the one. Hence, being of itself not one, it is both one and not one, being something else besides the one. And so far indeed as it abounds, it is not one, but so far as it is passive [to the one] it is one. Every thing, therefore, which participates of the one, is both one, and not one.

Proposition 3 (III)

6Every thing which becomes one, becomes so through the participation of the one, and is one, so far as it suffers the participation of the one.

7For if things which are not one become one, they doubtless become so by a conjunction and communication with each other, and they sustain the presence of the one, not being that which the one itself is. Hence, they participate of the one so far as they suffer to become one. For, if they are already one they will not become one; since that which is does

8not become that which it is already. But if they become one from nothing, i. e. from the privation of the one, since a certain one is ingenerated in them, the one itself is prior to them. [And this ingenerated one must be derived from the one itself. Every thing, therefore, which becomes one, becomes so through the participation of the one , &c. '3

Proposition 4 (IV)

9Every thing which is united is different from the one itself

10For if it is united, it will participate in a certain respect of the one , so far as it is said to be united. That, however, which participates of the one, is both one and not one. But the one itself is not both one and not one. For if this were the case, again the one which is in it would have both these, and this would take place to infinity, there being no one itself at which it is possible to stop; but every thing being one and notone, there will be something united which is different from the one. For if the one is the same with the united, it will be infinite multitude. And in a similar manner each of the things of which the united consists will be infinite multitude. [Every thing, therefore, which is united is different from the one itself. M

Proposition 5 (V)

11All multitude is posterior to the one.

12For if multitude is prior to the one, the one indeed will participate of multitude, but multitude which is prior to the one will not participate of the one, since that multitude existed prior to the subsistence of the one.

13For it will not participate of that which is not; because that which parti* cipates of the one, is one and at the same time not one; but the one will not yet subsist, that which is first being multitude. It is, however, impossible that there should be a certain multitude, which in no respect whatever participates of the one. Multitude, therefore, is not prior to the one.

14But if multitude subsists simultaneously with the one , and they are naturally co-ordinate with each other; for nothing of time will prevent them being so; neither will the one of itself be many, nor will multitude be one, as being at one and the same time oppositely divided by nature, if neither is prior or posterior to the other. Hence, multitude of itself will not be one, and each of the things that are in it will not be one, and this will be the case to infinity, which is impossible. Multitude, therefore, according to its own nature, participates of the one, and it will not be possible to assume any thing of it which is not one. For not. being one, it will be an infinite consisting of infinites, as has been demonstrated. Hence, it entirely participates of the one. If, therefore, the one which is of itself one, in no respect participates of multitude, multitude will be entirely posterior to the one; participating indeed of the one, but not being participated by the one.

15But if the one also participates of multitude, s ubsisting indeed as one according to hyparxis, but as uotone, according to participation, the one will be multiplied, just as multitude is united on account of the one. The one, therefore, will communicate with multitude, and multitude with the one. But things which coalesce, and communicate in a certain respect with each other, if indeed they are collected together by something else, that something else is prior to them. But if they themselves collect themselves, they are not opposed to each other. For opposites do not hasten to each other. Hence, if the one and multitude are oppositely divided, and multitude so far as multitude is not one, and the one so far as one is not multitude, neither will one of these subsisting in the other be one and at the same time two. If, also, there is something prior to them which collects them, this will either be one, or not one. But if it is not one, it will either be many or nothing. It will not however be many, lest multi-

16tude should be prior to the one, nor jet will it be nothing. For how can nothing congregate ? It is, therefore, one alone. For this which is the one cannot be many, lest there should be a progression to infinity. It is, therefore, the one itself, and all multitude is from the one itself

Proposition 6 (VI)

17Concerning Unity.

18Every multitude consists either of things united, or of unities.

19For that each of things many will not be itself multitude alone, and again that each part of this will not be multitude alone is evident. But if it is not multitude alone, it is either united, or unities («w&«r). And if, indeed, it participates of the one it is united; but if it consists of things of which that which is primarily united consists, it will be unities. For if there is the one itself, there is also that which primarily participates of it, and which is primarily united. But this consists of unities. For if R consists of things united, again things united consist of certain things, and this will be the case to infinity. It is necessary, however, that what is primarily united should consist of unities. And thus we have discovered what we proposed at first, [viz. that every multitude consists either of things united, or of unities.]

Proposition 7 (VII)

20Concerning producing causes and things produced .

21Every thing productive of another is more excellent than the nature of the thing produced.

22For it is either more excellent, or less excellent, or equal. Hence, that which is produced from this, will either also itself possess a power produc-

23tive of something else, or it will be entirely unprolific. But if it is unprolific, according to this very thing it will be inferior to that by which it was produced. And through its inefficacy it is unequal to its cause which is prolific, and has the power of producing. But if it also is productive of other things, it either likewise produces that which is equal to itself, and this in a similar manner in all things, and all beings will be equal to each other, and no one thing will be better than another, that which produces, always giving subsistence in a consequent series to that which is equal to itself; or it produces that which is unequal to itself, and thus that which is produced, will no longer be equal to that which produces it. For it is the province of equal powers to produce equal things. The progeny of these, however, will be unequal to each other, if that which produces indeed, is equal to the cause prior to itself, but the thing posterior to it is unequal to it. Hence, it is not proper that the thing produced should be equal to its producing cause.

24Moreover, neither will that which produces ever be less than that which is produced by it. For if it imparts essence to the thing produced, it will also supply it with essential power. But if it is productive of all the power which that posterior to it possesses, it will also be able to produce itself such as that posterior nature is. And if this be the case it will also make itself 1 more powerful. For impotency cannot hinder, productive power being present, nor a defect of will; since all things naturally aspire after good. Hence, if it is able to render another thing more perfect, jt will also perfect itself before it perfects that which is posterior to itself. Hence, that which is produced, is not equal to, nor more excellent than, its producing cause. The producing cause, therefore, is in every respect better than the nature of the thing produced.

Proposition 8 (VIII)

25Concerning the first good , which is called the good itself.

26That which is primarily good, and which is no other than the good itself is the leader of all things that in any way whatever participate of good.

27For if all beings aspire after good, it is evident that what is primarily good is beyond beings. For if it is the same with some one being, either being and the good are the same, and this particular being will no longer be desirous of good, since it is that to which it is passive, [i. e. since it is the goocQ- For that which aspires after any thing is indigent of that after which it aspires, and is different from it. And [if some one being and the good are the same] being indeed will participate, and that which is participated in being will be the good. Hence, the good is a certain good inherent in a certain participant, and after which the participant alone aspires, but is not that which is simply good, and which all beings desire. For this isrthe Common object of desire to all beings. But that which is inherent in a certain thing, pertains to that alone which participates of it. Hence, that which is primarily good, is nothing else than good. For whatever else you may add to it, you will diminish by the addition the goody and will make it to be a certain good, instead of that which is simply good. For that which is added not being the goody but something less than it, will by its own essence diminish the good.

Proposition 9 (IX)

28Concerning that which is sufficient to itself.

29Every thing which is sufficient to itself, either according to essence, or according to energy, is more excellent than that which is not sufficient to itself, but has the cause of its perfection suspended from another cause.

30For if all beings naturally aspire after good, and one thing supplies well-being from itself, ‘ but another is indigent of something else, the one indeed will have the cause of good present, but the other separate and apart. By how much the nearer, therefore, the former is to that which supplies the object of desire [i. e. to the good], by so much the more excellent will it be than that which is indigent of a separate cause, and externally receives the perfection of its hyparxis, or its energy. For since that which is sufficient to itself is both similar and diminished, it is more similar to the good itself [than that which is not self-sufficient]. It is diminished indeed through participating of the good, and because it is not primarily the good. Yet it is in a certain respect allied to it, so far as it is able to possess good from itself. But to participate, and to participate through another, are more remote from that which ist primarily good, and which is nothing else than good.

Proposition 10 (X)

31Of all things which proceed from another cause, those which exist from themselves, and which are allotted a self-subsistent essence,are the leaders.

32For if every thing which is sufficient to itself, either according to essence, or according to energy, is more excellent than that which is suspended from another cause ; but that which produces itself, since it produces the being of itself, is sufficient to itself with respect to essence ; but that which is alohe produced by another is not sufficient to itself; and the self-sufficient is more allied to the good; but things more allied * and similar to their causes, subsist from cause prior to such as are dissimilar;—this being the case, things which are produced by themselves, and are self-subsisteut, are more ancient than those which proceed into

33existence from another cause alone. For either there will be nothing self-subsistent, or the good is a thing of this kind, or the first things that subsist from the good. But if there is nothing self-subsistent, there will not in reality be in any thing self-sufficiency. Nor will it be in the good, since that being the one is better than self-sufficiency. It is also the good itself, and not that which possesses the good. But if the good was selfsubsistent, in consequence of itself producing itself, it will not be the one. For that which proceeds from the one is not the one. And it would proceed from itself, if it was self-subsistent; so that the one, would at the same time be one and not one. Hence, it is necessary that the selfsubsistent should be posterior to the first. And it is evident that it will be prior to things which alone proceed from another cause. For it has a more principal subsistence than these, and is more allied to the good , as has been demonstrated.

Proposition 11 (XI)

34Concerning Cause.

35All beings proceed from one first cause.

36For either there is not any cause of beings, or the causes of all finite thin gs are in a circle, or the ascent is to infinity, and one thing is the cause of another, and the pre>subsistence of essence will in no respect stop. If, however, there is no cause of beings, there will neither be an order of things second and first, of things perfecting and perfected, of things adorning and adorned, of things generating and generated, and of agents and patients, nor will there be any science of beings. For the knowledge of causes is the work of science, and we are then said to know scientifically, when we know the causes of things. 1

37But if causes revolve in a circle, the same things will be prior and posterior, more powerful and more imbecil. For every thing which produces is better than the nature of that which is produced. It makes, however, no difference to conjoin cause to effect, and to produce from cause, through many, or through fewer media. For cause will be more excellent than all the intermediate natures of which it is the cause. And by how much the more numerous the media, by so much greater is the causality of the cause.

38And if the addition of causes is to infinity, and there is always again another cause prior to another, there will be no science of any being. For there is not a knowledge of any thing infinite. But causes being unknown, neither will there be a science of the things consequent to the causes. If, therefore, it is necessary that there should be a cause of beings, and causes are distinct from the things caused, and there is not an ascent to infinity, there is a first cause of beings, from which as from a root every thing proceeds; some things indeed being nearer to, but others more remote from it. For that it is necessary there should be one principle has been demonstrated; * because all multitude subsists posterior to the one.

Proposition 12 (XII)

39The principle and first cause of all beings is the good.

40For if all things proceed from one cause, [as has been above demonstrated] it is requisite to call that cause either the good, or that which is more excellent than the good. But if it is more excellent than the good, whether is any thing imparted by it to beings, and to the nature of beings, or nothing? And if indeed nothing is imparted by it an absurdity will ensue. For we shall no longer preserve it in the order of cause; since it is every where requisite that something should be present from cause to things caused, * and especially from the first cause from which all things are suspended, and on account of which every being exists. But if something is imparted by it to beings, in the same manner as there is by the good, there will be something better than goodness in beings imparted to them by the first cause. For being more excellent than, and above the good, it can never bestow on secondary natures any thing subordinate to that which is imparted by the nature posterior to itself.* But what can be more excellent than goodness ? Since we say that the more excellent itself is that which participates of a greater good. Hence, if that which is not good cannot be said to be more excellent than, it must entirely be secondary to the good. If, likewise, all beings aspire after the good, how is it any longer possible that there should be something prior to this cause? For if they also aspire after that which is prior to the good, how can they especially aspire after the good? But if they do not aspire after it* how is it possible that things which proceed from it should not desire the cause of all ? Hence, if it is the good from which all beings are suspended, the good is the principle and first cause of all things.

Proposition 13 (XIII)

41Every good has the power of uniting its participants, and every union is good; and the good is the same with the one.

42For if the good is preservative of all beings, (on which account also it is desirable to all things) but that which is preservative and connective of the essence of every thing, is the one; for all things are preserved by the one , and dispersion removes every thing from essence;— if this be the case, the good will cause those things to which it is present, to be one, and will connect and contain them according to union. And if the one is collective and connective of beings, it will perfect every thing by its presence. Hence, therefore, it is good to all things to be united. If, however, union is of itself good, and good has the power of uniting, the simply good, and the simply one are the same, uniting and at the same time benefiting beings. Hence it is that those things which after a manner fall off from the goody are at the same time also deprived of the participation of the one. And those things which become destitute of the one , being filled with separation, are after the same manner likewise deprived of the good. Hence, goodness is union, and union is goodness, and the one is that which is primarily good.

Proposition 14 (XIV)

43Concerning the immoveable and self-motive principle , or cause.

44' Every being is either immoveable or moved. And if moved, it is either moved by itself, or by another. And if indeed it is moved by itself, it is self-motive; but if by another, it is alter-motive. Every thing therefore, is either immoveable, or self-motive, or alter-motive.

45For it is necessary since there are alter-motive natures, that there should also be that which is immoveable, and that the self-motive nature should subsist between these. For if every thing alter-motive is moved in. consequence of being moved by another thing, motions will either be in

46a circle, or they will proceed to infinity. 1 But they will neither be in a circle, nor have an infinite progression, since all beings are bounded by the principle of things and that which moves is better than that which ia moved, fience there will be something immoveable which first moves.* But if this be the case, it is also necessary that there should be something which is self-motive. For if’ all things should stop, what will that be which is first moved ? It cannot be that which is immoveable ; 4 for it is not naturally adapted to be moved ; nor that which is alter-motive; for that is moved by something else. It remains therefore, that the self-motive nature is that which is primarily moved. For it is this also which conjoins alter-motive natures to that which is immoveable, being in a certain respect a middle, moving and at the same time being moved. For of these, the immoveable moves only, but the alter-motive is moved only. Every thing therefore, is either immoveable, or self-motive, or alter-motive.

47COROLLARY.

48From these things likewise, it is evident, that of things which are moved, the self-motive nature is the first; but that of things which move the immoveable is the first.

Proposition 15 (XV)

49Concerning an incorporeal essence , and what the peculiarity of it is.

50Every thing which is converted to itself is incorporeal.

51For no body is naturally adapted to revert to itself. For if that which is converted to any thing is conjoined with that to which it is converted, it is evident that all the parts of the body which is converted to itself, will be conjoined with all the parts. For this it is for a thing to be converted to itself, when both that which is converted, and that to which it is converted, become one. This however is impossible in body, and in

52short, in all partible things. For the whole of that which is partible is not conjoined with the whole, on account of the separation of the parts, some of which are situated differently from others. No body therefore, is naturally adapted to revert to itself, so aa that the whole may be converted to the whole. Hence if there is any thing which has the power of reverting to itself it is incorporeal and impartible.

Proposition 16 (XVI)

53Every thing which is converted to itself, has an essence separate from all body.

54For if it was inseparable from any body whatever, it would not have a certain energy separate from body.' For thus energy would be more excellent than essence; since the latter indeed would be indigent of bodies, but the former would be sufficient to itself, and would not be in want of bodies: If therefore any thing is essentially inseparable from body, it is also in a similar manner inseparable according to energy, or rather it is in a still greater degree inseparable. But if this be the case, it will not revert to itself. For that which is converted to itself being something different from body, has an energy separate from body, and not either through, or together with body, since the energy, and that to which the energy is directed, are not at all in want of body. Hence, that which is converted to itself, is entirely separate from bodies.

Proposition 17 (XVII)

55Every thing which moves itself primarily, is convertive to itself.

56For if it moves itself, and its motive energy is directed to itself, that which moves, and that which is moved are at the same time one. For it either moves in a part but is moved in a part, or the whole moves and

57is moved, [or the whole moves, but a part is moved, or'] the Contrary. But if one part indeed, is that which moves, and another part is that which is moved, it will not be essentially self-motive, since it will consist of things which are not self-motive, but which appear indeed to be so* yet are not so essentially.

58If however, the whole moves, but the part is moved, or the contrary, there will be a certain part in both which according to one, moves and at the same time is moved/ And this is that which is primarily self-motive. If however, one and the same thing moves and is moved, it will have the energy of moving to itself, being motive of itself. But it is converted to that towards which it energizes. Every thing therefore which primarily moves itself, is converted to itself.

Proposition 18 (XVIII)

59Every thing which imparts existence to others, is itself that primarily which it communicates to the natures that are supplied by it with existence.

60For if it gives existence, and makes the communication from its own essence, that which it gives is subordinate to its own essence [by the 7th Proposition]. But that which it is, it is in a greater and more perfect degree; since every thing which gives subsistence to a certain thing, is better than and not the same with it. For it is primarily, but the other is secondarily that which it is. For it is necessary either that each should be the same, and that there should be one definition of both, or that there should be nothing common and the same in both, or that the one should subsist primarily, but the other secondarily. If however indeed, there is the same definition of both, the one will no longer be cause, but the oth^r effect; nor will the one subsist essentially, but the other by participation ;

61nor will the one be the maker, but the other the thing made., But if they have nothing which is the same, the one will not give subsistence to the other by its very being, in consequence of communicating nothing to the existence of the other. Hence, it remains that the one should be primarily that which it gives, but that the other should be secondarily that to which existence is given; the fqrmer supplying the latter from its very being.

Proposition 19 (XIX)

62Every thing which is primarily inherent in a certain nature of beings, is present to all the beings that are arranged according to that nature, and this conformably to one reason, and after the same manner.

63For if it is not present to all of them after the same manner, but to some and not to others, it is evident that it was not primarily in that nature, but that it is in some things primarily, and in others secondarily, that sometimes participate of it. For that which at one time exists, but at another time does not, does not exist primarily, nor of itself. But it is adventitious, and is imparted from some other place to the things in which it is thus inherent.

Proposition 20 (XX)

64The essence of soul is beyond all bodies, the intellectual nature is beyond all souls, and the one is beyond all intellectual hypostases.

65For every body is moveable by something else, but is not naturally adapted to move itself, but by the presence of soul is moved of itself, lives on account of soul, and when soul is present, is in a certain respect self-moveable, but when it is absent is alter-moveable, as deriving this nature from soul which is allotted a self-moveable essence. For to whatever nature soul is present, to this it imparts self-motion. It is

66however, by a much greater priority that which it imparts by its very being. Hence, it is beyond bodies, which become self-moveable by participation as being essentially self-moveable.

67Again however, soul which is moved from itself, has an order secondary to the immoveable nature, which subsists immoveable according to energy. Because of all the natures that are moved, the self-moveable essence is the leader; but of all that move, the immoveable is the leader. If therefore soul being moved from itself, moves other things, it is necessary that prior to it, there should be that which moves immoveably. But intellect moves being immoveable, and energizing always with an invariable sameness of subsistence. For soul on account of intellect participates of perpetual intellectual energy, just as body on account of soul possesses the power of moving itself. For if perpetual intellection was primarily in soul, it would be inherent in all souls, in the same manner as the selfmotive power. Hence, perpetual intellection is not primarily in soul. It is necessary therefore, that prior to it, there should be that which is primarily intellective. And hence, intellect is prior to souls.

68Moreover, the one is prior to intellect. For intellect though it is immoveable yet is not the one; for it intellectually perceives itself, and energizes about itself. And of the one indeed, all beings in whatever way they may exist, participate; but all beings do not participate of intellect. For those beings to whom intellect is present by participation, necessarily participate of knowledge; because intellectual knowledge is the principle and first cause of the gnostic energy. The one therefore, is beyond intellect ; and there is no longer any thing else beyond the one. For the one and the good are the same. But the good, as has been demonstrated, is the principle of all things.

Proposition 21 (XXI)

69That intellect is not the first cause.

70Every order beginning from a monad, proceeds into a multitude co-ordinate to the monad, and the multitude of every order is referred to one monad.

71For the monad having the relation of a principle, generates a multitude allied to itself. Hence one series, and one whole order has a decrement into multitude from the monad. For there would no longer be an order, or a series, if the monad remained of itself unprolific. But multitude is again referred to the one common cause of all coordinate natures. For that in every multitude which is the same, has not its progression from one of those things of wbioh the multitude consists. For that which subsists from one alone of the many, is not common to all, but eminently possesses the peculiarity of that one alone. Hence, since in every order there is a certain communion, connexion, and sameness, through which some things are said to be co-ordinate, but others of a different order, it is evident that sameness is derived to every order from one principle. 1 In each order, therefore, there is one monad prior to the multitude, which imparts one ratio and connexion to the natures arranged in it, both to each other, and to the whole.

72For let one thing be the cause of another, among things that are under the same series: but that which ranks as the cause of the one series, must necessarily be prior to all in that series, and all things must be

73generated by it as co-ordinate, not so that eacb will be a certain particular thing, but that each will belong to this order.

74COROLLARY.

75From these things it is evident that both unity and multitude are inherent in the nature of body; that one nature has many natures co-suspended from it; and that many natures proceed from the one nature of the universe. It follows also, that the order of souls originates from one first soul, and proceeds with diminution into the multitude of souls. That in the intellectual essence also, there is an intellectual monad ; and that a multitude of intellects proceeds from one intellect, and is converted to it. That a multitude of unities likewise originates from the one which is prior to all things; and that there is an extension of these unities to the one. Hence, after the first one there are unities; after the first intellect, there are intellects; after the first soul there are souls ; and after total nature, there are natures.

Proposition 22 (XXII)

76Every thing which subsists primarily and principally in each order is one, and is neither two, nor more than two, but is only begotten.

77For, if it be possible, let there be two things which thus subsist ; since there will be the same impossibility if there are more than two; or let that which subsists primarily consist of both these. But if indeed it consists of both, it will again be one, and there will not be two things that are first. And if it be one of the two, each will not be first. Nor if both are equally primary, will each have a principal subsistence. For if one of them is primary, but this is not the same with the other, what will it be in that order? For that subsists primarily, which is nothing else than that which it is said to be. But each of these being different is, and at the same time is not that which it is said to be.

78If, therefore, these differ from each other, but they do not primarily

79differ so far as they are that which they are said to be; for this primarily suffers that which is the same; both will not be first, but that of which both participating, are said to subsist primarily.

80COROLLARY..

81From these things it is evident, that what is primarily being is one alone, and that there are not two primary beings, or more than two; that the first intellect is one alone, and that there are not two first intellects; and that the first soul is one. This is also the case with every form, such as the primarily beautiful, and the primarily equal. And in a similar manner in all things. Thus also, with respect to the form of animal, and the form of man, the first of each is one ; for the demonstration is the same.

Proposition 23 (XXIII)

82Concerning the Imparticipable?

83Every imparticipable gives subsistence from itself to things which are participated. And all participated hypostases are extended to imparticipable hyparxes.

84For that which is imparticipable having the relation' of a monad, as subsisting from itself, and not from another, and being exempt from participants, generates things which are able to be participated. For either * it remains of itself barren, and possesses nothing honourable; or it gives something from itself. And that which receives indeed from it participates, but that which is given subsists in a participated manner. But every thing which is something belonging to a certain

85‘ The imparticipable is that which is not consubsistent with a subordinate nature. Thus imparticipable intellect is the intellect which is not consubsistent with soul, but is exempt from it. And imparticipable soul is the soul which is not consubsistent with body. And so in other things.

86thing by which it is participated/ is secondary to that which is similarly present to all things, and which fills all things from itself. For that which is in one thing is not in others. But that which is similarly present to ay things, in order that it may illuminate all things, is not in one thing, but is prior to all things. For it is either in all things, or in one of all, or it is prior to all. * But that indeed which is in all things being distributed into all, will again require another thing which may unite that which is distributed. And all things will no longer participate of the same thing, but this of one thing, and that of another, the one being divided. But if it is in one of all things, it will no longer be common to all, but to one thing. Hence if it is common to things able to participate, and is common to all, it will be prior to all. But this is imparticipable.

Proposition 24 (XXIV)

87Every thing which participates is inferior to that which is participated ; and that which is participated is inferior to that which is imparticipable.

88For that which participates, being imperfect prior to participation, but becoming perfect through participation, is entirely secondary to that which is participated, so far as it is perfect by participating. For so far as it was imperfect, it is inferior to that which it participates, which makes it to be perfect. That however which is participated since it belongs to a certain thing, and not to all things, is again allotted an hyparxis subordinate to that which is something belonging to all things, and not to a certain thing. For the latter is more allied to the cause of all; but the former is less allied to it.

89The imparticipable, therefore, is the leader of things which are participated ; but the latter are the leaders of participants. For, in short, the imparticipable is one prior to the many; but that which is participated

90in the many, is one and at the same time not one; and every thing which participates is not one, and at the same time one.

Proposition 25 (XXV)

91Concerning the Perfect.

92Every thing perfect proceeds to the generation of those things which it is able to produce, imitating the one principle of all.

93For as that on account of its own goodness, unically gives subsistence to all beings; for the good and the one are the same, so that the boniform is the same with the unical; thus also those things which are posterior to the first, on account of their perfection, hasten to generate beings inferior to their own essence. For perfection is a certain portion of the good, and the perfect, so far as it is perfect, imitates the good. But the good gives subsistence to all things. So that the perfect likewise, is productive according to nature of those things which it is able to produce. And that indeed which is more perfect, by how much the more perfect it is, by so much the more numerous are the progeny of which it is the cause. For that which is more perfect, participates in a greater degree of the good. It is, therefore, nearer to the good. But this being the case, it is nearer to the cause of all. And thus, it is the cause of a greater number of effects. That, however, which is more imperfect, by how much the more imperfect it is, by so much the less numerous are the effects of which it is the cause. For being more remote from that which produces every thing, it gives subsistence to fewer effects. For to that which gives subsistence to, or adorns, or perfects, or connects, or vivifies, or fabricates, all things, that nature is more allied which produces a greater number of each of these; but that is more remote which produces a less number of each.

94«. COROLLARY.

95From these things it is evident, that the nature which is most remote from the principle of all, is unprolific, and is not the cause of any thing.

96For if it generated a certain thing, and had something posterior to itself, it is evident that it would no longer be most remote, but that which it produced would be more remote than itself, from the principle of all things, but it would be nearer to productive power, and besides^ this, would imitate the cause which is productive of all beings.

97T>ROPOSITION XXVI.

98Every cause which is productive of other things, itself abiding in itself, produces the natures posterior to itself, and such as are successive.

99For if it imitates the one , but that immoveably gives subsistence to things posterior to itself, every thing which produces will possess in a „ similar manner the cause of productive energy. But the one gives subsistence to things immoveably. For if through motion, the motion will be in it, and being moved, it will no longer be the one , in consequence of being changed from the one. But if motion subsists together with it, it will also be from the one , and either there will be a progression to infinity, or the one will produce immoveably; and every thing which produces will imitate the producing cause of all things. For every where, from that which is primarily, that which is not primarily derives its subsistence; so that the nature which is productive of certain things originates from that which is productive of all things. Hence every producing cause produces subsequent natures from itself. And while productive natures abide in themselves undiminished, secondary natures are produced from them. For that which is in any respect diminished, cannot abide such as it is.

Proposition 27 (XXVII)

100Every producing cause, on account of its perfection, and abundance of power, is productive of secondary natures.

101For if it produced not on account of the perfect, but through a defect

102according to power, it would not b.e able to preserve its ownorder immoveable. For that which imparts existence to. another thing through defect and imbecility, imparts subsistence to it, through its. own mutation and change in quality. But every thing which produces remains such as it is, and in consequence of thus remaining, that which is posterior to'it* proceeds into existence. Hence, being full and perfect, it gives subsistence to secondary natures immoveably and without diminution, it being that which it is, and neither being changed into them, nor diminished. For that which is. produced, is not a distribution into parts of the producing cause; since this is. neither appropriate to the generating energy, nor to generating causes. Nor is it a transition. For it does not become the matter of that which proceeds; since it remains such as it is, and that which is produced is different from it. Hence that which generates is firmly established undiminished ; through prolific power multiplies itself; and from itself imparts secondary hypostases.

Proposition 28 (XXVIII)

103Every producing cause gives subsistence to thing} similar to itself, prior to such as are dissimilar.

104For since that which produces is necessarily more excellent than that which is produced, they can never be simply the same with each other, and equal in power. But if they are not the same and equal, but different and unequal, they are either entirely separated from each other, or they are both united and separated. If, however, they are entirely separated, they will not accord with each other, and no where will that which proceeds from a cause sympathize with it. Hence neither will one of these participate of the other, being entirely different from it. For that which is participated, gives communion to its participant, with reference to that of which it participates. Moreover, it is necessary that the thing caused should participate of its cause, as from thence possessing its essence.

105*' Instead of prr' oorto here, it is necewarytoread jmt* mvto.

106But if that which is produced, is partly separated from and partly united to its producing cause, if indeed, it suffers each of these equally, it will equally participate and not participate. So that after the same manner, it will both have essence and not have it from the producing cause. And if it is more separated from than united to it, the thing generated will be more foreign than allied to that by which it is generated, will be more unadapted than adapted to it, and be more deprived of, than possess sympathy with it. If, therefore, the things which proceed from causes are allied to them according to their very being, have sympathy with them, are naturally suspended from them, and aspire after contact with them, desiring good, and obtaining the object of their desire through the cause of their existence,—-if this be the case, it is evident that things produced are itt a greater degree united to their producing causes, than separated front them. Things, however, which are more united, are mote similar than dissimilar to the natures to which they are especially United. Every producing cause, therefore, gives subsistence to things similar to itself prior to such as are dissimilar.

Proposition 29 (XXIX)

107Every progression is effected through a similitude of secondary to first natures.

108For if that which produces, gives subsistence to similars prior to dissimilars, the similitude derived from the producing causes will give subsistence to the things produced. For similars are rendered similar through similitude, and not through dissimilitude. If, therefore, progression in its diminution preserves a [certain] sameness of that which is generated with that which generates, and exhibits that which is posterior to the generator such in a secondary degree, as the generator is primarily, it will have its subsistence through similitude.

Proposition 30 (XXX)

109Every thing which is produced from a certain thing without a medium,, abides in its producing cause, and proceeds from it.

110For if every progression is effected, while primary natures remain permanent, and is accomplished through similitude, similars being constituted prior to dissimilars,—if this be the case, that which' is produced will in a certain respect abide in its producing cause. For that which entirely proceeds, will have nothing which is the same with the abiding cause, but will be perfectly separated from it, and will not have any thing common with and united to it. Hence it will abide in its cause, in the same manner as that also abides in itself. If, however, it abides, but does not proceed, it will in no respect differ from its cause, nor will it, while that abides, be generated something different from it For if it is something different it is separated and apart from its cause* If, however, it is apart, but the cause abides, it will proceed from the eause, in order that while it abides, it may be separated from it. So far therefore, as that which is produced has something which is the same with the producing 1 cause, it abides in it; but so far as it is different, it proceeds from it. Being, however, similar, it is in a certain respect at once both the same and different. Hence, it abides, and at the same time proceeds, and it is neither of these without the other.

Proposition 31 (XXXI)

111Every thing which proceeds from a certain thing essentially, is converted to that from which it proceeds.

112For if it should proceed indeed, but should not return to the cause of this progression, it would not aspire after its cause. For every thing: which desires is converted to the object of its desire. Moreover, every.

113thing aspires after good, and to each thing the attainment of it is through the proximate cause. Every thing, therefore, aspires after its cause. For well-being is derived to every thing from that through which its existence is derived. But appetite is first directed to that through which well-being is derived. And conversion is to that to which appetite is first directed.

Proposition 32 (XXXII)

114All conversion is effected through the similitude of the things converted to that to which they are converted.

115For every thing which is converted, hastens to be conjoined with its cause, 1 and aspires after communion and colligation with it. But similitude binds all things together, just as dissimilitude separates and disjoins all things. If, therefore, conversion is a certain communion and contact, but all communion and all contact are through similitude,—if this be the case, all conversion will be effected through similitude.

Proposition 33 (XXXIII)

116Every thing which proceeds from a certain thing and is converted to it, has a circular energy. '

117For if it reverts to that from which it proceeds, it conjoins the end to the beginning, and the motion is one and continued one motion being from that which abides, but the other being directed to the abiding cause. Hence all things proceed in a circle from causes to causes; greater and less circles being continually formed of conversions, some of which are to the natures [immediately} placed above the things that are converted, but others are to still higher natures, and so on as far as tothe principle of all things. For all things proceed from this principle, and are converted to it.

Proposition 34 (XXXIV)

118Every tiling which is converted according to nature, makes its conversion to that, from which also it had the progression of its proper hypostasis.

119For if it is converted according to nature, it will have an essential desire of that to which it is converted. But if this be the case, the* whole being of it is suspended from that to which it makes an essential conversion, and it is essentially similar to it. Hence also it lias a natural sympathy with, as being allied to the essence of it. If this, however, be the case, either the being ol both is the same, or the one is derived from the other, or both arc allotted similitude from a certain other one. But if the being of both is the same, how is the one naturally converted to the other? And if both are from a certain one, it will be according to nature for both to be converted to that one. It remains, therefore, that the one must derive its being from the other. But if this be the case, the progression will be from that to which the conversion is according to nature.

120COROLI.ABT.

121From these things, therefore, it is evident that intellect is the object of desire to all things, that all things proceed from intellect, and that the whole world though it is perpetual possesses its essence from intellect. For it is not prevented from proceeding from intellect because it is perpetual. For neither because it is always arranged is it not converted to intellect, but it always proceeds, is essentially perpetual, and is always converted, and indissoluble according to order.

Proposition 35 (XXXV)

122Every thing caused, abides in, proceeds from, and returns, or is converted to, its cause.

123For if it alone abided* it would in no respect differ from its cause, being without separation and distinction from it. For progression is accompa* nied with separation. But if it alone proceeded, it would be unconjoined and deprived of sympathy with its cause, having no communication with it whatever. And if it were alone converted, how can that which Has not its essence from the cause, be essentially converted to that which is foreign to its nature ? But if it should abide and proceed, but should not be converted, how will there be a natural desire to every thing of wellbeing, and of good, and an excitation to its generating cause? And if it should proceed and be converted, but should not abide, how being separated from its cause will it hasten to be conjoined with it ? For it was unconjoined prior to its departure; since if it had been conjoined, it would entirely have abided in it. But if it should abide and be converted, but should hot proceed, how can that which is not' separated be able to revert to its cause ? For every thing which is converted resembles that which is resolved into the nature from which it is essentially divided. It is necessary however, either that it should abide alone, or be converted alone, or alone proceed, or that the extremes should be bound-to each other, or that the medium should be conjoined with each of the extremes, or that all should be conjoined. Hence it remains that every thing must abide in its cause, proceed from, and be converted to it.

Proposition 36 (XXXVI)

124Of all things which are multiplied according to progression, the first are more perfect than the second, the second than those posterior to them, and after the same manner successively.

125For if progressions separate productions from their causes, and there are diminutions of things secondary with respect to such as are first,' it follows that 6rst natures in proceeding, are more conjoined with their causes, being [as it were,] germinations from them. But second natures

126PIJOP. XXXVII. XXXVIII.

127are more remote from their causes, and in a similar manner such as are successive. Things however, which are nearer and more allied to their causes, are more perfect. For causes are more perfect than things caused. But things which are more remote art more imperfect, being dissimilar to their causes.

Proposition 37 (XXXVII)

128Of all things which subsist according to conversion, the first are more imperfect than the second, and the second than those that follow; but the last are the most perfect. 9 _

129For if conversions are effected in a circle, and conversion is directed to that from which progression is derived, but progression is from that which is most perfect, hence conversion is directed to the most perfect. And if ^ conversion first begins from that in which progression terminates, but progression terminates in that which is most imperfect, conversion will begin from the most imperfect. Hence in things which subsist according to conversion, such as are most imperfect are the first, but such as are most perfect, the last.

Proposition 38 (XXXVIII)

130Every thing which proceeds from certain numerous causes, is converted through as many causes as those are through which it proceeds, and all conversion is through the same things as those through which progression is effected.

131For since each of these takes place through similitude, that indeed which has a transition immediately from a certain thing, is also immediately converted to it. For the similitude here is without a medium. But that which requires a medium in proceeding, requires also a medium according to conversion. For it is necessary that each should be effected with reference to the same thing. Hence the conversion will be first to the medium, and afterwards to that which is better than the medium.

132Through such things therefore as being is derived to each thing, through so many well-being also is derived, and vice versa.

Proposition 39 (XXXIX)

133Every being is either alone essentially converted, or vitally, or also gnostically.

134For either it alone possesses being from its cause, or life together with being, or it likewise receives from thence a gnostic power. So far therefore as it alone is, it makes an essential conversion, but so far as it lives, a vital, and so far as it likewise knows, a gnostic conversion. For in such a way as it proceeded from its cause, such also is the mode of its conversion to it, and the measures of its conversion are defined by the measures according to progression. Desire therefore is to some things according to being alone, this desire being an aptitude to the participation of causes; but to others it is according to life, being a motion to more excellent natures; and to others, it is according to knowledge, being a co-sensation of the goodness of causes.

Proposition 41 (XLI)

135Every thing which is in another is alone produced by another; but every thing which is in itself is self-subsistent.

136For that which is in another thing and is indigent of a subject* can never be generative of itself. For that which is naturally adapted to* generate itself, doe3 not require another seat, because it is contained by itself, and is preserved in itself apart from a subject. But that which abides, and; is able to be established in itself, is productive of itself, itself proceeding into itself, and being connective of itself. And thus it is in itself, as the thing caused in its cause. For it is not in itself, as in place* or as in a subject. For place is different from that which is in place, and that which is in a subject is different from the subject. But this which is in itself is the same with that in which it is inherent; for it is self-subsistent. And it is in such a manner in itself, as that which is from a cause is in the cause.

Proposition 42 (XLII)

137Every thing self-subsistent is convertive to itself.

138For if it proceeds from itself, it will also make a conversion to itself. For to that from which progression is derived, to that a conversion co-ordinate to the progression is directed. For if it alone proceeded from itself, but having proceeded was not converted to itself, it would never aspire after its proper good, and that which it is able to impart to itself. Every cause however is able to impart to that which proceeds from it, 1 together with the essence which it gives, well-being conjoined with this essence. Hence that which is self-subsistent will impart this to itself. This therefore is the proper good to that which is self-subsistent. And hence this will not be the object of desire to that which is not* converted to itself. But not desiring this, it will not obtain it, and not obtaining it, it will be imperfect, and not sufficient to itself. If, however, self-sufficiency and perfection pertain to any thing, they must pertain to that which is self-subsistent. Hence it will obtain its proper good, and will, be converted to itself.

Proposition 43 (XLIII)

139Every thing which is convertive to itself is self-subsistent.

140For if it is converted to itself according to nature, it is perfect in the conversion to itself, and will possess essence from itself. For to every thing, essential progression is from that to which conversion according to nature is directed. If therefore, it imparts well-being to itself, it will likewise undoubtedly impart being to itself, and will be the lord of its own hypostasis. Hence, that which is able to revert to itself is selfsubsistent.

Proposition 44 (XLIV)

141Every thing which is convertive to itself according to energy, is also converted to itself essentially. >

142For if it is capable of being converted to itself in energy, but is without conversion in its essence, it will be more excellent according to energy than according to esseuce, the former being convertive, but the latter without conversion. For that which depends on itself, is better than that which alone depends on another. And that which has a power of preserving itself, is more perfect than that which is alone preserved by another. If therefore, it is convertive to itself according to the energy proceeding from essence,' it will also be allotted a convertive essence, so that it will not alone energize towards itself, but will .depend on itself, and will be contained, connected, and perfected by itself.

Proposition 45 (XLV)

143Every thing self-subsistent is unbegotten.

144For if it is generated, because generated indeed, it will be imperfect of Itself, and will be indigent of perfection from another. Because, however, it produces itself, it is perfect and sufficient to itself. For every thing generated is perfected by another which imparts generation to it not yet* existing. For generation is a path from the imperfect to its contrary the perfect. But if any thing produces itself, it is always perfect, being always present with the essence of itself, or rather being inherent in that which is perfective of essence.

145PROPOSmON XLVI.

146Every thing self-subsistent is incorruptible.

147For if it should be corrupted, it would desert itself, and would be without itself. This however is impossible. • For being one thing, it is at the same time cause and the thing caused. But every thing which is corrupted, departing from the cause of itself is corrupted. For so far as it adheres to that which contains, connects and preserves it, it is connected and preserved. But that which is self-subsistent never leaves its cause, because it does not desert itself; for it is the cause of itself. Every thing therefore self-subsistent is incorruptible.

Proposition 47 (XLVII)

148Every thing self-subsistent, is impartible and simple.

149For if it is partible, being self-subsistent, it will constitute itself partible, 1 and the whole will be converted to itself, and all will be in all itself. This however is impossible. Hence that which is self-subsistent is impartible. But it is also simple. For if a composite, one thing in it will be less, but another more excellent, and the more will be derived from the less excellent, and the less from the more excellent, if the whole proceeds from itself. Farther still, it would not be sufficient to itself, being indigent of the elements of itself of which it consists. Every thing therefore, which is self-subsistent, is simple.

Proposition 48 (XLVIII)

150Concerning the perpetual , in order to demonstrate that the world is

151perpetual.

152Every thing which is not perpetual, is either a composite, or subsists in another.

153For either it is dissoluble into those things of which it consists, and is entirely composed from the things into which it is dissolved, or it is indigent of a subject, and leaving the subject it departs into non-entity. But if it is simple in itself, it will be indissoluble, and incapable of being dissipated.

Proposition 49 (XLIX)

154Every thing self-subsistent is perpetual.

155For there are two modes according to which it is necessary a thing should not be perpetual; the one arising from composition, and the other from a subsistence in something else fas in a subject]. That which is self-subsistent however, is neither a composite, but simple, nor in another, but in itself. Hence it is perpetual.

Proposition 51 (LI)

156Every thing self-subsisteut, is essentially exempt from the natures which are measured by time.

157For if that which is self-subsistent is unbegotten, it will not according to existence be measured by time. For generation is conversant with the nature which is measured by time. Hence nothing self-subsistent has its being in time.

158Hence) they are ready by every trifling impulse) to remain as they are impelled; to rush from the embraces of bound) and hasten into multitude and non-entity. So that whatever becomes corporeal in an eminent degree) as falling, fast into non-entity, has but little power of recalling itself into one. And on this account ponderous and vehement concussions are attended with ruin, when by mutual rushing one thing impels another. But when debility runs against debility, the one is valid against the other, in the same manner as non-entity rushing on non-entity. And this we think a sufficient confutation of their opinion, who only place being in the genus of body, persuaded by the testimony of impulses and concussions, and the phantasms perceived through the senses, which testify that sense is the only standard of truth. Such as these are affected in a manner similar to those in a dream, who imagine that the perceptions of sleep are true. For sense is alone the employment of the dormant soul; since as much of the soul as is merged in body, so much of it sleeps. But a true elevation, and true vigilance are a resurrection from, and not with the dull mass of body. For indeed, a resurrection with body, is only a transmigration from sieep to sleep, and from dream to dream, like a man passing in the dark from bed to bed. But that elevation is perfectly true, which entirely rises from the dead weight of bodies. For these possessing a nature repugnant to soul, possess something opposite to essence. And this is farther evident, from their generation, and their continual flowing and decay, which are properties entirely foreign from the nature of being substantial and real.”

Proposition 52 (LII)

159Every thing eternal is a whole which subsists at once. And whether it has its essence alone eternal, it will possess the whole at once present, nor will it have this thing pertaining to itself now subsisting, but that afterwards which as yet is not; but as much as is possible it now possesses the whole without diminution, and without extension. Or whether it has its energy as well as its essence at once present, it possesses this also collectively, abiding in the same measure of perfection, and as it were, fixed immoveably and without transition according to one and the same boundary.

160For if the eternal, as the name denotes, is perpetual being, but to be sometimes, 1 and to subsist in becoming to be, are different from perpetual being, it is not proper that it should have one thing prior and another posterior. For if it had, it would be generation, and not being. But where there is neither prior nor posterior, nor was and will be, but alone fo be, and this a whole, there every thing subsists at once that which it is. The same thing also takes place with respect to the energy of that which Is eternal.

161COROLLA ET.

162From this it is evident that eternity is the cause to wholes of their existence as wholes, since every thing which is eternal either according to essence, or according to energy, has the whole of its essence or energy present with itself.

Proposition 53 (LIII)

163Concerning Eternity and Eternal Natures.

164Eternity subsists prior to all eternal natures, and time exists prior to every thing which subsists according to time.

1651 wot* is omitted in the original*

166For if every where the natures which are participated are prior to their participants, and imparticipables are prior to participated natures, it is evident that the eternal is one thing, the eternity which is in the eternal, another, and eternity itself, another. And the first of these indeed subsists as a participant, the second as a thing participated, and the third as an imparticipate. That also which is in time is one thing; for it is a participant. The time which is in this is another thing; for it is participated. And the time prior to this is another thing; for it is imparticipable. Every where also, that which is imparticipable is in all things the same. But that which is participated is in those things only by which it is participated. For there are many eternal, and many temporal natures in all of which eternity subsists according to participation. The time also which is in temporal natures subsists in a distributed manner; but the time which they participate is indivisible. And there is one time prior to both these. Eternity itself likewise is an eternity of eternities, and time itself is a time of times; and they give subsistence, the one to participated eternity, but the other to participated time.

Proposition 54 (LIV)

167Every eternity is the measure of eternal natures, and every time is the measure of things in time; and these are the only two measures of life and motion in beings.

168. For every thing which measures, either measures according to a part, or it measures the whole at once when it is adapted to that which is measured. That which measures, therefore, according to the whole is eternity; but that which measures according to parts is time. Hence, ♦ there are only two measures, the one of things eternal, but the other of things in time.

Proposition 55 (LV)

169Every thing which subsists according to time, either subsists through the whole of time, or has its hypostasis once in a part of time.

170For if all progressions are through similitude, and things more similar to first natures subsist in union with them prior to such as are dissimilar, but it is impossible for things which are generated in a part of time to be conjoined with eternal natures, (for as being generated they differ from first natures which are self-subsistent,' and as existing once, they are separated from things which always exist, but the media between these, are such things as are partly similar and partly dissimilar to them)— this being the case, the medium between things which are once generated, and those that exist always, is either that which is always becoming to be, or that which is once, or that which is not truly being. It is however impossible it should be that which once only truly is. And that which is once not truly being is the same with that which is becoming to be. Hence the medium is not that which is once only. It remains, therefore, that the medium between both is that which is always becoming to be, being conjoined indeed with the worse of the two through becoming to be, but through subsisting always, imitating an eternal nature,

171COROLLARY,

172From these things it is evident that perpetuity is twofold, the one indeed being eternal, but the other subsisting according to time. The one also being a stable, but the other a flowing perpetuity. And the one indeed having its being collected, and the whole subsisting at once, but the other diffused, and expanded according to temporal extension. And the one being a whole of itself, but the other consisting of parts, each of which is separate, according to prior and posterior,

Proposition 56 (LVI)

173Every thing which is produced by secondary natures, is produced in a greater degree by prior and more causal natures, by whom such as are secondary were also produced.

174For if that which is secondary has the whole of its essence from that

175' It is necessary here to supply the word cwtvirorruTuv. •

176which is prior to it, its power of producing is also derived from thence ; for powers in producing causes are essentially productive, and give completion to the essence of them. But if it is allotted the power of producing from a superior cause, it will possess from that its existence as the cause of things of which it is the cause, and its power of giving subsistence to other things will be measured from thence. If, however, this be the case, the things proceeding from it are effects through that which is prior to it. For the one perfects a cause, and the other the thing caused. But if this be the case, the thing caused is from thence rendered such as it is.

177Moreover, that it is also in a greater degree perfected from thence is evident. For if that which is first gives to that which is second the cause of producing, it will primarily possess this cause; and on this account that which is secondary generates, receiving from thence a secondary generative power. If, however, the one becomes productive through participation, but the other in a way superior to participation and primarily, that will be in a greater degree a cause, which imparts generative power to another thing proximate to its own nature.

Proposition 57 (LVII)

178Every cause both energizes prion to the thing caused, and gives subsistence to a greater number of effects posterior to it.

179For so far as it is cause, it is more perfect and more powerful than that which is posterior to it, and in consequence of this is the cause of a greater number of effects. For it is the province of a greater power to produce more, of an equal power to produce equal, and of a less power to produce a less number of effects. And the power which is able to effect greater things among similars, is also capable of effecting such as are less. But that which is able to effect such as are less, is not necessarily capable of producing such as are greater. If, therefore, the cause is more powerful, it is productive of more numerous effects.

180Moreover, such effects as the thing caused is uble to produce, the

181cause is in a greater degree able to produce. For every thing which is produced by secondary natures, is in a greater degree produced by such as are prior and more causal. The cause, therefore, gives subsistence together with the thing caused to such effects as the thing caused is naturally adapted to produce. But if likewise it produces prior to it, it is indeed evident that it energises prior to the thing caused, according to the energy which is productive of it. Every cause, 'therefore, energizes prior to the thing caused, and together with it, and posterior to it, gives subsistence to other things.

182COROLLARY.

183Hence, it is evident, that of such things as soul is the cause, intellect also is the cause; but that soul is not also the cause of such things as intellect is the cause. But intellect energizes prior to soul. And such things as soul imparts to secondary natures, intellect also imparts in a greater degree. Likewise, when soul no longer energizes, intellect imparts by illumination the gifts of itself to those things to which soul does not impart herself. For that which is inanimate, so far as it participates of form, participates of intellect, and the production of intellect. Moreover, of such things as intellect is the cause, the good also is the cause; but not vice versa. For the privations of forms subsist from the good ; since all things are from thence. But intellect being form, does not give subsistence to privation.

Proposition 58 (LVIII)

184Every thing which is produced by many, is more compounded than that which is produced by fewer causes.

185For if every cause imparts something to that which proceeds from it, more numerous causes -will impart a greater number of gifts, but less numerous causes a less number. Hence, of participants some will consist of a greater number of things, but others, of a less number, of which each participates, some indeed through a progression from a

186greater number of causes, but others from a less. Those, however, which proceed from a greater number of causes are more compounded, but those from a less number of the same causes, are more simple. Every thing, therefore, which is produced by a greater number of causes, is more compounded, but that which is produced by a less number is more simple. For the more compounded participates of those things of which the more simple participates, but the contrary to this is not true.

Proposition 59 (LIX)

187Every thing which is essentially simple, is either better or worse than composite natures.

188For if such beings as are the extremes of things are produced by fewer and more simple causes, but such as are in the middle, from a greater number of causes, the latter indeed will be composites, but of the former, some are more simple according to that which is better, but other? according to that which is worse. That the extremes, however, are produced by fewer causes is evident, because such natures as are higher begin to produce prior to such as are subordinate, and extend beyond them, to things to which subordinate natures do not proceed through a diminution of power. For on this account also, the last of things, Q. e. matter] is most simple, as well as the first of things, because it proceeds from the first alone. With respect to simplicity, however, one kind subsists according to that which is better than all composition, but another according to that which is worse. And there is the same reasoning in all things,

Proposition 60 (LX)

189Every thing which is the cause of a greater number of effects, is better than that which is allotted a power of producing a less number, and which produces the parts of those things to the wholes of which the other gives subsistence.

190For if the one is the cause of a less, hut the other of a greater number of effects, but the former are parts of the latter, that which gives subsistence to a greater number of effects, will produce all that the other produces; but not vice versa. Hence the former of these two is more powerful and more comprehensive. For as that which proceeds is to that which proceeds, so is one productive power to another, when assumed with reference to each other. For that which is able to effect a greater number of things, possesses a greater and more total power. But this is nearer to the cause of all things. That however, which is nearer to this cause, is in a greater degree good, just as the cause of all is the good itself. Hence, that which is the cause-of a greater number of effects, is essentially more excellent than that which produces a less number.

Proposition 61 (LXI)

191Every power which is impartible is greater, but when divided is less.

192For if it is divided it proceeds into multitude. And if this be the case, it becomes more remote firom the one. But in consequence of this it is able to effect a less number of things, through departing from the one , and the unity which contains it, and will be imperfect, since the good of every thing consists in union.

Proposition 62 (LXII)

193Every multitude which is nearer to the one t is less in quantity than things more remote firom it, but is greater in power.

194For that which is nearer to is more similar to the one. But the one gives subsistence to all things, without having any multitude in itself. Hence that which is more similar to it, bang the cause of a greater

195number of effects, since the one is the cause of all things, has more the form of unity, and is more impartible, because that is one . As therefore, that which is less multiplied, is more allied to the one y so likewise as being allied to the cause of all things, it is productive of a greater number of effects. Hence it is more powerful.

196COROLLARY.

197From these things it is evident, that there are more corporeal natures than souls ; more souls than intellectual natures ; and more intellects than divine unities. And there is the same reasoning in all things.

Proposition 63 (LXIII)

198Every thing which is imparticipable gives subsistence to two-fold orders of participated natures, one indeed in things which sometimes participate, but the other in things which always and connascently participate.

199For that which is always participated, is more similar to the imparticipable than that which is sometimes participated. Hence, before the imparticipable establishes that which is sometimes, it will establish that which is always participable; and which by being participated differs from that which is posterior to it, but by the always is more allied and more similar to the imparticipable. Nor are there alone things which are sometimes participated; for prior to these are the natures which are always participated, through which these also are bound to imparticipables according to a certain well ordered progression. Nor are there alone things which are sometimes participated. For these possessing an inextinguishable power, since they are always, are prolific of other things which are sometimes participated, and as faf as to these the dim}*

200COROLLARY.

201From hence it is evident that of the unions proceeding from the one , and which illuminate beings, some are always, but others sometimes participated. Intellectual participations, likewise, are in a Similar manner two-fold, as also are the animations of souls, and the participations of other forms. For beauty, similitude, permanency, and sameness, being imparticipable, are participated by natures which always participate, and secondarily by those that sometimes participate according to the same order.

Proposition 64 (LXIV)

202Every monad which ranks as a principle, gives subsistence to a twofold number; one indeed of self-perfect hypostases, but the other of illuminations which possess their hypostasis in other things.

203For if progression is according to diminution, through things appropriate to producing causes, perfect natures will proceed from the allperfect, and through these as media, imperfect natures will proceed in a well-ordered progression, so that some indeed will be self-perfect hypostases, but others will be imperfect. And these latter will become the forms of participants. For being imperfect, they will be indigent of subjects in their very nature. But the self-perfect hypostases will produce things which participate of themselves. For being perfect, they will indeed fill these from themselves, and establish them in themselves. But they will require nothing of inferior natures to their own subsistence. Self-perfect hypostases, therefore, through their separation into multitude, are indeed diminished with respect to their principal monad ; but through * their self-perfect hyparxis, they are in a certain respect assimilated to it. But imperfect hypostases, in consequence of subsisting in other things, are remote from that which subsists from itself, and through their imperfection are separated from that which perfects all things. Progres-

204sions, however, are through similars, as far as to natures which are entirely dissimilar. Every monad, therefore, which ranks as a principle, gives subsistence to a two-fold number.

205COROLLARY.

206From these things it is evident, that of the unities, some are self-perfect proceeding from the one , but others are illuminations of unions. And with respect to intellects, that some of them are self-perfect essences, but others belong to animated natures, being only the images of souls. And thus, neither is every union a God, but this is true of a self-perfect unity alone, nor is every intellectual peculiarity an intellect, but an essential peculiarity alone [is entitled to this appellation], nor is every illumination of soul a soul, but there are also images of souls.

Proposition 65 (LXV)

207Every thing which has any subsistence whatever, either subsists according to cause, so as to have the form of a principle, or according to hyparxis, or according to participation, after the manner of an image.

208For either that which is produced is seen in that which produces, as preexisting in cause, because every cause antecedently comprehends in itself the thing caused, being that primarily which the thing caused is secondarily. Or that which produces is seen in that which is produced. For the latter participating of the former, exhibits in itself secondarily that which the producing cause is primarily. Or each thing is beheld in its own order, and is neither seen in the cause nor in the effect. For the cause subsists more excellently than that which exists [out of the cause]. But that which is in the effect is less excellent than that which exists out of the cause Cbut is not in any thing else]. It is, however, necessary there should be that which after this manner is. But every thing subsists according to hyparxis in its own order. -

209I’KOP. LXVi. LXVlIi

Proposition 66 (LXVI)

210All beings with reference to each-other, are either wholes, or parts, or the same, or different.

211For either some of them comprehend, but the rest are comprehended, or they neither comprehend, nor are comprehended. And they either suffer something which is the same, as participating of one thing, or they are separated from each other. But if they comprehend, they will be wholes, and if they are comprehended, parts. If also many things parti* cipate of one thing, they are the same according to this one. But if they are alone many things, so far as they are many they will be different from each other.

Proposition 67 (LXVII)

212Every wholeness (oxonjs) is either prior to parts, or consists of parts, or is in a part.

213For the form of each thing is either surveyed in its cause, and we call that which subsists in its cause a whole prior to parts. Or it is seen in the parts which participate of it; and this in a two-fold respect. For it is either seen in all the parts together, and this is a whole consisting of parts, any part of which being absent diminishes the whole. Or it is seen in each of the parts, so that the part also becomes according to participation a whole; which makes the part to be a whole partially. The whole, therefore, which is according to hyparxis consists of parts. But the whole which is prior to parts is according to cause. And the whole which is in a part is according to participation. For this also according to an ultimate diminution is a whole, so far as it imitates the whole which consists of parts, when it is not any casual part, but is capable of being assimilated to the whole, of which the parts also are wholes.

214PROP, LXVIII. LXIX.

Proposition 68 (LXVIII)

215Every whole which is in a part, is a part of that whole which consists

216For if it is a part, it is a part of a certain whole. And it is either a part of the whole which it contains, according to which it is said to be a whole in a part. But thus it will be a part of itself, the part will be equal to the whole, and each will be the same. Or it is a part of a certain other whole. And if of some other, it is either the only part of that, and thus again, it will in no respect differ from the whole, being one part of one thing. Or it is a part in conjunction with another part. - For of every whole the parts are more than one, and that will be a whole from many parts, of which it consists. And thus the whole which is in a part, is a part of the whole which consists of parts.

Proposition 69 (LXIX)

217Every whole which consists of parts, participates of the wholeness which is prior to parts.

218For if it consists of parts, the whole is passive [i. e. the whole participates of another whole]. For the parts becoming one, are passive to a whole on account of their union, and the whole subsists in parts which are not wholes. But the imparticipable subsists prior to every tiling which is .participated. The imparticipable wholeness, therefore, subsists prior to that which is participated. Hence, there is a certain form of wholeness, prior to the whole which consists of parts, which is not passive to a whole, but is wholeness itself, and from which the wholeness consisting of parts is derived. For the whole indeed, which consists of parts, subsists in many places, and in many things, in various ways. It is, however, necessary that there should be a monad essentially of all totalities. For

219neither is each of these wholes genuine, since it is indigent of parts that are not wholes, of which it consists. Nor is the whole which is in a certain thing capable of being the cause of wholeness to all other things. Hence, that which is the cause to all wholes of their being wholes, is prior to parts. For if this also consisted of parts, it would be a certain whole, and not simply whole. And again, this would be from another whole, and so on, to infinity; or it will subsist on account of that which is prima* rily a whole, and which is not a whole from parts, but is a wholeness.

Proposition 70 (LXX)

220Every thing which is more total among principal causes, illuminates participants, prior to partial natures, and when these fail, still continues to impart its illuminations.

221For it begins its energy upon secondary natures prior to that which is posterior to it, and is present in conjunction with the presence of it. When likewise that which is posterior to it no longer energizes, it is still present, and that which is more causal continues to energize. And this not only in different subjects, but likewise in each of the natures that sometimes participate. Thus it is necessary, for instance, that being should be first generated, afterwards animal, and afterwards man. And man, indeed, is not, if the rational power is absent, but there is still animal, breathing and sentient. And again, life failing, being remains. For though a thing does not live, yet it has existence. And there is a similar reasoning in all things.

222The cause, however, of this is, that the more causal nature being more efficacious, energizes on the thing caused * prior [to that which is less causal]. For the thing caused participates first of that which is more powerful. And that which is secondary again energizing, that which is more powerful energizes with it. Because every thing which the secondary nature produces, that which is more causal produces likewise in

223conjunction with it. When the former also fails, the latter is still present. For the communication of the more powerful cause, operating in a greater degree, leaves that which participates it, posterior to the energy of the less powerful cause. For through the communication of the secondary nature, it corroborates its own illumination.

Proposition 71 (LXXI)

224All things which among principal causes possess a more total and higher order in their effects, according to the illuminations proceeding from them, become in a certain respect subjects to the communications of more partial causes. And the illuminations indeed, from higher causes, receive the progressions from secondary causes; but the latter are established in the former. And thus some participations precede others, and some representations extend after others, beginning from on high, to the same subject, more total causes having a prior energy, but such as are more partial, supplying their participants with their communications, posterior to the energies of more total causes.

225For if more causal natures energize prior to such as are secondary on account of exuberance of power, and are present with those that have a more imperfect aptitude, and illuminate them also; but things more subordinate, and which are second in order, are supplied from such as are more causal,—it is evident that the illuminations of superior natures antecedently comprehend that which participates of both these, and give stability to the communications of things subordinate. But these illuminations of superior causes, employ the resemblances of subordinate natures as foundations, and operate on that which'participates of them, the superior causes themselves having a prior energy.

Proposition 72 (LXXII)

226All things which in their participants have the relation of a subject, proceed from more perfect and total causes.

227For the causes of a greater number of effects, are more powerful and total, and are nearer to the one than the causes of fewer effects. But the natures which give subsistence to such things as are antecedently the subjects of others, are among causes the sources of a greater number of effects.

228COROLLARY.

229From hence it is evident why matter which derives its subsistence from the one , is of itself destitute of form. And why body, though it participates of being, is of itself without the participation of soul. For matter being the subject of all things proceeds from the cause of all. But body being the subject of animation, derives its subsistence from that which is more total than soul, and participates after a certain manner of being.

Proposition 73 (LXXIII)

230Every whole is at the same time a certain being, and participates of being, but not every being is a whole.'

231For either being and whole are the same, or the one is prior, but the other posterior. If, however, a part, so far as it is a part, is being (for a whole is from parts which have a being), yet it is not of itself also a whole. Being, therefore, and whole are not the same. For if this were the case, a part would be a non-entity. But if a part was a non-entity, the whole would have no existence. For every whole is a whole of parts, either as existing prior to them [and therefore causally containing them in itself], or as subsisting in them. But the part not existing, neither is it possible for the whole to exist. If, however, whole is prior to being, every being will immediately be a whole. Again, therefore, there will not be a part. This, however, is impossible. For if the whole is a whole, being the whole of a part, the part also being a part, will be the part of the whole. It remains, therefore, that every whole indeed is being, but that not every being is a whole.

232* «Aoy is omitted is original.

233COROLLARY.

234From these things, it is evident that being which has a primary subsistence is beyond wholeness. For the one indeed, viz. being, is present with a greater number of things ; since to be is present with parts, so tar as they are parts. But the other, viz. wholeness, is present with a less number of things. For that which is the cause of a greater number of effects is more excellent; but the cause of a leSs number is of a subordinate nature, as has been demonstrated.

Proposition 74 (LXXIV)

235livery form is a certain whole; for it consists of many things, each of which gives completion to the form. But not every whole is a form.

236For a particular' thing is a whole and also an individual, so far it is an individual, but neither of them is a form. For every whole consists of parts ; but form is that which may be divided into individual forms. Whole, therefore, is one thing, and form another. And the one is present with many things, but the other with a few. Hence, whole is above the

Proposition 75 (LXXV)

237Every cause which is properly so called, is exempt from its effect.

238For if it is in the effect, it either gives completion to it, or is in a certain respect indigent of it in order to its existence, and thus it will be more imperfect than the thing caused. For being in the effect, it is rather a concause than a cause, and is either a part of that which is generated, or an instrument of the maker. For that which is a part in the thing generated, is more imperfect than the whole. The cause also which is in the effect, is an instrument of generation to the maker, being unable to define of itself the measures of production. Every cause, therefore, which is properly so denominated, if it is more perfect than that which proceeds from it, imparts to its effect the measure of generation, and is exempt from instruments and elements, and in short, from every thing which is called a concause.

Proposition 76 (LXXVI)

239Every thing which is generated from an immoveable cause, has aa immutable hyparxis. But every thing which is generated from a moveable cause, has a mutable hyparxis.

240For if that which makes is entirely immoveable, it does not produce from itself that which is secondary through motion, but by its very being. If, however, this be the case, it has that which proceeds from it concurrent with its own essence. And 'if this also be the case, it will produce as long as it exists. But it exists always, and therefore it always gives subsistence to that which is posterior to itself. Hence, this is always generated from thence, and always is, conjoining with the ever according to energy of the cause, its own ever according to progression. If, however, the cause is moved, that also which is generated from it will be essentially mutable. For that which has its being through motion,

241changes its being when its moveable cause 1 is changed. For if, though produced from motion, it should itself remain immutable, it would be better than its producing cause. This, however, is impossible. It will not, therefore, be immutable. Hence, it will be mutable, and will be essentially moved, imitating the motion of that which gave it subsistence.

Proposition 77 (LXXVII)

242Every thing which is in capacity proceeds from that which is it): energy. And that which is in capacity, proceeds into energy. That also which is in a certain respect in capacity, so far as it is in capacity, is the offspring of that which is in a certain respect in energy. But that which is all things in capacity, proceeds from that which is all things in energy.

243For that which is in capacity is not naturally adapted to produce itself into energy, because it is imperfect. For if being imperfect it should become the cause to itself of perfection, and this in energy, the cause will be more imperfect than that which is produced by it. Hence, that which is in capacity, so far as it is in capacity, will not be the cause to itself of a subsistence in energy. For on this hypothesis, so far as it is imperfect, it would be the cause of perfection; since every thing which is in capacity, so far as it is in capacity, is imperfect, but that which is in energy is perfect. Hence, if that which Mas in capacity becomes in. energy, it will have its perfection from something else. And this will either be in capacity; but thus again the imperfect will be generative of the perfect; or it will be in energy, and either something else, or this which was in capacity will be that which becomes in energy. But if something else which is in energy produces,'operating according to itsown peculiarity, it will not by being in capacity make that which is im another to be in energy; nor will this which is now made be in energy,,

244* eurm is oaaitted in the original.

245unless it becomes this so far as it was in capacity. It remains, therefore, that from that which is in energy, that which is in capacity must be changed into energy.

Proposition 78 (LXXVIII)

246Every power is either perfect or imperfect.

247For the power which is prolific of energy is perfect. For it makes other things to be perfect through its own energies. That, however, which is perfective of other things is in a greater degree perfect, as being more self-perfect. But the power which is indigent of another that pre-exists in energy, according to which indigence it is something in capacity, is imperfect. For it is indigent of the perfection which is in another, in order that by participating of it, it may become perfect. Hence, such a power as this is of itself imperfect. So that the power of that which is in energy is perfect, being prolific of energy. But the power of that which is in capacity is imperfect, and obtains perfection from the power which is in energy.

Proposition 79 (LXXIX)

248Every thing which is generated, is generated from a two-fold power. *

249For it is requisite that the thing generated should possess aptitude and an imperfect power. And that which makes being in energy 1 that which the thing generated is in capacity, antecedently comprehends a perfect power. For all energy proceeds from inherent power. For if that which makes did not possess power, how could it energize, and produce some-

250* i. e. As the Greek Scholiast bbserves in the margin of this Proposition, from the efficacious cause of that which acts, and the aptitude of that which suffers*

251a The words to toiovy tvtpyuet ov o *vto are wanting in the original*

252thing else? And if that which is generated did not possess power according to aptitude, how could it be generated? For that which makes or acts, makes or acts in that which is able to suffer, but not in any casual thing, and which is not naturally adapted to suffer from the agent.

Proposition 80 (LXXX)

253Every body is naturally adapted of itself to suffer; but every thing incorporeal to act. And the former indeed is essentially inefficacious* but the latter is impassive. That which is incorporeal, however, suffers through its communion with body; just ashodies are able to act through the participation of incorporeals.

254For body, so far as body, is,alone divisible, and through this becomes passive, being entirely partible, and this to infinity. But that which is incorporeal, being simple, is impassive. For neither is that which is impartible, capable of being divided, nor can that be changed in quality which is not compounded. Either, therefore, nothing will be effective, or this must be affirmed of an incorporeal nature, since body, so far as. body, does not act, because it is alone liable to be divided, and to suffer. For every thing which acts has an effective power; so that body, so far as it is body, will not act, but so far as it contains in itself a power of acting. Hence, when it acts, it acts through the participation of power. Moreover, incorporeal natures when they are inherent in bodies*, participate of passions, being divided together with bodies, and enjoying their partible nature, though according to their own essence they are impartible.

Proposition 81 (LXXXI)

255Every thing which is participated in a separable manner, is present with its participant by a certain inseparable power which it inserts in it.

256For if it is itself present with the participant in a separate manner, and is not in it, as if it possessed its subsistence in it, a certain medium between the two is necessary* connecting the one with the other, an4 which is more similar to that which is participated, and subsists in the participant. For if this medium is separable, how can it be participated by the participant, since the participant neither contains the medium, nor any thing proceeding from it? A power, therefore, and illumination proceeding from that which is separable into the participant conjoins both. Hence, one of these will be that through which the participation is effected, another will be that which is participated, and another that which participates.

Proposition 82 (LXXXII)

257Every thing incorporeal', which is converted to itself, when it is participated by other things, is participated in a separable manner.

258For if in an inseparable manner, the energy of it would not be separate from its participant, as neither would its essence. If, however, this were the case, it would not be converted to itself. For being converted, it will be separate from its participant, each being different from the other. If, therefore, it is able to be converted to itself, it will be participated in a: separable manner, when it is participated by other things.

Proposition 83 (LXXXIII)

259Every thing which has a knowledge of itself, is entirely converted to itself.

260For knowing itself, it is evident that it is converted to itself in energy. For that which knows and that which is known are one. And the knowledge of itself is directed to itself as to that which is known. This knowledge also as pertaining to that which knows is a certain energy; but

261it is the knowledge of itself directed to itself, because it is gnostic of itself. Moreover, that it is converted to itself essentially, if it is so in energy, has been demonstrated. For every thing which by energizing is converted to itself, has also an essence verging to, and subsisting in itself.

Proposition 84 (LXXXIV)

262Every thing which always is, possesses an infinite power.

263For if its hypostasis is never-failing, the power also according to which it is that which it is, and is able to exist, is infinite. For the power of existing being finite, it will some time or other fail. But this failing, the existence also of that which possesses it will fail, and it will no longer be that which always is. It is necessary, therefore, that the power of that which always is, and which connects and contains it essentially, should be infinite.

Proposition 85 (LXXXV)

264Every thing which is always becoming to be, or rising into existence, {aei yivopevov) possesses an infinite power of becoming to be.

265For if it is always rising into existence, the power of generation in it is never-failing. For if this power was finite, it would cease in an infinite time. But the power of becoming to be ceasing, that which is rising into being according to this power would cease, and thus it would no longer be always becoming to be. 1 It is, however, supposed to be always becoming to be. Hence, it possesses an infinite power of rising into existence.

Proposition 86 (LXXXVI)

266Every thing which is truly being (om»s ov) is infinite, neither according to multitude, nor according to magnitude, but according to power alone.

267For every infinite, is either in discrete, or in continued quantity, or in power. But that which always is, is infinite, as having an inextinguishable life, a never-failing hyparxis, and an undiminished energy. That which is eternally being, however, is neither infinite on account of rnagnitude; for that which is truly being is without magnitude, being selfsubsistent; since every thing self-subsistent is impartible and simple. Nor is it infinite on account of multitude; for it has in the most eminent degree the form of the one , as being arranged most near, and being most allied to it. But it is infinite according to power. Hence, it is also impartible and infinite. And by how much the more it is one and impartible, by so much the more is it infinite. For the power which is divided, becomes irabecil and finite, and powers which are entirelydivided, are in every respect finite. For ultimate powers, and which are most remote from the one , are in a certain respect finite, on account of their distribution into parts. But first powers, on account of their impartibility, are infinite. For a separation into parts divulses and dissolves the power of every thing. But impartiality compressing and contracting that which it contains, renders it never-failing, and undiminished in itself.

268Moreover, infinity, according to magnitude, and also according to multitude, is entirely a privation and falling off from impartibility. For that which is finite is most near to the impartible, hut the infinite is most remote from it, entirely departing from the one. Hence, that which is infinite according to power, is not infinite either according to multitude or magnitude, since infinite power subsists in conjunction with impartibility. But the infinite either in multitude or magnitude, is most remote from the impartible. If„ therefore, that which is truly being was.

269ELEMENTS PROP. LXXXVI1. LXXXVIII.

270infinite either in magnitude or multitude, it would not possess infinite power. It does, however, possess infinite power; and therefore is not infinite either according to multitude, or according to magnitude.

Proposition 87 (LXXXVII)

271Every thing eternal indeed is being, but not every being is eternal.

272For the participation of being is present in a certain respect with generated natures, 1 so far as each of these is not that which in no respect is. But if that which is generated is not entirely deprived of being, it is in a certain respect being. The eternal, however, is in no respect whatever present with generated natures, and especially not with such of these as do not even participate of the perpetuity which subsists according to the whole of time. Moreover, every thing eternal always is. For it participates of eternity, which imparts to the natures by which it is participated to be always that which they are. Being, therefore, is participated by a greater number of things than eternity. And hence being is beyond eternity. For by those natures by whom eternity is participated, being is also participated. But not every thing which participates of being, participates also of eternity.

Proposition 88 (LXXXVIII)

273Every thing* which is truly being, is either prior to eternity, or in eternity, or participates of eternity.

274For that there is true being prior to eternity has been demonstrated. But true being is also in eternity. For eternity possesses the always in

275■ i. e. With natures rising into existence, or becoming to be, as opposed to the things which are, or to beings truly so called {rot oyrccg ovra).

276a Instead of layrws to ovrwg ov, it is doubtless necessary to read to ovrvg oy.

277PROP. LXXXJX. XC, XCL OE THEOLOGY.

278conjunction with being. And that which participates of eternity, has both the alwqys and being , according to participation. Eternity, however, possesses the always primarily, but being according to participation. But being itself is primarily being.

Proposition 89 (LXXXIX)

279Every thing which is primarily being consists of bound and infinity.

280For if it possesses infinite power, it is evident that it is infinite, and on this account consists from the infinite. If also it is impartible, and has. the form of the one , through this, it participates of bound. For that which participates of unity is bounded. Moreover, it i? impartible, and therefore possesses infinite power. Hence every thing which is truly £or primarily] being consists of bound and infinity.

Proposition 90 (XC)

281The first bound, and the first infinity subsist by themselves prior to every thing which consists of bound and the infinite.

282For if beiugs which subsist by themselves, are prior to those which are certain beings, as being common to all essences, and principal causes, and not the causes of certain, but in short of all beings, it is necessary that the first bound, and the first infinity should be prior to that* which consists of both these. For the bound in that which is mixed [or the first being,] participates of infinity, and the infinite participates of bound. But of every thing, that which is the first, is nothing else than that which it is. It is not therefore proper that the first infinite should have the form of bound, or that the first bound should have the form of infinity. These therefore subsist primarily prior to that which is mixed.

Proposition 91 (XCI)

283Every power is either finite or infinite. But every finite power indeed derives its subsistence from infinite power. And infinite power subsists from the first infinity.

284For the powers which have an existence at a certain time, are finite, falling from the infinity of existing always. But the powers of eternal beings are infinite, never deserting their own hyparxis.

Proposition 92 (XCII)

285Every multitude of infinite powers, is suspended from one first infinity, winch does not subsist as a participated power, nor in things which are endued with power, but subsists by itself, not being the power of a certain participant, but the cause of all beings.

286For though the first being possesses power, yet it is not power itself. For it has also bound. But the first power is infinity. For infinite powers are infinite, through the participation of infinity. Infinity itself therefore, will be prior to all powers, through which being also possesses infinite power, and all things participate of infinity. For infinity is not the first of things [or the ineffable principle of all] since that is the measure of all things, being the good and the one. Nor is infinity beings For this is infinite, but not infinity. Hence infinity subsists between that which is first and being, and is the cause of all infinite powers, and of all die infinity that is in beings.

Proposition 93 (XCIII)

287Every infinite which is in [true] beings, is neither infinite to the natures that are above beings, nor is it infinite to itself.

288For that by which each thing is infinite, by this also it exists uncircumscribed. But every thing which is in [true] beings, is bounded by itself, and by all the things prior to it. It remains therefore, that the infinite which is in [true] beings, is infinite to subordinate natures alone, above which it is so expanded in power, as to be incomprehensible by all of them. For in whatever manner they may extend themselves towards

289this infinite, yet it has something' entirely exempt from them. And though all things enter into it, yet it has something occult, and incomprehensible by secondary natures. Though likewise it evolves the power# which it contains, yet it possesses something on account of its union insurmountable, contracted, and surpassing the evolution of beings. Since however, it contains and bounds itself, it will not be infinite to itself nor much less to the natures situated above it, since it has a portion of the infinity which is in them. For the powers of more total natures are more infinite, in consequence of being more total, and having an arrangement nearer to the first infinity.

Proposition 94 (XCIV)

290Every perpetuity is indeed a certain infinity, but not every infinity is perpetuity.

291For there are many infinites which have the infinite not on account of the always , such for instance, as the infinity according to magnitude, the infinity according to multitude, and the infinity of matter. And whatever else there may be of the like kind, which is infinite, either because it cannot be passed over, or through the indefiniteness of its essence. That perpetuity however is a certain infinity 1 is evident. For that which never fails is infinite. But this is that which always has its hypostasis inexhaustible. Infinity therefore, is prior to perpetuity. For that which gives subsistence to a greater number of effects, and is more total, is more causal. Hence, the first infinity is beyond eternity, and infinity itself is

Proposition 95 (XCV)

292Every power which is more single, is more infinite than that which is multiplied.

293* t» is omitted in the original.

294$64 ELEMENTS PROP. XCVI. XCVIU

295For if of powers the first infinity is nearest to the one , that power which is more allied to the one , is in a greater degree infinite than that which recedes from it. For being multiplied it loses the form of the one y ia which while it remained, it possessed a transcendency with respect to other powers, being connected and contained through its impartiality. For in partible natures themselves, the powers when congregated, are united,* but when divided, they are increased in number, and become obscured.

Proposition 96 (XCVI)

296The power which is infinite of every finite body, is incorporeal.

297For if it were corporeal, if this body indeed is finite,* the infinite will be contained in the finite. But if the body is infinite, it will not be power so far as it is body. For if so far as it is body it is finite, but power is infinite, it will not be power so far as it is body. Hence, the power which is infinite in a finite body is incorporeal.

Proposition 97 (XCVII)

298In each series of things, every cause which has the relation of a leader, imparts to the whole series the peculiarity of itself; and that which the cause is primarily, tire series is according to diminution.

299For if it is the leader of the whole series, and all co-ordinate natures are co-arranged with reference to it, it is evident that it imparts to all that the series contains the one idea according to which they are arranged

300in that series. For either all things partake of similitude to this cause without a cause, or that which is the same in all is derived from it. Bui the former of these is impossible. For that which is without a cause is also fortuitous. But the fortuitous can never take place in things in which there is order, connection, and an invariable sameness of subsistence. From the cause therefore, which ranks as a leader, every series receives the peculiarity of the hypostasis of that cause. But if from it, it is evident that this is accompanied with a diminution and decrement adapted to secondary natures. For either the peculiarity exists similarly in the leader, and the natures that are secondary, and how in this case can the former be the leader, but the latter be allotted an hypostasis after the leader ? Or it exists dissimilarly. And if this be the case, it is evident that sameness is derived to the multitude from one thing, but not vice versa. And the illustrious peculiarity of the series which is primarily in one thing [or the leader,] is secondarily in the multitude ([suspended from the leading cause].

Proposition 98 (XCVIII)

301Every separate cause is at one and the same time every where and no where.

302For by the communication of its own power it is every where. For this is a cause which replenishes the natures that are naturally adapted to participate of it, rules over all secondary beings, and is present to all things by the . prolific progressions of its illuminations. But by an essence unmingled with things in place, and by its exempt purity, it is no where. For if it is separate, it is established above all things. In a similar manner also, it is in no one of the natures inferior to itself. For if it was alone every where, it would not indeed be prevented from being a cause, and from subsisting in all its participants. But it would not be prior to all of them in a separate manner. If also it was no where \vithout being every where, it would not indeed be prevented from being prior to all things, and from being nothing pertaining to subordinate

303natures. But it woulA not be in all things, as causes are naturally adapted to be in their effects,' by the abundant and unen vying communications of themselves. In order therefore, that existing as a cause, it maybe in all things that are able to partake of it, and that being separate in itself, it may be prior to all the natures that are filled by it, it is every where, and at the same time no where.

304And it is not indeed partly every where and partly no where. For thus it would be divulsed and separate from itself, if one part of it was every where in all things, but another was no where, and prior to all things. But the whole of it is every where, and in a similar manner no where. For the things which are able to participate of it, meet with the whole of it, and find the whole present with themselves, that at the same time being wholly exempt from them. For the participant does not place this separate cause in itself, but participates of it as much as it is capable of receiving. Nor in the communication of itself does it become contracted by the multitude of the participations of it; for it is separate. Nor do its participants participate of it defectively; for that which imparts is every where.

Proposition 99 (XCIX)

305Every imparticipable, so far as it is imparticipable, does not derive its subsistence from another cause. But it is itself the principle and cause of all its participants. And thus every principle in each series is un begotten.

306For if it is imparticipable in its own proper series, it is allotted the principality, and does not proceed from other things. For it would no longer be the first, if it received this peculiarity, according to which it is imparticipable, from something else.* But if it is inferior to other things,

307and proceeds from them, it does not proceed from them so far as it is imparticipable, but so far as it participates. For of the things from which it originates, it doubtless participates, and it is not primarily the things of which it participates. Hence, it is not from a cause so far as it is imparticipable. For so far as it is from a cause it participates, and is not imparticipable. But so far as it is imparticipable, it is the cause of things that are participated, and is not itself a participant of other things.

Proposition 100 (C)

308Every thing which proceeds in the divine orders, is not naturally adapted to receive all the powers of its producing cause. Nor in short, are secondary natures able to receive all the powers of the natures prior to themselves, but the latter have certain powers exempt from things in an inferior order, and incomprehensible by the beings posterior to themselves.

309For if the peculiarities of the Gods differ from each other, those of the subordinate preexist in the superior divinities ; but those of the superior being more total, are not in the subordinate. But more excellent natures impart indeed some things to their progeny, but antecedently assume others in themselves, in an exempt manner. For it has been demonstrated that those Gods who are nearer to the one are more total; and those more remote from it more partial. But if the more total have powers comprehensive of the more partial, those that have a secondary and more partial order, will not comprehend the power of the more total Gods. In the superior therefore, there is something incomprehensible and uncircurnscribed by the inferior orders. For each of the divine orders is truly infinite.* Nor is that which is infinite, as has been demonstrated, 1 infinite to itself, nor much less to things above itself, but to all the natures posterior to itself. But infinite in these last is in capacity. The infinite however, is incomprehensible by those natures to which it is infinite. Subordinate natures therefore, do not participate of all the powers which more excellent natures antecedently comprehend in themselves. For the latter are incomprehensible by the former. Hence things of a secondary nature, from theii* more partial subsistence, will neither possess all the powers of more excellent beings, nor will they possess the powers

310which they do contain after the same manner as superior natures, on account of that infinity through which the latter transcend the former.

Proposition 102 (CII)

311All beings which exist in any manner whatever, consist of bound and the infinite through that which is primarily being. But all living beings are motive of themselves through the first life. And all gnostic beings participate of knowledge, through the first intellect.

312For if that which is imparticipable in each series imparts its own peculiarity to all the natures under the same series, it is evident that the first being also imparts to all things bound, and at the same time infinity, since it is itself primarily mixed from these. Life also imparts to all things

313* of y*g w**, fc “ necessary to read toAXm yag ona fttv oufo

314mSt von.

315the motion which it possesses in itself. For life is the first progression and motion from the stable hypostasis of being. And intellect imparts knowledge to all things. For the summit of all knowledge is in intellect. And intellect is the first gnostic nature.

Proposition 103 (CIII)

316All things are in all, but appropriately in each.

317For in being there is life and intellect; and in life, being and intellection; and in intellect being and life. But in intellect indeed, all things subsist intellectually, in life vitally, and in being, all things are truly beings. For since every thing subsists either according to cause, or according to hyparxis, or according to participation; and in the first, the rest are according to cause; in the second, the first is according to participation, but the third, according to cause; and in the third, the natures prior to it are according to participation;—this being the case, life and intellect have a prior or causal subsistence in being. Since however, each thing is characterized according to hyparxis, and neither according to cause (for cause pertains to other things, i. e. to effects) nor according to participation (for a thing derives that elsewhere of which it participates,) —hence in being there is truly life and intellection, essential life, and essential intellect. And in life, there is being indeed according to participation, but intellection according to cause. Each of these however, subsist there vitally. For the hyparxis is according to life. And in intellect, life and essence subsist according to participation, and each of these subsists there intellectually. For knowledge is the essence and the life of intellect.

Proposition 104 (CIV)

318Every thing which is primarily eternal, has both its essence and its energy eternal.

319For if it primarily participates of the perpetuity of eternity, it does not partially participate of it, but entirely. For either it participates of it in energy, but not in essence. This however is impossible; since in this case, energy would be more excellent than essence. Or it participates of it according to essence, but does not participate of it according to energy. In this case however, that which is primarily eternal, and that which primarily participates of time will be the same. And time indeed, will primarily measure the essence of certain things, but eternity which is more excellent than all time, will not measure the essence of any thing, if that which is primarily eternal, is not essentially contained by eternity. Hence every thing which is primarily eternal, has both an eternal essence and energy.

Proposition 105 (CV)

320Every thing immortal is perpetual; but not every thing perpetual is immortal.

321For if the immortal is that which always participates of life, but that which always participates of life, participates also of being, and that which always lives, always is,—hence, every thing immortal is perpetual. But the immortal is that which is unreceptive of death, and always lives. And the perpetual is that which is unreceptive of non-being, and always is. If however, there are many beings more and less excellent than life, which are unreceptive of death, but exist always;—if this be the case, not every thing which is perpetual is immortal. That however, there are many beings not immortal, that exist always, is evident. For there are certain beings indeed, which are destitute of life, but which exist always, and are indestructible. For as being is to life, so is the perpetual to the immortal. For the life which cannot be taken away is immortal, and the being which cannot be taken away is perpetual. But being is more comprehensive than life, and therefore the perpetual is more comprehensive than the immortal.'

Proposition 106 (CVI)

322The medium of every thing which is entirely eternal both in essence and energy, and of every thing which has its essence in time, is that which is partly indeed eternal, and partly is measured by time.

323For that which has its essence comprehended by time, is entirely temporal. For by a much greater priority, this will be allotted a temporal energy. But that which is entirely temporal, is in every respect dissimilar to that which is entirely eternal. But all progressions are through similars. Hence there is something between these. The medium therefore, is either that which is eternal in essence, but temporal in energy, or vice versa. This latter however, is impossible. For energy would be more excellent than essence. It remains therefore, that the medium is the former of these.

Proposition 107 (CVII)

324Every thing which is partly eternal, and partly temporal, is at one and the same time being and generation.

325For every thing eternal is being, and that which is measured by time is generation. So that if the same thing participates of time and eternity, yet not according to the same, it will be both being and generation.

326COROIXARV.

327From these things it is evident, that generation indeed, having a temporal essence, is suspended from that which partly partakes of being, and partly of generation, participating at once of eternity and time. But this is suspended from that which is in every respect eternal. And that which is in every respect eternal, is suspended from being which is prior to the eternal.

Proposition 108 (CVIII)

328Every thing which is partial in each order, is able to participate in a twofold respect of the monad which is in the proximately superior order, viz. either through its own wholeness or through that which is partial in the superior order, and co-ordinate with the thing according to an analogy to the whole series.

329For if conversion is to all things through similitude, that which is partial in an inferior order, is dissimilar to that which is monadic and a whole in a superior order. And in short, is as that which is partial, to a whole, and as one order to another. But a partial nature is similar to a whole of the same series, through a communion of peculiarity, and to the proximately superior co-ordinate peculiarity through an analogous subsistence. It is evident, therefore, that through these media a conversion from one to the other is effected, as through similars to that which is similar.' For the one is similar as the partial to that which is partial, but the other as that which is the appropriate of the same series. But the whole of the superior series is dissimilar in both these respects.

Proposition 109 (CIX)

330Every * partial intellect participates of the unity which is above intellect and the first, both through the intellect which ranks as a. whole, and through the partial unity which is co-ordinate with this partial intellect. Every partial soul, likewise, participates of the intellect which is a whole, through the soul which ranks as a whole, and through a partial intellect. And every partial nature of body participates of the soul which is a whole through the wholeness of nature, and a partial soul.

331For every thing partial participates of the monad which is in a superior order, either through its proper wholeness, or through that which is partial in that order, and which is co-ordinate to the thing.

Proposition 110 (CX)

332All the powers of divine natures, having a supernal origin, and proceeding through appropriate media, extend as far as to the last of things, and to places about the earth;

333For neither does any thing intercept these powers, and exclude them irom being present with all things. For they are not in want of places and intervals, on account of their unrestrained transcendency with respect to all things, and a presence every where unmingled. Nor is that which is adapted to participate of them, prohibited from participation. But as soon as any thing is prepared for participation, they also are present, neither then approaching, nor . prior to this being absent, but always possessing an invariable sameness of subsistence. If, therefore, any terrene nature is adapted to the participation of these divine powers, they are present with it, and fill all things with themselves. And indeed they are in a greater degree present with superior natures. But they are present with those of a middle nature, according to the order which they possess. And with such natures as are last, they are present in an ultimate degree. From on high, therefore, they extend themselves as far as to the last of things. Hence also, in last natures there are representations of such as are first, and all things sympathize uith all; * secondary

334indeed, preexisting in first natures, but first natures presenting themselves to the view in such as are second. For every thing subsists in a threefold manner, either according to cause, or according to hvparxis, or according to participation.

Proposition 111 (CXI)

335Every God is a self-perfect unity, and every self-perfect unity is a God.

336For if the number of unities is twofold, as has been before demonstrated, and some are self-perfect, but others are illuminations from the self-perfect unities, and if a divine number is allied to and connatural with the one and the good , the Gods are self-perfect unities. And vice versa, if there is a self-perfect unity it is a God. For as unity is in the most eminent degree allied to the one , and the self-perfect to the good , so likewise according to both these the self-perfect participates of the divine peculiarity and is a God. But if a God was a unity, yet not a self-perfect unity, or a selfperfect hypostasis, yet not a unity, he would be arranged in another order, on account of the mutation of the peculiarity . 1

337' There are two chasms in this sentence in the original, which I have endeavoured to supply in the translation.

Proposition 112 (CXII)

338Of every order those things that are first, have the form of the natures

339For the highest genera in each order, are conjoined through similitude to the natures placed above them , 1 and through the connexion and coherence of the progression of wholes. Hence, such as the superior natures are primarily, such also is the form which these highest genera are allotted, and which is allied to the nature of those in the superior order. They are also such according to the peculiarity of subsistence as are the natures prior to them.

340' It is here requisite to supply vou.

Proposition 113 (CXIII)

341Every divine number is unical.

342For if a divine number has a precedaneous cause, viz. the one , just as an intellectual number has intellect, and a psychical number soul, and if multitude is every where analogous to its cause, it is evident that a divine number is unical, since the one is God. But this follows, since the one and the good are the same. For the good and God are the same. For that beyond which there is nothing, and after which all things aspire, is God. And also that from which all things proceed, and to which all things tend. But this is good. If therefore, there is a multitude of Gods, the multitude is unical. But that there is, is evident. For every principal cause is the leader of an appropriate multitude which is similar and allied to the cause.

Proposition 115 (CXV)

343Every God is superessential, supervital, and superintellectual.

344For if each is a self-perfect unity, but neither being, life, or Intellect is a unity, but that which is united, it is evident that every God is beyond each of these. For if these differ from each other, but all are in all, each of these being all will not be one only. Farther still, if the first God is superessential, but every God is of the series of the first, so far as a God, each will be superessential. But that the first God is superessential,* is evident. For essence is not the same with unity, nor is to exist the same thing as to be united. If, however, these are not the same, either the first God is both these, and in this case he will not be one only, but something else besides the one , and will participate of unity, but will not

345i That the principle of all things is something beyond intellect and being itself, was asserted by the most ancient Pythagoreans, as well as by Plato and his best disciples, as the following

346be the one itself; or he is one of these. But if indeed he is essence, he will be indigent of the one. It is, however, impossible that the good , and

347the universe, and on account of his superiority to every being, to all life, and to all-perfect intellect. But they denominated him the measure of all things, on account of his conferring on all things through illumination, essence and bound \ and containing and bounding all things by the ineffable supereminence of his nature, which is extended beyond every bound." Toov Bum avtipaov ev [MV X eyovrcuv rov Beov a>$ eveoseoog to 0 X 01 $ amov, xcu tolvto$ too ovto$, xcu *a<n}$ %coijr f xcu you too TotvTeXo v; txtxuvct. i tierpov Be tcov txvtcov a>$ iratn ryv otxnav, xou to reXo; exihafiirovra, xcu a* %avra •Keqir/ovroLj xcu ogi£ovra rou$ afyaoroig aoroo, xcu tsolv to; vxeprpt\ciofjL§vai$ icepotrog wtgo^ai*. And again, this is confirmed by Clinius the Pythagorean, as cited by Syrianus, p. 104, in which place pr&clari is erroneously substituted for Clinii. “ That which is the one , and the measure qf all things (says he), is not only entirely exempt from bodies, and mundane concerns, but likewise from intelligibles themselves: since he is the venerable principle 'of beings, the measure of intelligible!, ingenerable, eternal, and alone (/xovov), possessing absolute dominion (xupitotie$), and himself manifesting himself (avro to terno SijXowv).” This fine passage I have translated agreeably to the manuscript corrections of the learned Gale, the original of which he has not inserted. To this we may likewise add the testimony of Philolaus; who, as Syrianus informs us, p. 102, knew that cause which is superior to the two first elements of things, bound and infinite. For (says he) “ Philolaus asserts that the deity established bound and infinite : by bound indeed exhibiting every co-ordination, which is more allied to the onet but by infinity a nature subjected to bound. And prior to these two principles he places one, and a singular cause, separated from the universality of things, which Archainetus (Agx^ve ro$) denominates a cause prior to cause ; but which, according to Philolaus, is the principle of all things." To all these respectable authorities for the superessential nature of the first cause, we may add the testimony of Sextus Empiricus himself. For in his books against the Mathematicians (p. 425) he informs us " that the Pythagoreans placed the one as transcending the genus of things which are essentially understood." xcu tit) raov [isv xati 9 otura voovfxevuiv yevo$ V7cc<rTr)<rctvT0 IhiBayopiXoi nccutie^, eo$ etrava/3e/3i)xo$ to ev. In which passage, by things which are essentially understood, nothing more is meant than intelligible essences, as is obvious to every tyro in the Platonic and Pythagoric philosophy.

348But in consequence of this doctrine of the ancients concerning the one , or the first principle of things, we may discover the meaning and propriety of those appellations given by the Pythagoreans to unity, according to Photius and others : such as aXa/xiria, <rxo rcvBiot, apu^la, ftdquBpov uroybovw, AttoMoov, &c. viz. obscurity, or without illumination, darkness, without mixture , a subterranean profundity, Apollo , &c. For, considered as ineffable, incomprehensible, and superessential, he may be very properly called obscurity, darkness, and a subterranean profundity ; but considered as perfectly simple and one, he may with no less propriety be denominated without mixture , and Apollo i since Apollo signifies a privation of multitude. “ For (says Plotinus) the Pythagoreans denominated the first God Apollo, according to a more secret signification, implying a negation of many." Ennead. 5, lib. 5. To which we may add, that the epithets darkness and obgptrity

349the first should be indigent. Hence, he is one alone; and therefore superessential. But if each thing imparts the peculiarity of that which it is

350wonderfully agree with the appellation of a thrice unknown darkness , employed by the Egyptians, according to Damascius, * in their most mystical invocations of the first God; and at the same time afford a sufficient reason for the remarkable silence of the most ancient philosophers and poets concerning this highest and ineffable cause.

351This silence is indeed remarkably obvious in Hesiod, when in his Theogony he says:

352yjTOt fxev ngoortoToi Xao$ yevtr, --

353That is, “ Chaos was the Jirst thing which was generate#' —and consequently there must be some cause prior to Chaos, through which it was produced; for there can be no effect without a cause. Such, however, is the ignorance of the moderns, that in all the editions of Hesiod, yevero is translated Juit f as if the poet had said that Chaos was the Jirst of all things ; and he is even accused by Cudworth on this account, as leaning to the atheistical system. But the following testimonies clearly prove, that in the opinion of all antiquity, yev fro was considered as meaning was generated) and not was simply. And in the first place, this is clearly asserted by Aristotle in lib. S, de Ccelo. “ There are certain persons (says he) who assert that there is nothing unbegotten, but that all things are generated . —And this is especially the case with the followers of Hesiod. ,, — euri yap

354primarily to the whole series £of which it is the leader], hence, every divine number is superessential; since every principal cause produces similars prior to dissimilars. If, therefore, the first God is superessential, all the Gods will be syperessential. For they will be entirely similar [to the first]. Since, however, they are also essences, they will be produced from the first essence, as the monads of essences.

Proposition 116 (CXVI)

355Every deity except the one is participable.

356For that the one is imparticipable is evident, since if it were participated, and on this account pertained to something else, it would no longer be similarly the cause of all things; both of such as are prior to beings, and of beings themselves. But that the other unities are participated, we shall thus demonstrate. For if there is another imparticipable unity after the first, in what does it differ from the one ? For either it subsists after the same manner as that; and how in this case is the one the second, but the other first? Or it does not subsist after the same manner. And thus one of these will be the one itself, but the other one and not one. This non-one also, if it is no hypostasis whatever, will be one alone. But if it is a certain other hypostasis besides the one , in this case the one will be participated by the non-one. And that will be a selfperfect one, which conjoins the non-one with the one. So that again God will be this [viz. the one] so far as he is God. But that which is non-one will subsist in the participation of the one. Every unity, therefore, which subsists after the one is participable, and every God is participable.

357rated, except the first. It is, however, evident that those theologists, singing in fabulous strains, meant nothing more by generation than the procession of things from their causes; on which account all of them consider the first cause as unbegotten. For Hesiod also, when he says that Chaos was first generated, insinuates that there was something prior to Chaos, from which Chaos was produced. For it is always necessary that every thing which is generated should be gene* N rated from something. But this likewise is insinuated by Hesiod, that the first cause is above all knowledge *nd every appellation.” (De Coclo, p. 147.)

Proposition 117 (CXVII)

358Every God is the measure of beings.

359For if every God is unical, he defines and measures all the multitude of beings. For all multitudes being in their own nature indefinite, are bounded through the one. But that which is one being for being characterized by the one] measuring and terminating the natures with which it is present, leads into bound that which according to its own power is not bounded. For the one being has the form of the one by participation.

360But that which is uniform, or has the form of the one, recedes from indefiniteness and infinity. And by how much the more uniform it is, by so much the less 1 is it indefinite, and without measure. Every multitude of beings, therefore, is measured by the divine unities.

Proposition 118 (CXVIII)

361Every thing which is in the Gods pre-exists in them according to their peculiarities. And the peculiarity of the Gods is unical and superessential. Hence, all things are contained in them unically and superessentially.

362For if every thing subsists in a three-fold manner, viz. either according to cause, or according to hyparxis, or according to participation, but the first number of all things is the divine number, nothing will be in the Gods according to participation, but all things will subsist in them either according to hyparxis, or according to cause. Such things, however, as they antecedently comprehend, as being the causes of all things, they antecedently comprehend in a manner appropriate to their own uuion. For every thing which is the leader of secondary natures causally, contains the cause of things subordinate, in a way naturally adapted to itself. All things, therefore, are in the Gods‘unically and superessentially.

Proposition 119 (CXIX)

363Every God subsists according to superessential goodness, and is good neither according to participation, nor according to essence, but superessentially; since habits and essences are allotted a secondary and manifold order from the Gods.

364For if the first God is the one and the good, and so far as he is the one , he is also the good , and so far as the good , the one , if this be the case, <9very series of the Gods has the form of the one , and the form of the good , according to one peculiarity, and each of the Gods is not a unity and goodness according to any thing else. But each so far as he is a unity, so far he is a goodness, and so far as he is a goodness, so far he is a unity. So far also as the Gods posterior to the first God proceed from the first, they have the form of the good , and the form of the one , since the first is the one and the good. But so far as all of them are Gods, they are unities and goodnesses. As, therefore, the one of the Gods is superessential, so likewise is their goodness, since it is nothing else than the one. For each of them is not any thing else than the good, but is good alone; as neither is each any thing else than the one , but is one alone.

Proposition 120 (CXX)

365Every God possesses in his own hyparxis a providential inspection of the whole of things. And a providential energy is primarily in the Gods.

366For all other things which are posterior to the Gods, energize providentially through the participation of them. But providence is connascent with the Gods. For if to impart good to the subjects of providential energy, is the prerogative of the providential peculiarity, but all the Gods are goodnesses, either they do not impart themselves to anything, and thus nothing will be good in secondary natures. And whengfe will that be

367derived which subsists according to participation, except from those natures that primarily possess peculiarities? Or if they do impart themselves, they impart good, and in consequence of this providentially attend to all things. Providence, therefore, subsists primarily in the Gods. For where is the energy which is prior to intellect, except in superessential natures ? But providence (rpowm), as the name signifies, is an energy prior to intellect (tvtpyua *<m irp* voo). The Gods, therefore, from being Gods, and from being goodnesses, provide for all things, and fill all things with the goodness which is prior to intellect.

Proposition 121 (CXXI)

368Every divine nature has indeed for its hyparxis goodness, but possesses a power which is unsubdued and at once incomprehensible by all secondary natures.

369For if it providentially attends to the whole of things, there is in it a power which has dominion over the subjects of its providential energy; through which being unsubdued and uncircumscribed by all things, divine natures fill all things with, and subject all things to themselves. For every thing of a ruling nature, which is the cause of other things, and has dominion over them, rules through abundance of power, and predominates according to nature.

370The first power, therefore, is in the Gods, not indeed having dominion over some things, but not over others, but equally comprehending in itself according to cause the powers of all beings, this power neither being essential, nor much less unessential; but being connascent with the hyparxis of the Gods, and superessential. Moreover, the boundaries of all knowledge, presubsist uniformly in the Gods. For through divine knowledge, which is exempt from the whole of things, all other knowledge has a subsistence; this knowledge neither being intellectual, nor much less, being a certain knowledge posterior to intellect, but being established according to the divine peculiarity above intellect. Whether, therefore, there is a divine knowledge, this knowledge

371is occult and uniform [or has the form of the one]. Or whether there is a power uncircumscribed by all things, this power is in a similar manner comprehensive of all things. Or whether there is a divine goodness, this goodness defines the hyparxis of th§ Gods. For if all things are in the Gods, knowledge, power, and goodness are also in them. But their hyparxis is characterized by that which is most excellent, and their hypostasis also is according to that which is best. But this is goodness.

Proposition 122 (CXXII)

372Every thing divine provides for secondary natures, and is exempt from the subjects of its providential care, providence neither relaxing the unmingled and unical transcendency of that which is divine, nor a separate union abolishing providence.

373For divine beings abiding in their unical nature, and in their own hyparxis, fill all things with the power of themselves. And every thing which is able to participate of them, enjoys the good which it is capable of receiving, according to the measures of its proper hypostasis; divine natures, in the mean time, illuminating beings with good, by their very essence, or rather prior to essence. For that which is divine being nothing else than goodness, it supplies all things with an unenvying abundance of good, by its very being, not making a distribution according to a reasoning process; but other things receiving indeed according to their desert, and divine natures according to their hyparxis. Neither, therefore, in providing for other things, do they receive a habitude, or alliance with the subjects of their providential care. For they benefit all things by being that which they are. But every thing which makes by its very essence, makes without habitude, and with an unrestrained energy. For habitude is an addition to essence. Hence also it is preternatural. Nor being separate, do they withdraw their providential care. For thus they would subvert, which it is not lawful to say, their own hyparxis, the peculiarity of which is goodness. For it is the province of goodness to extend itself

374to every thing which is able to participate of it. And the greatest of all things is not that which is boniform, but that which is beneficent. Either, therefore, no being will possess this beneficent nature, or the Gods will possess it prior to beings. For it is not possible that a greater good should be present with the natures that are good by participation, but a less good with those that are primarily good.

Proposition 123 (CXXIII)

375Every thing divine is itself indeed, on account of its superessential union, ineffable and unknown to all secondary natures; but it is comprehended and known by its participants. Hence, that which is Jirst, is alone perfectly unknown, as being imparticipable.

376For all knowledge which subsists through reasoning and language, pertains to beings, and in beings possesses the apprehension of truth. For it comes into contact with conceptions, and subsists in intellections. But the Gods are beyond all beings. Neither, therefore, is that which is divine doxastic, or the object of opinion, nor is it dianoetic, nor intelligible. For every being is either sensible, and on this account doxastic, or truly existing being, and on this account intelligible, or it is between these, subsisting as being and at the same time generation , and on this account is dianoetic. If, therefore, the Gods are superessential, and subsist prior to beings, there is neither any opinion of them, nor science and dianoia, nor intellection. But the nature of their peculiarities is known by the beings that are suspended from them. And this by a necessary consequence. For the differences of participants are co-divided conformably to the peculiarities of the participated natures. And neither does every thing participate of every thing; for there is no co-ordination of things perfectly dissimilar. Nor does any casual thing participate of that which is casual. But that which is kindred is conjoined to that which is kindred, and proceeds from that to which it is allied.

Proposition 124 (CXXIV)

377Every God knows partible natures irapartibly, temporal natures, without time, things which are‘not necessary, necessarily, mutable natures, immutably; and in short, all things in a manner more excellent than the order of the things known.

378For if every thing which is with the Gods, is with them according to their peculiarity, it is evident that the knowledge in the Gods of things inferior, will not subsist according to the nature of the inferior things, but according to the exempt transcendency of the Gods. Hence, their knowledge of multiplied and passive natures, will be uniform and impassive. If, therefore, the object of knowledge is partible, divine knowledge will be impartible. If the objects that are known are mutable, the knowledge of the Gods will be immutable; if they are contingent, they will be known by the Gods necessarily; and if they are indefinite, definitely. For that which is divine, does not receive knowledge from subordinate beings, in order that thus the knowledge may be such as is the nature of the thing known. But subordinate beings become indefinite about the definite nature of the Gods, are changed about their immutability, receive passively that which is impassive in them, and temporally that which in them is without time. For it is possible for subordinate to be surpassed by more excellent natures; but it is not lawful for the Gods to receive any thing from beings inferior to themselves.

Proposition 125 (CXXV)

379Every God who is nearer to the one is more total, but the God who is more remote from it is more partial.

380For the God, who is the cause of a greater number of effects, is nearer to that which produces all things; but he who is the cause of a less number is more remote from it. And he indeed, who is the cause o a greater number of effects, is more total; but he who is the cause of a less number, is more partial. And each indeed, is a unity, but the one is greater, and the other less in power. The more partial Gods also are generated from the more total; the latter not being divided, for they are unities; nor changed in quality, for they are immoveable; nor multiplied by habitude, for they are unmingled. But they generate secondary progressions from themselves, which are the decrements of the natures prior to them, through abundance of power.

Proposition 127 (CXXVII)

381, Every thing divine, is especially primarily simple, and on this account most sufficient to itself.

382For that it is indeed simple, is evident from its union; since every thing divine is most unical. But a thing of this kind is transcendently simple. That it is also most sufficient to itself, may be learnt by considering that a composite nature is indigent, if not of other things to which it is external, yet of those things of which it is composed. But that which is most simple and unical, and which establishes itself in the good , is most sufficient to itself. Such, however, is every thing divine. Neither, therefore, is it indigent of other things, existing as goodness itself, nor of things requisite to composition, because it is unical.

Proposition 128 (CXXVIII)

383Every God, when participated by natures nearer to himself, is participated without a medium; but when participated by natures more remote from himself, the participation is through a less or greater * number of media.

384For the former through their alliance being uniform, are immediately able to participate of the divine unities; but the latter through their diminution, and extension into multitude, require other things which are more united, in order that they may participate of the unities themselves, and not of things united. For united multitude subsists between unity itself and divided multitude; being indeed able * to coalesce with unity, but allied in a certain respect to divided multitude, through the representation of multitude.

385' % *A»ov<ov is omitted in the original.

Proposition 129 (CXXIX)

386Every divine body is divine through a deified soul. But every soul is divine through a divine intellect. And every intellect is divine through the participation of a divine unity. And unity indeed is of itself a God; intellect is most divine; soul is divine; but body is deiform. For if every number of the Gods is above intellect, but participations are effected through kindred and similar natures, the impartible essence will primarily participate of the supercssential unities. But the nature which comes into contact with generation will participate of them secondarily. And generation in the third place. Each of these likewise participates of them through the proximately superior natures. And the peculiarity of the Gods indeed proceeds, as far as to the last of things, in its participants ; but through media allied to itself. For unity indeed imparts the transcendent power of itself to the first intellect, among divine natures, and causes this intellect to be like itself according to unical multitude. But through intellect it is also present with soul, conjoining soul with intellect and co-inflaming it £with divine fire], when this intellect is participable. And through the echo ' of soul, imparting also to body its own peculiarity, if it is a body which participates something of soul. And thus body becomes not only animated and intellectual, but also divine. For it receives life indeed and motion from soul; but indissoluble permanency from intellect; and divine union from participated unity. 1 For each of these imparts its own hyparxis to the subsequent natures.

Proposition 130 (CXXX)

387In every divine order, such things as are first, are in a greater degree exempt from the natures proximately arranged under them, than these latter are from things subsequent. And secondary natures in a greater degree adhere to their proximate superiors, than following natures to these.

388For by how much more unical and total any thing is, by so much the more is it allotted a greater transcendency with respect to subsequent natures. And by how much the more diminished it is according to power, by so much the more is it connascent with the natures posterior to itself. And more elevated natures indeed are more united with their more principal causes; but inferior natures are less united with them. For it is the province of a greater power to be more exempt from subordinate, and to be more united to better natures. As on the contrary, it is the province of a diminution of power, to recede in a greater degree from more excellent, and to be co-passive with subordinate natures. And this happens to secondary, but not to first natures, in every order of things.

Proposition 131 (CXXXI)

389Every God begins his own energy from himself.

390For he first exhibits the peculiarity of his presence with secondary natures, in himself; because he imparts himself to other things also according to his own exuberant plenitude. For neither is deficiency adapted to the Gods, nor fulness alone. For every thing deficient is imperfect, and not being itself perfect, it is impossible it should make another thing to be perfect. But that which is full is alone sufficient to itself, and is hot yet prepared to communicate. It is necessary, therefore, that the nature which fills other things, and which extends to other things the communications of itself should be super-plenary or exuber-

Proposition 132 (CXXXII)

391All the orders of the Gods are bound in union by a medium.

392For all the progressions of beings are effected through similars; and much more will the orders of the Gods possess an indissoluble continuity, as subsisting uniformly, and being defined according to the one , which is the principal cause of their existence. The decrements, therefore, are produced unitedly, and alone according to ' the similitude in beings of secondary to first natures. And this, because the hyparxis of the Gods much more consists in union than the subsistence of beings. All the divine genera, therefore, are bound together by appropriate media; and first natures do not proceed into progressions perfectly different without a medium, but through the genera common to each, from which they proceed, and of which they are immediately the causes. For these congregate the extremes into one union, being spread under some things connascently, but proximately exempt from others. And they preserve the well-ordered generation of divine natures.

Proposition 133 (CXXXIII)

393Every God is a beneficent unity or an unific («vojroiof) goodness; and each, so far as a God, possesses this hyparxis. The first God, however, is simply good, and simply one. But each posterior to the first, is a certain goodness, and a certain unity.

394For the divine peculiarity distinguishes the unities and goodnesses of

Proposition 134 (CXXXIV)

395Every divine intellect, intellectually perceives indeed, as intellect, but energizes providentially as a God.

396For it is the illustrious prerogative of intellect to know beings, and to have its perfection in intellections. But it is the province of a God to energize providentially, and to fill all things with good. This communication, however, and replenishing with good, is accomplished through the union of the replenishing natures with the causes prior to themselves ; which intellect, also imitating, passes into sameness with intelligibles. A divine intellect, therefore, -so far as it energizes providentially, is a God i providence being established in an energy prior to intellect. Hence, as a God it imparts itself to all things; but as intellect it is not present with all things. For a divine nature extends to things into which the intellectual peculiarity does not proceed. For beings which are without intellect desire to energize providentially, and to participate of a certain good. But this is because all things indeed do not aspire after intellect, not even all such as are able to participate of it. All things, however, aspire after good, and hasten to obtain it.

Proposition 135 (CXXXV)

397Every divine unity is participated by some being immediately, or without a medium; and every deified nature is extended to one divine

398PROP, cxxxri.

399unity. As many also as are the participated unities, so many are the participating genera of beings.

400For neither two or more unities are participated by one being. For since the peculiarities in the unities are different, must not that which is connascent with each be different also, since contact is effected through similitude? Nor is one unity participated in a divided manner by many beings. For many beings are unadapted to be conjoined with unity, and as beings they are unconjoined with the unity which is prior to beings, and as many , they are separated from unity. It is necessary, however, that the thing which participates should be partly similar to that which is participated, and partly different and dissimilar. Since, therefore, that which participates is something belonging to beings, but unity is superessential, and according to this they are dissimilar; it is necessary that the participant should be one, in order that according to this, it may be similar to the one which is participated, though of these, the latter is one in such a manner as to be unity, but the former, so as to be passive to the one, and to be united through the participation of unity.

Proposition 136 (CXXXVI)

401Every God who is more total, and arranged nearer to the first, is participated by a more total genus of beings. But the God who is more partial, and more remote from the first, is participated by a more partial genus of beings. And as being is to being, so is one divine unity to another.

402For if unities are as many in number as beings, and vice versa, and one,unity is participated by one being, it is evident that the order of beings proceeds according to the order of the unities, being assimilated to the order prior to beings. And more total beings indeed are connascent with more total unities; but more partial beings with more partial unities. For if this were not the case, again similars would be conjoined with dissimilars, and there would not be a distribution according to

403PROP. CXXXVII. CXXXV1II. OF THEOLOGY.

404desert. These things, however, are impossible. Since from thence the one, and an appropriate measure are luminously imparted to all things, and from these proceed. Much more, therefore, will there be an order of participation in these, similars being suspended as much as possible from similars.

Proposition 137 (CXXXVII)

405Every unity in conjunction with the one gives subsistence to the being which participates of it.

406For the one, as it gives subsistence to all things, so likewise it is the cause of the participated unities, and of beings suspended from these unities. But (he unity belonging to every being produces the peculiarity which shines forth in that particular being. And the one indeed is the cause of existence simply ; but unity is the cause of alliance, because it is connascent with the one. Hence, unity is that which of itself defines the being which participates of it, and essentially exhibits in itself a superessential peculiarity. For every where, from that which is primary that which is secondary is that which it is. If, therefore, there is a certain superessential peculiarity of deity, this also belongs to the being which participates of it superessentially.

Proposition 138 (CXXXVIII)

407Of all the deified natures which participate of the divine peculiarity, the first and highest is being itself.

408For if being is beyond intellect and life, as has been demonstrated, and if it is also after the one the cause of the greatest number of effects, being will be the highest deified nature. For it is more single than life and intellect, and is on this account entirely more venerable. But there is not any thing else-prior to it except the one. For prior to unical

409multitude what else can there be except the one ¥ But being is unical multitude as consisting of bound and infinity. And in short, the superessential one * is prior to essence. Since also in the illuminations which are imparted to secondary natures, the one alone extends beyond being. But being is immediately posterior to the one. For that which is being in capacity, but is not yet being, is nevertheless according to its own nature one. And that which follows the being that is in capacity is now being in energy. ITence, in the principles of things, non-being is immediately beyond being, as something more excellent, and no other than the one itself.

Proposition 139 (CXXXIX)

410All things which participate of the divine unities, originate indeed from being, but end in a corporeal nature.

411For being is the first of participants, but body the last,* for we say that there are divine bodies. For the highest of all the genera of bodies, souls and intellects, are attributed to the Gods, that in every order, things analogous to the Gods may connect and preserve secondary natures, and that each number may be a whole, containing all things in itself, according to the whole which is in a part, and possessing prior to other things the divine peculiarity. The divine genus, therefore, subsists corporeally, psychically, and intellectually. And it is evident that all these are divine according to participation. For that which is primarily divine subsists in the unities. Hence, the participants of the divine unities originate indeed from being, but end in a corporeal nature.

Proposition 141 (CXLI)

412Every providence of the Gods is twofold, one indeed being exempt from the natures for which it provides, but the other being co-arranged with them.

413For some divine essences indeed, according to hyparxis, and the peculiarity of their order, are entirely expanded above the illuminated natures. But others being of the same order, provide for things subordinate that are of the same co-ordination; these also imitating the providential energy of the exempt Gods, and desiring to fill secondary natures with the good which they are able to impart.

Proposition 142 (CXLII)

414The Gods are present with all things after the same manner, but all things are not after the same manner present with the Gods. But every thing participates of their presence according to its own order and power. And this is accomplished by some things uniformly, but by others manifoldly ; by some things eternally, but by others according to time; and by some things incorporeally, but by others corporeally.

415For it is necessary that the different participation of the same things, should become different, either from the participant, or from that which is participated. But every thing divine always possesses the same order, and is without habitude to, and unmingled with all things. It remains therefore, that the mutation must subsist from the participants, and that in these that which is not invariably the same must be found, and that at different times they are differently present with the Gods. Hence, the

416Gods being present with all things with invariable sameness, all things are not after the same manner present with them. But other things are present with them as far as they are able, and according to the manner in which they are present they enjoy their illuminations. For the participation is according to the measure of the presence of the divinities.

Proposition 143 (CXLIII)

417All inferior natures fail before the presence of the Gods, though that which participates of them may be adapted to participation. Every thing foreign indeed from divine light becomes far removed from it. But all things are illuminated at once by the Gods.

418For divine natures are always more comprehensive and more powerful than the things which proceed from them. But the inaptitude of the participants, becomes the cause of the privation ' of divine illumination. For this inaptitude obscures it by its own imbecility. And this being obscured, something else appears to receive dominion, not according to its own power, but according to the imbecility of the participant, which seems to rise against the divine form of the illumination.

Proposition 144 (CXLIV)

419AH beings, and all the distributions of beings, extend as far in their progressions, as the orders of the Gods.

420For the Gods produce beings in conjunction with themselves, nor is any thing able to subsist, and to receive measure and order external to the Gods, [or beyond their influence.] For all things are perfected through, their power, and are arranged and measured by the Gods. Prior therefore to the last genera in beings, the Gods preexist, who also adorn these

421genera, and impart to them life, formation and perfection, and convert them to the good. In a similar manner also, the Gods are prior to the middle and first genera of beings. And all things are bound and rooted in the Gods, and through this cause are preserved. But when any thing apostatizes from, and becomes destitute of the Gods, it entirety departs into nonrentity and vanishes, in consequence of being perfectly deprived of those natures by which it was contained.

Proposition 145 (CXLV)

422The peculiarity of every divine order pervades through all secondary natures, and imparts itself to all the subordinate genera of beings.

423For if beings proceed as far as the orders of the Gods extend, in every genus of beings, there is a supernally-illuminated peculiarity of the divine powers. For every thing receives from its proximate appropriate cause, the peculiarity according to -which that cause is allotted its subsistence. I say for instance, if there is a certain cathartic or purifying deity, there is also a purification in souls, in animals, in plants, and in stones. And in a similar manner, if there is a guardian, k convertive, a perfective, and a vivific power. And a stone indeed participates of the divine cathartic power in a corporeal manner only. ' But a plant participates it still more clearly according to life. An animal possesses this form according to impulse; the rational soul rationally; intellect, intellectually; and the Gods superessentially and unically. The whole series also has the same power from one divine cause. And there is the same mode of reasoning with respect to the peculiarities of the other divine powers. For all things are suspended from the Gods. And different natures are illuminated by different Gods; every divine series extending as far as to the last of things. And some things indeed are suspended from the Gods immediately, but others through a greater or less number of media. But all things are full 1 of Gods. And whatever any thing naturally possesses, it derives from the Gods.

424PROP. CXLVI. CXLVII. CXLV1II. OF THEOLOGY. 399

Proposition 146 (CXLVI)

425The ends of all the divine progressions are assimilated to their principles, preserving* a circle without a beginning and without an end, through conversion to their principles.

426For if every thing that has proceeded, is converted to the proper principle from which it proceeded, much more will total orders having proceeded from their summit be again converted to it. But the conversion of the end to the beginning, renders the whole order one, definite, and converging to itself, and exhibiting through the convergency, that which has the form of the one in the multitude.

Proposition 147 (CXLVII)

427The summits of all the divine orders are assimilated to the ends of the natures [proximately] situated above them.

428For if it is necessary that there should be an uninterrupted connection of the divine progression, and that each order should be bound together by appropriate media, it is necessary that the summits of secondary should be conjoined with the terminations of first orders. But this contact is through similitude. Hence there will be a similitude of the principles of an inferior, to the ends of a [proximately] superior order.

Proposition 148 (CXLVIII)

429Every divine order is united to itself in a threefold manner, from the

430summit which is in it, from its middle, and from its end.

431For the summit possessing a power which is most single, transmits union to all the series, and unites the whole of it supernally abiding in

432itself. But the middle extending to both the extremes, binds together the whole order about itself; transmitting indeed, the gifts of primary divine natures, but extending the powers of such as are last, and inserting communion in all of them, and a conjunction with each other. For thus the whole order becomes one, from natures that replenish and those that are filled, converging to the middle as to a certain centre. And the end again returning to the beginning, and recalling the proceeding powers, imparts similitude and convergency to the whole order. And thus the whole order is one through the unific power of primary natures, through the connexion existing in the middle, and through the conversion of the end to the principle of the progressions.

Proposition 149 (CXLIX)

433Every multitude of the divine unities is bounded according to number.

434For if this multitude is most near to the one it will not be infinite. For the infinite is not connascent with, but foreign from the one. Indeed, if multitude is of itself, or in its own nature, separated from the one t it is evident that infinite multitude is perfectly destitute of it. Hence it is powerless, and inefficacious. The multitude of the Gods therefore, is not infinite. Hence it has the form of the one and is finite, and is more finite than every other multitude. For it is nearer to the one than all other multitude. If therefore the principle of things was multitude, it would be necessary that what is nearer to the principle should be a greater multitude than what is more remote from it. For that which is nearer to any thing is more similar to it. Since however, that which is first is the one , the multitude which is conjoined with it, is a less multitude than that which is more remote from it. But the infinite is not a Jess, but is the greatest possible multitude.

Proposition 151 (CLI)

435Every thing paternal in the Gods is of a primary nature, and is pre-established in the rank of the good, according to all the divine orders.

436For it produces the hyparxes of secondary natures, and total powers and essences, according to one ineffable transcendency. Hence also it is denominated paternal, in consequence of exhibiting the united and boniform power of the one, and the cause which gives subsistence to secondary natures. And according to each order of the Gods, the paternal genus ranks as the leader, producing all things from itself, and adorning them, as being arranged analogous to the good. And of divine lathers, some are more total, but others are more partial, just as the orders themselves of the Gods, differ by the more total, and the more partial, according to the reason of cause. As many therefore, as are the progressions of the Gods, so many also are the differences of fathers. For if there is that which is analogous to the good in every order, it is necessary that there should be the paternal in all the orders, and that each order should proceed from the paternal union.

Proposition 152 (CLII)

437Every thing which is generative in the Gods, proceeds according to the infinity of divine power, multiplying itself, proceeding through all things, and transcendently exhibiting the never-failing in the progressions of secondary natures.

438For to multiply things which proceed, and to produce things into progeny, from the occult comprehension in causes, of what else is it the prerogative, than of the infinite power of the Gods, through which all divine natures are filled with prolific good ? For every thing which is full

439produces other things from itself according to a super-plenary power. The domination of power therefore is the peculiarity of generative deity, which multiplies the powers of the things generated, and renders them prolific, and excites them to generate and give subsistence to other things. For if every thing imparts the appropriate peculiarity which it possesses primarily to other things, every thing which is prolific will impart progression, and will adumbrate the infinity which is the primary leader of wholes, from which every generative power proceeds, and which in an exempt manner pours forth the ever-flowing progressions of divine natures.

Proposition 153 (CLIII)

440[Every thing which is perfect in the Gods,’] is the cause of divine perfection.

441For as the hypostases of beings are of one kind, but those of superessential natures of another, so likewise with respect to perfections, those of the Gods themselves according to hyparxis, are different from those of beings, which are secondary and posterior to them. And the former indeed, are self-perfect and primary, because the good subsists primarily in them; but the latter possess perfection according to participation. Hence the perfection of the Gods is one thing, and that of deified natures is another. The perfection however, which is primarily in the Gods, is not only the cause of perfection to deified natures, but also to the Gods themselves. For if every thing so far as it is perfect, is converted to its proper principle, that which is the cause of all divine conversion, is the perfective genus of the Gods.

Proposition 154 (CLIV)

442Every thing which is of a guardian nature in the Gods, preserves every thing in its proper order, and is uniformly exempt’ from secondary, and established 1 in primary natures.

443For if a guard immutably preserves the measure of the order of every thing, and connectedly contains all the natures that are guarded in their appropriate perfection, it will impart to all things a transcendency exempt from subordinate beings, and will firmly establish each thing unmingled, in itself, existing as the cause of undefiled purity to the natures that are guarded, and fixing them in superior beings. For every thing is perfect which adheres to primary natures, but is in itself alone, and is expanded

444above things subordinate.

Proposition 155 (CLV)

445Every thing vivific in the Gods is [a generative cause, but every generative cause is not vivific.’}

446For a generative is more total than a vivific cause, and is nearer to the principle of all things. For generation manifests a cause which produces beings into multitude. But vivification represents to us the deity who is the supplier of all life. If therefore the former multiplies the hypostases of beings, but the latter gives subsistence to the progressions of life,—if this be the case, as being is to life, so is the generative order to the vivific series. The former therefore, will be more total, and the cause of a greater number of effects, and will on this account be nearer to the principle of all things.

447' For tfygtifUMv it is necessary to read i^giifitvov.

Proposition 156 (CLVI)

448Every cause of purity is comprehended in the guardian order. But on the contrary, not every thing of a guardian order is the same with the purifying genus.

449For purity imparts to all the Gods the unmingled with things inferior, and the undefiled in the providence of secondary natures. But a guardian power also effects this, and contains all things in itself, and firmly inserts them in superior natures. The guardian therefore is more total than the purifying genus. For in short, the peculiarity of the guardian power, is to preserve the order of every thing the same with reference to itself, and to the natures prior and posterior to itself. But the peculiarity of purity is to keep more excellent natures exempt from such as are subordinate. These powers however primarily subsist in the Gods. For it is necessary that there should be one cause preceding that which is in all things, and in short, it is requisite that there should be uniform measures of all good, and that these should be comprehended by the Gods according to cause. For there is no good in secondary natures which does not pre-exist in the Gods. [Hence in the divinities purity is likewise a primary good, guardianship, and every thing of this kind.']

Proposition 157 (CLVII)

450Every paternal cause is the supplier of being to all things, and gives subsistence to the hyparxes of beings. But every thing which is fabricative of the production of form, exists prior to composite natures, and precedes their order, and division according to number, and is also of the same co-ordination with the paternal cause, in the more partial genera of things.

451For each of these belongs to the order of bound; since hyparxis also, number and form, have all of them the nature of bound. Hence, in this respect they are co-ordinate with each other. But the demiurgic or fabricative cause indeed, produces fabrication into multitude. And the uniform, or that which has the form of the one supplies the progressions of beings. And the former indeed, is the artificer of form, but the latter produces essence. So far therefore, as these differ from each other, viz. form and being, so far also does the paternal differ from the demiurgic cause. But form is a certain being.* Hence the paternal cause is more total and causal, and is beyond the demiurgic genus, in the same manner as being is beyond form.

Proposition 158 (CLVIII)

452Every elevating cause in the Gods, differs both from a purifying cause, and from the convertive genera.

453For it is evident that this cause also has necessarily a primary subsistence in the Gods; since all the causes of total good preexist in the divinities. But it subsists prior to the purifying cause. For the one liberates from things of a subordinate nature, but the other conjoins with more excellent natures. The elevating however, has a more partial order than the convertive cause. For every thing which converts, [is converted either to itself, or to that which is more excellent than itself. 1 ] But the energy of the elevating cause is characterized by a conversion to that which is more excellent, as leading that which is converted to a superior and more divine cause.

Proposition 159 (CLIX)

454Every order of the Gods consists of the first principles, bound and infinity. But one order is in a greater degree derived from bound, and another from infinity.

455For every order proceeds from both these, because the communications of first causes pervade through all secondary natures. But in some things bound predominates in the mixture [of bound and infinity,] and in others infinity. And thus the genus which has the form of bound has its completion, in which the prerogatives of bound have dominion. This too is the case with the genus which has the form of the infinite, and in which the properties of infinity predominate.

Proposition 160 (CLX)

456Concerning Intellect .

457Every divine intellect is uniform, or has the form of the one, and is perfect. And the first intellect subsists from itself, and produces other intellects.

458For if it is a God it is filled with divine unities, and is uniform. But if this be the case, it is also perfect, being full of divine goodness. And if this be admitted, it is likewise primarily intellect, as being united to the Gods. But being primarily intellect, it also gives an hypostasis to other intellects. For all secondary natures obtain their hyparxis from such as have a primary subsistence.

Proposition 161 (CLXI)

459Every thing which is truly being, and is suspended from the Gods, is divine and imparticipable.

460For since that which is truly being, is the first of the natures that participate of the divine union, it likewise fills intellect from itself. For intellect is being, as replete with being, and is therefore a divine intelligible. And so far indeed as it is deified it is divine, but as filling intellect, and being participated by it, it is intelligible. Intellect also is being, on account of that which is primarily being. But that which is primarily being itself is separate from intellect; because intellect is posterior to being. But imparticipables subsist prior to things which are participated. Hence being which subsists by itself and is imparticipable, is prior to the being which is conjoined with intellect. For it is intelligible, not as co-arranged with intellect, but as perfecting intellect in an exempt manner, because it imparts being to it, and fills it with truly existing essence.

Proposition 162 (CLXII)

461Every multitude of unities which illuminates truly existing being, is occult and intelligible; occult indeed, as being conjoined with unity; but intelligible,' as participated by being.

462For all the Gods are denominated from the things which are suspended from them; because from these it is possible to know their different hypostases, which are [of themselves] unknown. For every thing divine is of itself ineffable and unknown, as being connascent with the ineffable one. From the difference, however, of the participants it happens that the peculiarities of divine natures become known. The unities, therefore, which illuminate truly existing being are intelligible; because being, truly so called, is a divine intelligible, and imparticipable, subsisting prior to intellect. For this would not be suspended from the first Gods, unless they also possessed a primary hypostasis, and a power perfective of other* Gods; since, as participants are to each other, so likewise are the hyparxes of the things that are participated.

463PROP. CLXIII. CLXIV. CLXV. OF THEOLOGY.

Proposition 163 (CLXIII)

464Every multitude of unities which is participated by imparticipable’ intellect, is intellectual.

465For as intellect is to truly existing being, so are these unities to the intelligible unities. Since, therefore, the latter which illuminate being, 1 are intelligible, hence, the former which illuminate a divine and imparticipable intellect, are intellectual. Yet they are not intellectual in such a way, as if they subsisted in intellect, but as causally existing prior to intellect, and generating intellect.

Proposition 164 (CLXIV)

466Every multitude of unities which is participated by every imparticipable soul, is supermundane.

467For because imparticipable soul is primarily above the world, the Gods also which are participated by it are supermundane, having the same analogy to the intellectual and intelligible Gods, which soul has to intellect, and intellect to truly existing being. As, therefore, every soul is suspended from intellect, and intellect is converted to the intelligible, thus also the supermundane are suspended from the intellectual, in the same manner as the intellectual from the intelligible Gods.

Proposition 165 (CLXV)

468Every multitude of unities which is participated by a certain [sensible body is mundane.]

469For it illuminates the parts of the world, through intellect and soul as

470• For jttrfucrov here, it is necessary to read afutn tr#«.

471media. 1 For intellect is not present with any mundane body without soul, nor are deity and soul conjoined without a medium; since participations are through similars. Intellect itself also according to its intelligible summit, participates of unity. These unities, therefore, are mundane, as giving completion to the whole world, and as deifying visible bodies. For each of these is divine, not on account of soul; for soul is not primarily a God. Nor on account of intellect; for intellect is not the same with the one. But each of• these visible bodies, is animated indeed on account of soul, and moved of itself. But it possesses a perpetual sameness of subsistence, and is moved in the most excellent order, on account of intellect. It is| however, divine on account of union. »And if it possesses a providential power, it possesses it through this cause.

Proposition 166 (CLXVI)

472Every intellect is either imparticipable or participable. And if participable, it is either participated by supermundane, or by mundane souls.

473For imparticipable intellect having the first order, is the leader of every multitude of intellects. But of participable intellects, some illuminate supermundane and imparticipable soul, but others the mundane soul. For the mundane multitude is not immediately derived from the imparticipable; since progressions are through similars. But that which is separate from the world, is more similar to the imparticipable, than that which is divided about it. Nor has a supermundane multitude alone a subsistence, but there are also mundane intellects; since there is likewise a mundane multitude of Gods, and the world itself is animated, and at the same time intellectual. The participation also of the supermundane Gods by mundane souls, is through mundane intellects as the media.

Proposition 167 (CLXVII)

474Every intellect intellectually perceives itself. But the first intellect indeed, perceives itself alone; and in this, intellect and the intelligible are one in number. But each of the subsequent intellects, perceives itself, and the natures prior to itself. And the intelligible to each of these,' is partly that which it is, and partly that from which it is derived.

475For every intellect, either * intellectually perceives itself, or that which is above, or that which is posterior to itself. But if indeed it perceives that which is posterior to itself, it will through intellect be converted to that which is less excellent than itself; and thus will not know that to which it is converted, as not being in itself, but external to itself. But it will only know the image of this thing, as being generated in itself from it. For it knows that which it possesses, and the manner in which it is affected, but not that which it does not possess, and by which it is not affected.

476But if it perceives that which is above itself, if indeed, this is accomplished through the knowledge of itself, it will at one and the same time both know itself and that superior nature. But if it knows that alone, it will be ignorant of itself, though it is intellect. In short, by knowing that which is prior to itself, it will know that it is a cause, and will also know the things of which it is the cause. For if it is ignorant of these, it will likewise be ignorant of that which is the cause of them; not knowing that which produces what it produces, by its very being, and what the things are which it does produce. Hence, by knowing the things of which it is the cause, it will also know itself, as deriving its subsistence from thence. By knowing, therefore, that which is prior to itself, it will likewise entirely know itself. Hence, if there is a certain intelligible intellect, this by knowing itself, will also know the intelligible,

477being itself intelligible. But each of the intellects posterior to this, will intellectually perceive the intelligible which is in itself, and at the same time that which is prior to itself. Hence, in intellect there is the intelligible, and in the intelligible intellect. But one intellect is the same with the intelligible; and another is the same with the intelligible which is in itself, but is not the same with the intelligible prior to itself. For that which is simply intelligible is one thing, and the intelligible in that which intellectually perceives is another.

Proposition 168 (CLXVIII)

478Every intellect knows in energy that which it intellectually perceives, and it is not the peculiarity of one part of it to perceive, and of another to perceive that it perceives.

479For if it is intellect in energy, and perceives itself as not any thing different from the object of intellectual perception, it will know itself, and see itself. But seeing that which perceives intellectually, and knowing that which sees, it will know that it is intellect in energy. But knowing this, it will know that it perceives intellectually, and will not alone know the objects of its intellection. Hence, it will at once both know the intelligible, and that it intellectually perceives it, and by. intellection it will be intellectually perceived by itself.

Proposition 169 (CLXIX)

480Every intellect has its essence, power and energy in eternity.

481For if it intellectually perceives itself, and intellect is the same with the intelligible, intelligence also is the same with intellect and the intelligible. For being the medium between that which intellectually perceives, and the object of intellectual perception, and these being the same, intelligence also will be the same with both. Moreover, that the essence

482of intellect is eternal, is evident. 1 For the whole of it subsists at once. And this being the case, intelligence also will be eternal, since it is the same with the essence of intellect. But if intellect is eternal,* it will not be measured by time, neither according to its being, nor its energy. But these subsisting with invariable sameness, the power also of intellect will be eternal.

Proposition 170 (CLXX)

483Every intellect at once intellectually perceives all things. But imparticipable intellect indeed, simply perceives all things. And each of the intellects posterior to it perceives all things [according to one.

484For if] 1 every intellect establishes its essence in eternity, and together with its essence its energy, it will intellectually perceive all things at once. For to every thing which is not established in eternity, the successive objects of its perception subsist according to parts. For every thing which is successive, is in time; the successive consisting of prior and posterior, but the whole of it not existing at once. If therefore all intellects similarly perceive all things, 4 they will not differ from each other. For if they perceive all things similarly,’ they are similarly all things, since they are the very things which they intellectually perceive. But being similarly all things, one intellect will not be imparticipable, and another not. For their essences are the same things as the objects of their intellection ; since the intellection of each is the same with the being of each, and each is both intellection and essence. It remains therefore, either that each intellect does not similarly perceive all things, but one thing, or more than one, but not all things at once; or that it perceives

485all things according to one.* To assert however, that each intellect does not perceive all things, is to make intellect to be ignorant of some particular being. For if it suffers transition in its energy, and intellectually perceives, not at once, but according to prior and posterior, at the same time possessing an immoveable nature, it will be inferior to soul, which understands all things in being moved, [or in a mutable energy]; because intellect on this hypothesis, will only understand one thing by its permanent energy. It will therefore understand all things according to one. For it either intellectually perceives all things, or one thing, or all things according to the one of intellection. For in all intellects indeed, there is always an intellectual perception of all things; yet so as to bound all things in one of all. Hence there is something predominant in intellection, and the objects of intellection; since all things are at once understood as one, through the domination of one, which characterizes all things with itself.

Proposition 171 (CLXXI)

486Every intellect is an impartible essence.

487For if it is without magnitude, incorporeal, [and immoveable, it is impartible. For every thing] 1 which in any way whatever is partible, is either partible on account of magnitude, or multitude, or on account of energies which are borne along with the flux of time. But intellect is eternal according to all things, and is beyond bodies, and the multitude which is in it is united. It is, therefore, impartible. That intellect also is incorporeal, is manifest from its conversion to itself. For no body is converted to itself. But that it is eternal, the identity of its energy with its essence evinces. For this has been before demonstrated. And that

488PROP. CLXXII. CLXXIII. OF THEOLOGY.

489the multitude in it is united isevident from the continuity of intellectual multitude with the divine unities. For these are the first multitude ; but intellects are next to these. Hence, though every intellect is a multitude, yet it is an united multitude. For prior to that which is divided, that which is collected into profound union, and is nearer to the one , subsists.

Proposition 172 (CLXXII)

490Every intellect is proximately the producing cause of beings perpetual and immutable according to essence.

491For every thing whichis produced by an immoveable cause, is immutable according to essence. But immoveable intellect being all things eternally, and abiding in eternity, produces by its very being that which it produces. If however it always is, and is invariably the same, it always produces, and after the same manner. Hence, it is not the cause of things which sometimes have existence, and at other times not, but it is the cause of things which always exist.

Proposition 173 (CLXXIII)

492Every intellect is intellectually both the things which are prior and posterior to itself.

493For it is those things which are posterior to itself, according to cause, but those things which are prior to itself, according to participation. Yet it is still intellect, and is allotted an intellectual essence. [Hence it defines] all things [according to its essence];' both such as are according to cause, and such as are according to participation. For every thing participates of more excellent beings in such a way as it is naturally adapted to participate, and not according to their subsistence. For otherwise, they would be similarly participated by all things. Participa-

494' From the Tertion of Patririus, it is likewise necessary to supply in this plaee the words Kara tijv avrou owna* oyi£«.

495tions therefore, are according to the peculiarity and power of the participants. Hence in intellect, the natures prior to it subsist intellectually. But intellect is likewise intellectually the things posterior to itself. For it does not consist of its effects, nor does it contain these, but the causes of these in itself. But intellect is by its very being the cause of all things. And the very being of it is intellectual. Hence it contains intellectually the causes of all things. So that every intellect possesses all things intellectually, both such as are prior, and such as are posterior to it. As therefore, every intellect contains intelligibles intellectually, so

Proposition 174 (CLXXIV)

496Every intellect gives subsistence to things posterior to itself, by intellection, and its fabrication consists in intellection, and its intellection or intelligence, in fabrication.

497For if intelligible and intellect are the same, the essence also of every intellect will be the same with the intellection in itself. But it produces that which it produces by essence, and produces according to the very being, which it is. By intellection therefore, it will produce the things which are produced. For in intellect, being and intellection are both of them one. For intellect is the same with every being which it contains. If therefore, it makes by its very being, but its very being is intellection, it makes by intellection. Intelligence also which is in energy, consists in intellection. But this is the same with the essence of intellect. And the essence of intellect consists in producing. For that which produces immoveably, [always possesses] its very being [in producing. The intelligence of intellect therefore consists in fabrication or production.’]

498PROP. CLXXV. CLXXVI. OF THEOLOGY.

Proposition 175 (CLXXV)

499Every intellect is primarily participated by those natures which are intellectual, both according to essence, and according to energy.

500For it is necessary that it should either be participated by these, or by other natures, which possess indeed an intellectual essence, but do not always energize intellectually. It is however impossible that it should be participated by the latter of these. For the energy of intellect is immoveable. And hence, the natures by which it is participated, always participate of intellectual energy, which always causes the participants of it to be intellectual. For that which possesses its energy in a certain part of time, is unadapted to be conjoined with an eternal energy. But that which has perfection according to the whole of time, is the medium between every eternal energy, and that which is perfect in a certain time, as well in the mutations of energy, as in essences. For progressions are never effected without a medium, but through kindred and similar natures, both according to hypostases, and the perfections of energies. After a similar manner therefore, every intellect is primarily participated by those beings that are able to perceive intellectually, according to the whole of time, and who always energize intellectually, though their intellection is in time, and is not eternally in energy.

501COROLLARY.

502From this therefore, it is evident that it is impossible for the soul which sometimes perceives intellectually and sometimes does not, to participate proximately of intellect,

Proposition 176 (CLXXVI)

503All intellectual forms are in each other, and each is at the same time separate and distinct from the rest.

504For if every intellect is impartible, and the multitude which is in it is

505united through intellectual impartiality, all things in it will be in one, impartibles will be united to each other, and all intellectual forms will pervade through all. But if all intellectual forms subsist immaterially and incorporeally, they are unconfused with each other and separate, and each preserving its own purity, remains that which it is. The peculiar participation however of each participating in a separate manner, manifests the unconfused nature of intellectual forms. For unless the forms which are participated were distinguished separate from each other, the participants of each of them would not participate in a separate manner, but in the subordinate natures [i. e. in the participants] there would be, in a much greater degree, an indistinct confusion, these being according to their order of an inferior condition. For whence would there be a separation of these, if the natures which give subsistence to, and perfect them, were without distinction, and were confused together ? But again the impartible hypostasis, and uniform essence of that which contains forms, evinces their united nature. For things which have their hyparxis in the impartible and the uniform, are impartibly in the same thing. For how can you divide the impartible and the one f Hence, they have a simultaneous subsistence, and are in each other, .each wholly pervading through the whole of each, in a manner unaccompanied with interval. For that which comprehends them is not extended with interval, nor is one of them in this thing, but another elsewhere, as in that which has interval; but every thing is at once in the impartible and in one. So that all intellectual forms are in each other, and are in each other unitedly, and at the same time each is distinctly apart from each.

506COROLLARY.

507But if some one, in addition to these demonstrations, should require also examples, let him direct his attention to the theorems which exist in one soul. For all these are in the same essence, which is truly without magnitude,* and are united to each other. For that which is without magnitude, does not locally contain the things which are in it, but the

5081 afuydu it omitted in the original.

509natures which it contains are united and separated, impartibly and without interval. For the soul genuinely produces all things, and each apart from each, attracting nothing from the rest, which, unless they were always separated according to habit, would not be separated by the energy of the soul.

Proposition 177 (CLXXVII)

510Every intellect being a plenitude of forms, one indeed, is comprehensive of more total, but another of more partial forms. And the superior intellects contain in a more total manner, such things as those posterior to them contain more partially. But the inferior intellects contain more partially, such things as those that are prior to them contain more totally.

511For the superior intellects employ greater powers, having more the form of the one than secondary intellects. But the inferior intellects being more multiplied, diminish the powers which they contain. For things that are more allied to the one ,, being contracted in quantity, surpass the natures that are posterior to them. And on the contrary, things more remote from the one, as they are increased in quantity, are inferior to the natures that are nearer to the one. Hence the superior intellects, being established according to a greater power, but being less in multitude, produce a greater number of effects, according to power, through fewer things according to the quantity of forms. But the intellects posterior to them produce fewer effects through a greater number of things, according to a defect of power.* If therefore, the former produce a greater number of effects, through fewer things, the forms in them are more total. And if the latter produce fewer effects, through a greater number of things, the forms in them are more partial. *

512■ Instead of •> 8. ^ 8.« «W<r« x*t« t,v au , ,x«vo., x. x it is

513necessary to read •< 8. ^ ew.vouj, ha rVww eX*<rcr«, x«r« n,y h»a^ mi ,xx«4,v. e< ow e x . A

514COROLLARY.

515Hence it happens that the natures which are generated from superior intellects according to one form, are produced fin a divided manner from secondary intellects *3 according to many ideas. And again, those natures which are produced by inferior intellects through many and distinct forms, are produced by superior intellects through fewer, but more total forms. And that indeed which is a whole and common, accedes supernally to all its participants. But that which is divided and peculiar accedes from secondary intellects. Hence secondary intellects, by the more partial separation of peculiarities, accurately and subtly distinguish the formations of primary intellects.

Proposition 178 (CLXXVIII)

516Every intellectual form gives subsistence to eternal natures.

517For if every intellectual form is eternal and immoveable, it is essentially the cause of immutable and eternal hypostases, but not of such as are generated and corrupted. So that every thing which subsists according to an intellectual form is an eternal intellectual nature. For if all forms produce things posterior to themselves by their very being, but their essence possesses Rn invariable sameness of subsistence, the things produced by them will also be invariably the same, and will be eternal. Hence, neither the genera which subsist from a formal cause, according to a certain time, nor corruptible natures so far as they are corruptible, have a pre-existent intellectual form. For they would be incorruptible and unbegotten, if they derived their hypostasis from intellectual forms.

518PROP. CLXXIX. CLXXX. OF THEOLOGY.

Proposition 179 (CLXXIX)

519Every intellectual number is bounded.

520For if there is another multitude posterior to this, essentially inferior to it, and thus [more remote from the one , but the intellectual number is nearer to the one; *] and if that which is nearer to the one , is less according to quantity, but that which is more remote from it, is more according to quantity;—if this be the case, the intellectual number also will be less than every multitude posterior to it. Hence, it is not infinite. The multitude of intellects therefore, is bounded. For that which is less than a certain thing is not infinite, because the infinite, so far as infinite, is not less than any thing.

Proposition 180 (CLXXX)

521Every intellect is a whole, so far as each consists of parts, and is united to other things, and at the same time separated from them. But i imparticipable intellect indeed, is simply a whole, as containing all parts

522in itself totally. But each partial intellect possesses the whole as in a part; and thus is all things partially.

523For if a partial intellect is all things according to one, but a subsistence according to one thing is nothing else than a subsistence partially, the whole is in each of these intellects partially, being defined according to a certain one particular thing which predominates in all of them.

524' 1 It it necessary here to read and supply from the version of Patricius, mqfartfo* too no;, t it

Proposition 181 (CLXXXI)

525Every participated intellect is either divine, as being suspended from the Gods, or is intellectual only.

526For if a divine and imparticipable intellect has a primary subsistence, the intellect which is allied to this, is not that which differs from it in both respects, viz. which is neither divine, nor imparticipable. For things which are dissimilar in both these respects, cannot be conjoined with each other. It is evident therefore, that the medium between these is partly similar to that which is primarily intellect, and partly dissimilar to it. Either 1 therefore, it is imparticipable and not divine; or it is participated and divine. But every thing imparticipable is divine, as being allotted an order in multitude analogous to the one. Hence, there will be a certain intellect which is divine and at the same time participated. It is necessary however that there should be [an intellect which does not participate *] of the divine unities, but intellectually perceives them only. For in each series, such things as are first, and which are conjoined with their monad, are able to participate of things proximately situated in a superior order. But such as are far distant fronai the primary monad, cannot be suspended from the natures that proximately belong to a higher order. There is therefore both [a divine intellect, 1 ] and an intellect which is intellectual only ; the latter indeed, being established' according to an intellectual peculiarity, which it possesses from its own monad, and from imparticipable intellect; but the former subsisting according to the union which it receives from the participated monad.

527' For n here it is necessary to read tj.

528PROP. CLXXXII. CLXXX1II. CLXXXIV. OF THEOLOGY.

529' PROPOSmON CLXXXII.

530Every [divine 1 ] participated intellect, is participated by divine souls.

531For if participation assimilates the participant to that which is participated, and renders the former connascent with the latter, it is evident that the participant of a divine intellect must be a divine soul, as being suspended from a divine intellect, and that through intellect as a medium it must participate of the deity which it contains. For deity conjoins h soul which participates of it with intellect, and binds that which is divine to that which is divine.

Proposition 183 (CLXXXIII)

532Every intellect which is participated indeed, but is intellectual alone, is participated by souls which are neither divine, nor subsisting in a mutation from intellect into a privation of intellect.

533For neither are divine souls of this kind, nor such as participate of intellect. For souls participate of the Gods through a divine intellect, as was before demonstrated. Nor are souls which admit of mutation, of this kind. For every intellect is participated by natures which are always intellectual, both according to essence and according to energy. For this is evident from what has been before shown.

Proposition 184 (CLXXXIV)

534Concerning Soul .

535Every soul is either divine, or is changed from intellect into a privation of intellect; or always remains as a medium between these, but is inferior to divine souls.

536* fcio; is omitted in the original.

537For if a divine intellect indeed, is participated by divine souls, but an intellectual intellect by those souls alone which are neither divine, nor receive a mutation from intelligence into a privation of intellect (for there are souls of this kind, which sometimes perceive intellectually, and some- . times do not);—if this be the case, it is evident that there are three genera of souls. And the first of these indeed, are divine. But the second are not divine, yet always participate of intellect. And the third are those, which are sometimes changed into an intellectual condition, and sometimes into a privation of intellect.

Proposition 185 (CLXXXV)

538All [divine] * souls, are indeed Gods psychically. But all those that participate of an intellectual intellect, are the perpetual attendants of the Gods. And all those that are the recipients of mutation, are sometimes only the attendants of the Gods.

539For if some souls have divine light supernally shining upon them, but others are endued with perpetual intelligence, and others again only sometimes participate of this perfection;—if this be the case, the first of these will among the multitude of souls be analogous to the Gods. But the next to these, will always follow the Gods, in consequence of always energizing according to intellect, and will be suspended from divine souls, having the same relation to them as that which is intellectual* to that which is divine. And the souls which sometimes energize intellectually and follow the Gods, neither participate of intellect after a manner always the same, nor are always able to be converted [to the intelligible] in conjunction with divine souls. For that which sometimes only participates of intellect, cannot by any contrivance whatever be always conjoined with the Gods.

5401 taut is omitted in the original.

541PROP. CLXXXV1. CLXXXVII. CLXXXV1II. OF THEOLOGY.

Proposition 186 (CLXXXVI)

542Every soul is both an incorporeal essence, [and separate from body].*

543For if it knows itself, but every thing which knows itself, is converted to itself, and that which is converted to itself, does not pertain to body (since every body is without conversion to itself) nor is inseparable from body, since that which is inseparable from body is not naturally adapted' to revert to itself as it would thus be separated from body;—if this be the case, every soul is neither a corporeal essence, nor inseparable from body. Moreover, that the soul knows itself is evident. For if it knows the natures that are above itself, and is also naturally adapted to know itself, it will in a much greater degree know itself from the causes prior to itself.

Proposition 187 (CLXXXVII)

544Every soul is indestructible, and incorruptible.

545For every thing which can in any way whatever be dissolved and destroyed, is either corporeal and a composite, or is allotted its hypostasis in a subject. And that indeed, which is dissolved, is corrupted as consisting of many things. But that which is naturally adapted to be in another thing, vanishes into non-entity when separated from its subject. Moreover, the soul is incorporeal, and external to every subject, subsisting in itself, and being converted to itself. Hence, it is indestructible and incorruptible.

Proposition 188 (CLXXXVIII)

546Every soul is both life and vital.

547For that to which soul accedes necessarily lives. And that which is

548deprived of soul, is immediately left destitute of life. Either therefore it lived through soul, or through something else, and not through soul. It is however impossible that it should have lived through something else alone. For every thing which is participated, either imparts itself, or something pertaining to itself to its participant. But if it suffers neither of these, it will not be participated. Soul however, is participated by that to which it is present. And that which participates of soul is said to be animated. If therefore that which is participated introduces life to animated natures, it is either life, or vital alone, or both life and vital. If however, it is alone vital, but not also life, it will consist of life and non-life. It will not therefore know itself, nor be converted to itself. For knowledge is life, and the gnostic power so far as it is such is vital. If therefore, there is any thing in soul without life, this will not possess essentially the power of knowing. But if soul is life alone, it will no longer participate of the intellectual life. For the participant of life is vital, and is not life alone, i. e. the first and imparticipable life ; but the life which is posterior to this, is both vital and life. Soul however, is not imparticipable life. And hence it is at the same time both life and vital.

Proposition 189 (CLXXXIX)

549Every soul is self-vital.

550For if it is converted to itself, but every thing which is converted to itself is self-subsistent, the soul also is self-subsistent, and produces itself. But it is likewise life and vital, and its hyparxis is according to vitality. For it imparts life by its very being to the natures to which it is present. And if the participant is adapted, it immediately becomes animated and vital, [soul in effecting this not reasoning] 1 nor acting from deliberate choice, nor vivifying by cogitation and judgment, but by its very essence,

551OK THEOLOGY.

552and by that which it is, supplying the participant with life. Hence the being of soul is the same as to live. Tf therefore the soul possesses being from itself, and this is the same as to live , and it has life essentially;—if this be the case, it will impart life to itself, and will possess it from itself. And this being admitted, soul will be self-vital.

Proposition 190 (CXC)

553Every soul is a medium between impartible natures, and the natures which are divisible about bodies.

554For if soul is self-vital and self-subsistent, and has an hyparxis separate from bodies, it is, in consequence of being more excellent than, exempt from every thing divisible about body. For the natures which are divided about bodies, are entirely inseparable from their subjects, being co-distribuled with divisible bulks. They also depart from themselves, and their own impartiality, and are co-extended with bodies. And though they subsist in lives, yet these are not the lives of themselves, but of participants. Though likewise they exist in essence and in forms, yet they are not the forms of themselves, but of those things which are fashioned by forms. If therefore, soul is not these, it is a self-subsistent essence, a self-vital life, and a knowledge gnostic of itself. Hence, it is entirely separate from bodies, but is a participant of life. If however, this be the case, it also participates of essence. But it likewise participates of knowledge from other causes. It is evident therefore, that it is inferior to impartible natures, because it is filled ([with life externally.] * But if with life, it is evident that it is also externally filled with essence. For imparticipate life and imparticipable essence are prior to soul. 1 That soul however is not primarily gnostic is evident.’ For every soul

555indeed, so far as soul is life, but not every soul, so far as it is soul possesses knowledge. For a certain soul while it remains soul, is ignorant of [jreal] beings. Soul therefore, is not primarily gnostic, nor does it possess knowledge from its very being. Hence/ it has an essence secondary to those natures that are primarily, and by their very being, gnostic. Since however, the essence of soul is divided from its knowledge, soul does not belong to patures [entirely] impartible. But it has been demonstrated that neither does it rank among the natures that are divisible about bodies. Hence, it is a medium between both.

Proposition 191 (CXCI)

556Every participable soul has indeed an eternal essence, but its energy is accompanied with time.

557For either it possesses both eternally, or both temporally; or the one eternally, but the other temporally. It cannot however, possess both eternally: for it would be an impartible essence, and the nature of soul would in no respect differ from an. intellectual hypostasis, viz. a selfmotive from an immoveable nature. Nor can it possess both temporally: for thus it would be generated alone, and would neither be self-vital, nor self-subsistent. For nothing which is essentially measured by time is self-subsistent. But soul is self-subsistent. For that which is converted to itself, according to energy, is also essentially converted to itself, » and proceeds from itself. It remains therefore, that every soul is partly eternal, and partly participates of time. Either therefore, it is essentially eternal, [but participates of time according to energy,'] or vice versa. The latter however, is impossible. Hence, every participable soul, is allotted an eternal essence, but a temporal energy.

Proposition 192 (CXCII)

558Every participate soul ranks among the number of [truly existing! beings, and is the first of generated natures.

559For if it is essentially eternal, it is truly being according to its hyparxis, and always is. For that which participates of eternity, participates likewise of perpetual existence. But if it is in time according to energy, it is generated. For every thing which participates of time, since it is always becoming to be, or rising into existence, according to the prior and posterior of time, and is not at once that which it is, is wholly generated. But if every soul is in a certain, respect generated according to energy, it will be the first of generated natures. For that which is in every respect generated, is more remote from eternal natures.

Proposition 193 (CXCIII)

560Every soul subsists proximately from intellect.

561For if it has an immutable and eternal essence, it proceeds from an immoveable essence. For that which proceeds from a moveable essence, is essentially changed in every respect. The cause, therefore, of every soul is immoveable. But if it proximately subsists from intellect, it is perfected by, and converted to intellect. And if it participates of the knowledge which intellect imparts to the natures that are able to partake of it; (for all knowledge is derived from intellect, and all things have their progression essentially from that to which they are naturally converted)—if this be the case, every soul proceeds from intellect

Proposition 194 (CXCIV)

562Every soul contains all the forms which intellect primarily possesses.

563For if it proceeds from intellect, and intellect gives subsistence to soul; and if intellect subsisting immoveably produces all things by its very being, it will also impart to soul which it fabricates, the essential reasons [or producing principles] of all things which it contains. For every thing which produces by its very being, imparts secondarily to the thing generated by it, that which it is itself primarily. The soul, therefore, contains secondarily the representations of intellectual forms.

Proposition 195 (CXCV)

564Every soul is all things, containing indeed sensibles paradigmatically, or after the manner of an exemplar; but intelligibles iconically, or after the manner of an image.

565For subsisting as a medium between impartible natures, and such as are divisible about body, it produces and gives subsistence to the latter of these, but pre-establishes in itself the causes from which it proceeds. Those things, therefore, of which it is the pre-existent cause, it antecedently comprehends paradigmatically. But it possesses according to participation, and as the progeny of first natures the causes of its subsistence. Hence it antecedently comprehends according to cause all sensible natures, and contains the immaterial productive principles of things material, the incorporeal principles of things corporeal, and without interval, the principles of things which possess interval. But it contains intelligibles and the forms of them after the manner of an image; so that it receives partibly indeed impartibles, with multiplication unical natures, and in a self-motive manner, things immoveable. Hence it is all beings, containing such as are first, according to participation, but paradigmatically such as are posterior to its own nature.

Proposition 196 (CXCVI)

566Every participable soul, primarily uses a perpetual body, which possesses an unbegotten and incorruptible hypostasis.

567For if every soul is essentially eternal, and by its very being primarily animates some particular body, [it will always animate this body. For the essence of every soul is immutable]. But if this be the case, that which is animated by it is always animated, and always participates of life. That, however, which always lives, by a much greater priority always exists. But that which always is, is perpetual. Hence, that which is primarily suspended from every soul, is perpetual. But indeed every participable soul is primarily participated by a certain body, since it is participable and not imparticipable, and animates its participant by its very being. Every participated soul, therefore, uses a body which is primarily perpetual, and essentially unbegotten and incorruptible.

Proposition 197 (CXCVII)

568Every soul is an essence vital and gnostic, and a life essential and gnostic, and is knowledge, essence, and life. All things likewise subsist in it at once, the essential, the vital, and the gnostic; and all things are in aU, and each is separate from the rest.

569For if it is the medium between impartible forms, and those which are divided about bodies, it is neither so impartible as all intellectual natures, nor so partible as corporeal forms. Sinee, therefore, essences, lives and cognitions are divided in corporeal natures, these subsist in souls impartibly, unitedly, and incorporeally, and all of them exist at once, through their immateriality and impartiality. Since, likewise, in intellectual natures, all things subsist according to union, they are distinguished and divided in souls. All things, therefore, subsist together in these, and at

570the same time apart. But if ail impartibles subsist together and in one, they pervade through each other, and if they are separate, they are again divided without confusion; so that each subsists by itself, and all are in all. For in the essence of soul there is both life and knowledge;' since every soul would not know itself, if the essence of it was of itself deprived of life and knowledge. And in the life of the soul there are both essence and knowledge. For unessential 1 life, and which is without knowledge, pertains to material lives, which are neither able to know themselves, nor are genuine essences. . Knowledge, also, which is unessential and without life, is without subsistence. For all knowledge belongs to that which is vital, and which is of itself allotted an essence.

Proposition 198 (CXCVIII)

571Every thing which participates of time, and is always moved, is

Proposition 199 (CXCIX)

572Every mundane soul uses periods of its proper life, and restitutions to its former state.

573For if it is measured by time, it energizes transitively, and possesses a peculiar motion. * But every thing which is moved and participates of time, if it is perpetual, uses periods, periodically revolves, and is restored from the same things to the same. And every mundane soul possessing motion, and energizing according to time, will have periods of motions, and restitutions to its pristine state. For every period of perpetual natures is apocatastatic, or restorative to a former condition.

Proposition 200 (CC)

574Every period of soul is measured by time. The period of other souls indeed is measured by a certain time; but that of the first soul, since it is measured by time, is measured by the whole of time.

575For if all motions have prior and posterior, so likewise have periods, and on this account they participate of time. That also which measures all the periods of souls is time. But if indeed there were the same periods of all souls, and they were about the same things, the time of all would be the same. If, however, the restitutions of different souls are different, the periodic time also and which restores to a pristine state, is different in different souls.

576That the soul, therefore, which is primarily measured by time, is measured by the whole of time, is evident. For if time is the measure of all motion, that which is primarily moved, will entirely participate of time, and will be measured by the whole of time. For if the whole of time did not measure its first participant, it would not measure any thing else, according to the whole of itself. From these things, however, it is evident

577' For i) Stoxivi)<n(, it is necessary to read iSi« xiv>j<n$.

578that all souls are measured by certain measures which are more partial than the whole of time. For if these souls are more partial than the soul which primarily participates of time, neither can they adapt their periods to the whole of time. The multitude of their restitutions, however, will be parts of the one period, and of the one restitution of things to their pristine state, which is effected by the soul that primarily participates of time. For a more partial participation pertains to a less power; but a more total to a greater power. Other souls, therefore, are not naturally adapted to receive the whole temporal measure according to one life, because they are allotted an order inferior to that of the soul which is first measured by time.

Proposition 201 (CCI)

579All divine souls have triple energies; some indeed as souls; but others as receiving a divine intellect; and others as suspended from the Gods. And they provide indeed for the whole of things as Gods; but they know all things through an intellectual life; and they move bodies through a self-moved hyparxis.

580For because they psychically ' participate of the natures situated above them, and are not simply souls, but divine souls, and are established according to an order, in the psychical extent, analogous to the Gods, they energize not only psychically, but also divinely, being allotted a deified summit of their essence, and also because they have an intellectual hypostasis, through which they are spread under intellectual essences. Hence, they not only energize divinely, but also intellectually; the former indeed accoridng to the one which they contain; but the latter through an energy established according to intellect. A third energy, likewise, is present with them, according to their own hyparxis, which is motive indeed of things naturally alter-motive, but is vivific of such as possess an adventitious life. For this is the proper employment of every soul; but

581such energies as are intellectual and providential, they possess according to participation.

Proposition 202 (CCII)

582All souls attending upon, and always following the Gods, are inferior to divine, but are expanded above partial souls.

583For divine souls participating of intellect and deity, on which account, they are at the same time both intellectual and divine, are the leaders of other souls, just as the Gods also are the leaders of all beings. But partial souls are deprived of a suspension from intellect, in consequence of not being able to participate proximately of an intellectual essence. For they would not fall from intellectual energy, if they essentially participated of intellect, as has been before demonstrated [in Prop. 184]]. Hence, the souls which always follow the Gods are of a middle condition; receiving indeed a perfect intellect, and through this surpassing partial souls, yet not being suspended from the divine unities. For the intellect which they participate is not divine.

Proposition 203 (CCIII)

584Of every psychical multitude, divine souls indeed being greater in power than other souls, are contracted according to number. But those that always follow divine souls have a middle order among all souls, both in power and quantity. And partial souls indeed are inferior in power to the others, but proceed into a greater number.

585For divine souls are more allied to the one , on account of their hyparxis being divine; but souls of a middle rank, through.the participation of intellect; and those of the last order, are essentially dissimilar both to those of the middle, and those of the first rank. Among perpetual natures, however, those that are nearer to the one , are more single in number, and are more contracted in multitude, than such as are more remote from it.

586But such as are more remote from the one , are more multiplied. The powers, therefore, of superior souls are greater, and have the same ratio to those of souls in the second rank, which the divine has to the intellectual, and the intellectual to the psychical peculiarity. Inferior souls also are more in number. For that which is more remote from the one , is a greater, and that which is nearer to it, is a less multitude.

Proposition 204 (CCIV)

587Every divine soul is the leader of many souls that always follow the Gods; and of a still greater number of such as sometimes receive this order.

588£For if it is a divine soul] it is necessary that it should be allotted an order £ which is the leader or generator *] of all things, and which has a primary rank among souls. For in all beings that which is divine, is the leader of wholes. It is likewise requisite that every divine soul should neither alone preside over such souls as perpetually follow the Gods, nor over those alone that are sometimes their attendants. For if any divine soul should alone preside over those that sometimes follow the Gods, how can there be a contact between these and a divine soul, since they are entirely different from it, and neither proximately participate of intellect, nor much less of the Gods. But if it only presides over those that always follow the Gods, how is it that the series proceeds as far as to these falone] P For thus intellectual natures will be the last, and will be unprolific, and unadapted to perfect and elevate. It is necessary, therefore, that such souls as follow the Gods, and energize according to intellect, and which are elevated to intellects more partial than divine intellects, should be primarily suspended from a divine soul. But it is necessary that partial souls, and which through those that are divine as media, participate of intellect and a divine life, should be suspended from a

589divine soul in the second place. For through those which always participate of a more excellent condition, those that sometimes only participate of it, are perfected. And again, it is necessary that about every divine soul, there should be a greater number of those that only sometimes follow, than of those that always attend on the Gods. For the power of the monad always proceeds into multitude, according to diminution; being deficient indeed in power, but redundant in multitude. Since every soul also of those that always follow the Gods, is the leader of a greater multitude of partial souls, imitating in this a divine soul; and elevates a greater number of souls to the primary monad of the whole series. Every divine soul, therefore, is the leader of many souls that always follow the Gods, but presides over a still greater number of those that sometimes only receive this order.

Proposition 205 (CCV)

590Every partial soul has the same ratio to the soul under which it is essentially arranged, as the vehicle of the one to the vehicle of the other.

591For if the distribution of vehicles to souls is according to nature, it is necessary that the vehicle of every partial soul should have the same ratio to the vehicle of the soul which ranks as a whole, as the essence of the one to the essence of the other. The distribution, however, is according to nature. For things which primarily participate are spontaneously conjoined with the natures which they participate. If, therefore, as a divine soul is to a divine body, so is a partial soul to a partial body, each soul essentially participating,—if this be the case, that which was at first asserted is true, that the vehicles of souls have the same ratio to each other, as the souls themselves of which they are the vehicles.

Proposition 207 (CCVII)

592The vehicle of every partial soul, is fabricated by an immoveable cause.

593For if it is perpetually and connascently suspended from the soul that uses it,* being immutable according to essence, it is allotted its hypostasis from an immoveable cause. For every thing which is generated from moveable causes, is essentially changed. Moreover, every soul has a perpetual body, which primarily participates of it. Hence, the cause of a partial soul, and therefore of its vehicle, * is immoveable, and on this account supermundane.

Proposition 208 (CCVIII)

594The vehicle of every partial soul is immaterial, essentially indivisible, and impassive.

595For if it proceeds from an immoveable fabrication, and is perpetual, it will have an immaterial and impassive hypostasis. For such things as are adapted to suffer essentially, and to be changed, are all of them material, and in consequence of subsisting differently at different times, are suspended from moveable causes. Hence, likewise, they receive an all-various mutation, being moved in conjunction with their principal causes. Moreover, that this vehicle is indivisible, is manifest. For every thing which is divided, so far as it is divided, is corrupted, in consequence of departing from the whole, and from its continuity. If, therefore, it is essentially immutable and impassive, it will-be indivisible.

Proposition 209 (CCIX)

596The vehicle of every partial soul descends indeed with the addition of more material vestments, but becomes united to the soul by an ablation of every thing material, and a recurrence to its proper form, analogous to the soul that uses it.

597For this soul indeed descends irrationally, assuming irrational lives; but it ascends laying aside all the generation-producing powers, with which it was invested iu its descent, and becoming [pure, returns to the pristine condition of its nature. For the vehicle '3 imitates the lives of the souls that use it, and they being every where moved, it is moved in conjunction with them. By its circulations likewise it represents the intellections of some souls; but the falling of others through their inclination to the realms of generation; and the purifications of others, through the circumductions which lead to an immaterial nature. For because it is vivified by the very essence of souls, * and is connascent

598’ There is a chasm here in the original, which as it is not supplied in the version of Patricius, I have filled up by conjecture. Hence, I have added the words xaimpav, avarpt^tt its rtjy «unj{

599with them, it is all-variously changed in conjunction with their energies; follows them every where; becomes co-passive with them; is restored to its pristine state together with them when they are purified;' and is elevated when they are elevated, and aspires after its own perfection. For every thing is perfected when it obtains its proper perfection.

Proposition 210 (CCX)

600Every connascent vehicle of the soul, always possesses both the same figure and magnitude. But it is seen to be greater and less, and of a dissimilar figure, through the additions and ablations of other bodies.

601For if it derives its essence from an immoveable cause, it is evident that both its figure and its magnitude are defined by this cause, and each is immutable and invariable. Moreover, at different times it appears to be different, as likewise greater and less. Hence, through other bodies added from the material elements, and again taken away, it exhibits a different appearance both in quantity and form.

Proposition 211 (CCXI)

602Every partial soul descending into generation descends wholly; nor does one part of it remain on high, and another part descend.

603For if something pertaining to the soul remained on high in the intelligible world, it will always perceive intellectually, without transition or transitively. But if without transition, it will be intellect, and not a part of the soul, and this partial soul will proximately 1 participate of intellect. This, however, is impossible. But if it perceives intellectually withtran-

604sition, from that which always [and from that which sometimes*] energizes intellectually, one essence will be formed. This, however, also is impossible. For these always differ, as has been demonstrated. To which may be added, the absurdity resulting from supposing that the summit of the soul is always perfect, and yet does not rule over the other powers, and cause them to be perfect. Every partial soul, therefore, wholly descends.

605' From the version of Patricius, it is here necessary to supply the words uu tw mi mouvto;.

606Vo l. II.

607PROVIDENCE AND FATE,

608v AND THAT

609WHICH IS IN OUR POWER,

610THEODORUS, THE MECHANIST.

6111. I am of opinion, my friend Theodoras, that the conceptions of your mind are mature, and adapted to a man who loves the contemplation of beings; and I am gratified that you have thought fit to write to us on these subjects; though there are many among you that are able to investigate and doubt with you about such like problems. But it is requisite, as it seems, that we also should adduce * what appears to us to be the truth on the subjects which you have proposed for our discussion, and what we conceive to accord with things themselves, and with the

612ON PROVIDENCE AND FATE.

613opinions of the most celebrated of the philosophers prior to us; and that we should not in vain hear the inquiries of a man eminently skilled in mechanics, who was formerly known to us, as I conceive, and as you have asserted. You inquire however, about things which have been a thousand times investigated, and which in my opinion will never have any. rest, because the soul is excited to the discussion of them, much light having been already thrown on them by the elaborate writings of Plotinus and Iamblichus, and prior to these by the divine Plato; and if it be not too much to say, such particulars respecting them have been proclaimed by the divinely-inspired mouth of theologists, as Plato alone has unfolded ‘ by demonstrations. And why is it requisite to adduce to you Plato, and men who were divinely wise, since they have been most luminously developed 1 by the Gods themselves, who transcendently know what pertains to themselves, and what they have produced, and have not been delivered by them in enigmas, as by theologists. It is requisite therefore, that we also writing conformably to them, should as I have said adduce to you what appears to us to be the truth respecting the subjects

6142. You deserve indulgence if looking to the all-various tragic and comic, and other connexions of human affairs, you have conceived that there is only one fabricator and maker of such colligations in the universe, and have called this Fate; or rather you have denominated it the series and consequent generation of things; have thought that such a dramatic scene is alone directed by some inevitable necessity; and have celebrated ; this as providence, and asserted that it alone possesses freedom of will, ! I and is the lord of all things. But you have conceived that the freedom ; S of will of the human soul is only a name, and is truly nothing, since she ! ' has an arrangement in the world, is subservient to the energies of other j • things, and is a part of the mundane fabric. Or rather, that I may use your own words, the human soul is a machine, since there is an irrefragable cause which moves all things that the world comprehends in itself. But ;

615* “ Differenter elucidate.” So Moibeka v i Irfftrenter being doubtless hi* version of Jiapigsmuf.

616ON PROVIDENCE

617the universe being as it were one machine, the whole spheres are complicated in each other analogously to certain drums, but the partial animals and souls that are moved by them, and in short, all things, depend on one mover. And perhaps in consequence of honouring your art, you have oonceived that the maker of the universe is a certain mechanic, and that you are an imitator of the best of causes. These things however we have written, mingling the jocose with the serious.

6183. Betaking ourselves therefore to the contest, we say, that the difference of these three things ought especially to be considered by you, if you intend to arrive at the gate of the subjects of investigation. And of these, the first indeed is, that Providence and Fate do not differ in the way in which you conceive they do, viz. that the one is a connected consequence, but the other is necessity, the cause of this consequence. For both indeed are the causes of the world, and of whatever is produced in the world, but Providence subsists prior to Fate; and all that is produced according to Fate, is by a much greater priority produced by Providence, but the contrary is not true; for in short,' the natures which are governed by Providence are more divine than those which are governed by Fate. The second thing is this, that the soul which is separable from the body, and which descends into this mortal abode from the Gods, is different from the soul which is in bodies, and which subsists in, and is inseparable from its subjects; and that the latter essentially depends on Fate, but the former on Providence. The third particular is, that the science and truth which are inherent in souls conversant with generation, though they may lead an immaculate life, are different from the science and truth in souls that have fled from this abode, and are established in that place whence they first fell, and descended into the realms of mortality. Of these three particulars therefore, as we have said, if you can discover sufficient solutions, you will obtain a satisfactory answer to your inquiries. For Providence indeed, differing in the above mentioned manner from Fate, it will be evident that many things escape

619' n Soaum cairn totonna.” This I suppose wests the Greek «a«? yaf.

620AND FATE.

621Fate, but that nothing escapes Providence; that Providence supernally governs Fate, produces it, and has limited its empire * by alter-motive natures, viz. by things which are allotted their first subsistence in beings that are moved by something else. But again, having shown that the soul which is separable from bodies, is different from that which is planted in bodies, it will be manifest to you which of these two possesses freedom of will, and that which is in our power; which is subservient to necessity, and is under the dominion of Fate ; and where the complication of these is to be found, on account of which the one dulls the freedom of the will through a subordinate life, but the other participates of a certain image of election, in consequence of its greater proximity to a more excellent nature.* And science appearing to you to be twofold, it will be evident after what manner both Plato and Socrates, and to these also may be added the great Parmenides, assert, that the soul while here is capable of knowing truth, when it is purified from material darkness, and the passions introduced into it by the body, and its commixture with corporeal natures, but that it is allotted science in a greater degree, and in a more genuine mode, when it exists beyond bodies, and generation, and bitter matter.

6224. These three problems therefore, being necessary and having been well discussed * by the ancients, partly by Iamblichus, in his copious and elaborate treatises On Providence and Fate, and partly by all the lovers of Plato, who proclaim that the soul is twofold, by Plotinus likewise in many places, and also by Porphyry, who make a distinction between contemplation, and contemplative virtue, and in short, by all who are able to understand Plato,—this being the case, it is necessary that beginning from the first thing proposed, we should discover the difference between Providence and Fate. “ But in every thing, says Plato, it is

623ON PROVIDENCE

624requisite to know the one principle of that which is the subject of speculation, or we must err in every thing/' It is necessary however, as the demoniacal Aristotle teaches, after inquiring if a thing is, to investigate in the next place what it is. If therefore, you inquired whether Providence is, or is not, and in a similar manner concerning Fate, it would be requisite in the first place to show you that each of them is , 1 and if you still doubted, I should be unwilling after this to answer your doubts, but since you acknowledge that both of them have a subsistence, and that all things are comprehended in their dominion, it evidently remains, I conceive, that I should demonstrate to you what each of them is; for from this it will be evident what it is in which they differ. And this being known, many of your doubts, as we have said, will be solved. But again, because to the discovery of what a thing is, the dividing method is said to contribute, which Socrates in the Philebus celebrates as the gift of the Gods to men, and because what are called our common conceptions contribute to the discovery of principles, from which conceptions it is possible, as Aristotle writes, to investigate many things that are demonstrable,—hence it is requisite that we also employing both these, should unfold Providence and Fate; so far as pertains to what we say they are, using common conceptions, but so far as pertains to other things, employing distinctly the divisions of beings, from which, as it appears 10 me, we can alone discover what the definitions are of Providence and Fate. But these being known will enkindle a clear light in the subjects of investigation, and will perhaps free us from the doubts by which we are at present detained.

6255. The common conceptions therefore of all men, and which possess indubitable evidence, assert, that Providence is indeed the cause of good to those beings for which it provides, and that Fate is also a cause, but the cause of a certain connexion and consequence to those things that are generated. For that all of us have these irrefragable conceptions about Providence and Fate, is evident from our asserting that men who

626* “ Quia est utrumque,*’ with Morbeka.

627AND FATE.

628are the procurers of good to others, have well provided for the subjects of their beneficence; and again, we denominate that which is evolved through many causes complicated with each other and unknown to us, no otherwise than Fate. Our life also is full of these names, because names testify the truth of these conceptions. For the word Providence (vgoi ma) indicates 1 that energy which is prior to intellect, and which it is necessary to attribute to the good alone; for this alone is more divine than intellect, because much-honoured intellect desires good, together with all things and prior to all things. But the word Fate indicates that

629which connects all things that are naturally adapted to have such a connexion. Moreover, that the thing which is provided for is not the imparting, nor that which is connected, Fate, nor that which proceeds into this, connexion, but that which connects, you may assuope from this, that all of us conceive Providence and Fate to be certain productive powers. But every where effective causes are distinct from their effects: and these three things differ from each other, viz. that which makes, that which is made, and the energy of making.* Just as in what pertains to Providence and Fate there are, that which provides, that which is provided for, and the effective energy which proceeds from the providing cause into that which is provided for: and again, there are, that which connects, that which is connected, and the effective energy proceeding from the connecting cause into the thing connected. And it is evident that according to each of these triads, that which makes is not such as that which is made, but if the latter is various, it is necessary that the former should be simple, and that if the participant of good is the thing made, the maker should be imparticipable. For every where that which makes is allotted a part more divine than that which is made. When we say therefore, that Providence is the cause of good, we must also say that it is the fountain of good, which does not require to be benefited by other things. And admitting Fate to be the cause of connexion, we must not

630* « Qualificat,” with Morbeka.

631ON PROVIDENCE

632say that it is itself connected by other things. Such therefore, being the common conceptions which we antecedently assume of these two, it remains in the next place that we should consider what it is in which each of them excels [[and by which each is characterized}: and first, in what the characteristic of Fate consists.

6336. From these conceptions therefore, we infer that Fate is the cause of things that are connected. But let us consider what the things are that are connected. Of beings therefore, some have their essence in eternity, but others in time. By beings however, whose essence is in eternity, I mean those whose energy 1 together with their essence is eternal: but by beings whose essence is in time, I mean those whose essence is not, but is always in generation, or rising into existence, though it should be in generation for an infinite time. And the natures that subsist between these, are such as have their essence indeed permanent, and better than generation, but their energy measured by time. For it is necessary that every progression from things first to last should be effected through media. Since therefore, there are beings which are eternal both in essence and energy, it is necessary that there should be a middle extent, and that it should either have an eternal essence, but an energy indigent of time, or the contrary. The contrary however is impossible, that we may not confess that we place energies prior to essences. Hence it remains that the medium must be that which has an eternal essence, but a temporal energy. We say therefore, that we have exhibited to you these three orders of beings, the intellectual, the psychical,* and the corporeal. But I call the intellectual that which exists and is intellective through all eternity; the corporeal, that which is always rising into existence, or becoming to be, either in an infinite time, or in a part of time; and the psychical, that which is eternal indeed in essence, but which employs temporal energies. Where then, must the things which are connected be arranged ? Consider assuming from the Gods the meaning

6341 “ Operatio,” with Morbcka} in the original mgyu*,

635* with Morbeka anmalm.

636AND FATE.

637of the term t^to-deu to be connected , as implying nothing else than this, that the natures which are differently produced according to time, are conjoined with, and not separated from each other. And if existing at one and the same time they are distant from each other according to place, yet they have a certain co-ordination with each other. Hence being separated either by places or times, they are in a certain respect collected into unity, and into one sympathy, through connexion. And in short,' the things which are connected, cannot suffer this from themselves, but require something else which may impart to them connexion. If therefore the natures which are arranged under Fate, are such as are connected with each other, according to our common conception of Fate; but the things which are connected are partible, being distant either in places or times, and are naturally adapted to be connected by something else, on account of the opinion of connexion which prevails among all men ; and these are moved by something else, and are corporeal j for of the natures which are beyond bodies, some [i. e. intellects] are better both than place and time, but others [viz. souls] though they energize according to time, appear to be pure from place;—if this be the case, it is evident that the things which are governed and connected by Fate, are moved by something else, and arc entirely corporeal.

6387. Ip however this is demonstrated, it is evident that admitting Fate to * be the cause of connexion, we must also admit that it presides over alter-motive and corporeal natures. But assuming this, we will ask ourselves what that is which is said to be the cause of bodies, which is proximate to them, and by which things alter-motive are inspired 1 and contained, and accomplish whatever they are able to effect. And if you are willing, looking in the first place to our bodies, let us consider what it is that moves and nourishes, and always reweaves, and binds them together?

639Is not this that which is innate in bodies, which also in other animals

640* o\a>st totaliter Morbekz.

641* aspirantur in Morbeka, should evidently be impmmtwr.

642on Providence

643exhibits a similar energy, 1 which extends as far as to things that are rooted in the earth, and possesses a twofold energy, this indeed renovating bodies that they may not by discerption entirely vanish, but that preserving the several individuals in a condition conformable to nature ? For it is not the same thing to add what is deficient, and to preserve the power of things that are held together. If therefore, not only in us, and other animals and plants, but in this universe also * much prior to bodies, there is one nature of the world, which is connective and motive of the subsistence of bodies, as it is also in us, or why do we call all bodies the progeny of nature, it is indeed necessary that nature should be the cause of things that are connected, and that in this what is called Fate should be investigated. And on this account perhaps the daemoniacal Aristotle also is accustomed to call those augmentations or generations which are effected beside the accustomed time, deviations from Fate. And the divine Plato says, “ that the world considered by itself, without the intellectual Gods, is convolved as being corporeal by Fate, and innate desire.” The oracles of the Gods also accord with these and bear wit ness to our demonstrations when they say: “ Look not upon Nature, for the name of it is fatal.” And thus we have discovered what Fate is, and how it is the nature of this world, and a certain incorporeal essence. For it presides over and is the life of bodies, and this essentially, since it internally moves bodies, and not externally, moves all things according to time, and connects the motions of all things that are distant both in times and places; according to which also, mortal are adapted to the participation of eternal natures, are convolved together with them, and these are mutually copassive. For the nature which is in us, binds and connects all the parts of our body, and their operations on each other: and this also is a certain Fate of our body. As in our body likewise, some parts are more, but others are less principal, and the latter follow the former, so in the universe, the generations of the less principal follow the motions of the more principal parts, viz. the sublunary generations follow the periods of the celestial orbs, and

644AND FATE.

645the circle of the former is an image of the circle of the latter. And these things which have been divulged by all the ancients, I am unwilling to prolong.

6468. It is not therefore, difficult for you to see what Providence is. For if you assert that the fountain of good is primarily the divine cause itself, you will speak rightly. For whence, except from divinity, is good imparted to all things? So that as Plato says, “ no other cause of good than God, is to be admitted.” In the next place, Providence being established above both intelligibles and sensibles, is superior to Fate. And those things which are under Fate, are also under Providence, possessing indeed, their connexion from Fate, but their participation of good from Providence, so that the connexion may have a good end, and that Providence may contain the end of Fate in itself. But again, with respect to things that are under Providence, all of them are not likewise indigent of Fate, but intellectual natures are exempt from it. For the empire of Fate is entirely in corporeal natures ; * since to be connected introduces time, and corporeal motion. To these things also, as it appears to me, Plato looking, says that a subsistence of this kind, is mingled from intellect and necessity, intellect ruling* over the necessity of bodies. And in this place, he calls the motive cause necessity, which he elsewhere denominates Fate, conceiving that bodies act by compulsion. And this rightly. For every body is compelled both to do whatever it does, and to suffer whatever it suffers, to heat, or to be heated, to impart or to receive cold. But choice is not in bodies, because you may say that their peculiarity is the necessary and an existence unaccompanied with choice. For if this were not the case, what could there be that is better than bodies ? For the body which is moved in a circle, and which is of an illustrious nature, is thus moved from necessity, in the same manner as fire is from necessity moved to the circumference, but earth to the

647' “ Ubi autem in corporeis penitus.” So Morbeka.

648* “ Intellectu participante necessitate corporum.” Partidpanie here is perhaps an error of the transcriber; for Morbeka I have no doubt wrote princtpanie.

649ON PROVIDENCE

650middle Eof the universe!. Plato therefore asserts that necessity presides over the generations of bodies, and on this account, over their corruptions also; but he exalts intellect, and determines that it rules over necessity. If therefore Providence is above intellect, it is evident that it rules over intellect, and those things which are under this necessity; and that necessity alone rules over those things which are under its dominion. Hence, every thing indeed which has an intellectual subsistence, continues to exist under Providence alone, but every thing which has a corporeal subsistence, endures under necessity.

6519. You must understand therefore, that there are two genera of things, the one intellectual, but the other sensible, and also that there are two kingdoms of these, the kingdom of Providence indeed above, which reigns over both intellectuals and sensibles, and the kingdom of Fate beneath, which has dominion over sensibles alone. And Providence differs from Fate, in the same way in which a God differs from that which is divine indeed, but by participation and not primarily. For in other things also, as you may see, one thing has a primary subsistence, and another is according to participation. Thus for instance, there is light in the sun,* and light in the air, but the former subsists primarily, and the latter subsists on account of the former. And life is primarily in the soul, but secondarily in the body, and subsists on account of the life of the soul. Thus also, Providence indeed, is essentially deity, but Fate is something divine, and not deity , for it depends on Providence, and is as it were its image. For if as Providence is to intellectual, so is Fate to sensible beings; since the former reigns over intellectuals, but the latter over sensibles; then alternately, as geometricians say, as Providence is to Fate, so are intellectuals to sensibles. But intellectuals are primarily beings, and sensibles derive their subsistence from them. Hence Providence is primarily that which it is, and from this the order of Fate is suspended. But of these things enough.

652* « V«fot Hawn Sol,” -should he metut lumen sole.

653AND FATE.

65410. If you are willing, however, we will betake ourselves to the second discussion, viz. the consideration of the soul which is separable, and of that which is inseparable from bodies. But assume this also from the philosophy of Aristotle. For he says, that every soul which has an energy not at all indigent of body, is likewise allotted an essence beyond and separable from body. And this necessarily. For if we should arrange energy as existing independent of body, but essence inseparable from body, energy would be better than essence, since it would not be at all indigent of a subordinate essence, that being rooted in it, it might have a subsistence according to nature. This however is impossible. It is necessary, therefore, that the soul which has an energy separable from body, should also be itself separable. Consider then, my friend, what soul it is in us, which we acknowledge is not at all indigent of body, in the energies of itself according to nature ? Is it sense ? But every sensitive power uses corporeal instruments, and together with them energizes about its proper sensibles; viz. it uses the eyes, the ears, and all the other Senses, being at the same time moved and co-passive with them. What then shall we say of anger and desire? But do you not see that these frequently co-operate with the corporeal parts, with the heart and the liver, and that these also are not pure from body ? For how is it possible that things which energize with sense, should not also be indigent of body, since sense is always moved through body P But with respect to the orectic powers, that these energize with sense, is I conceive known to all of us. For what deprived of sense, can either be angry, or desire? Plotinus also rightly asserting, that all the passions are either senses, or are not without sense. If, therefore, that which is angry is so in conjunction with sense, possessing at the same time a sense of sorrow, and that which desires possesses a sense of delight; but that which energizes with sense energizes with body, for sense subsists with body;— if this be the case, it is necessary that every thing which is angry and desires, should energize with bod}'. Hence, these species of life, being all of them irrational, have that energy which is according to nature in conjunction with body.

655ON PROVIDENCE

65611. Looking now, however, to the rational nature itself, consider the life of it which is seated in the inferior lives, and corrects either what is deficient in them according to knowledge, as when from above it evinces that sense is deceived about its own objects of knowledge. 1 mean for instance, when it shows that sense is deceived in asserting that the sun is but a foot in diameter, or when sense with its usual deception asserts of such things any thing of a similar nature: or when reason disciplines anger,' which is immoderate in its motions, when it is agitated with fury. Hence Ulysses in Homer exclaims “ endure, my heart,” and represses the impulse of anger barking like a dog: or when the rational nature represses the wantonness of desire, and frustrates its endeavours to detain the soul by the delights that germinate from the body, the petulance of these delights being ameliorated by the corporeal temperaments. For in all such energies the rational soul evidently represses all the irrational motions both gnostic and orectic, and liberates itself from them, as from things foreign to its nature. It is necessary, however, to investigate the nature of every thing, not from the perverted use of it, but from its natural energies. Hence, if reason, when it is moved in us as reason, restrains the shadowy impression of the delights of desire, punishes the precipitate motion of anger, and reproves sense as full of deception, asserting that we neither hear nor see any thing accurately,* and if it asserts these things looking to its internal reasons, none of which it knows through body, or through corporeal cognitions, it is evident that accord* ing to this energy it elongates itself from the senses, contrary to the decision of which it is separated from those sorrows and delights.

65712. After this, however, I see another and a better energy of our ratibnal soul, the inferior powers being now at rest, and exhibiting no tumult, as in many things they are accustomed to do, according to which energy she is converted to herself, sees her own essence and the powers 1

658AND FATE.

659ON PROVIDENCE

660causes that impart intellect are above things intellectualized, and in a similar manner imparticipable hypostases are above all participants. For according to all these elevating intellections, I conceive it is evident to those that are not perfectly blind, how the rational soul leaving sense and bodies behind, is led upward by intellectual surveys about the inflected and truly mystic intuitions of the supermundane Gods. Or whence, and from what kind of energies have the progeny of the Gods unfolded to us the occult dispensations of divinity? And after what manner are souls said to energize enthusiastically, and assuming a mania better than temperance' to be conjoined to the Gods themselves ? I speak of the Sibyl who soon after she was born uttered admirable things, and told those who were present at the time who she was, and from what order she came into this terrestrial abode, and I allude to any other soul who in a similar manner was of a divine destiny/

66114. In short, we must say that the rational and intellectual soul in whatever way it may energize, is beyond body and sense; and therefore it is necessary that it should have an essence separable from both these. This however though of itself now evident, I will again manifest from hence, that when it energizes according to nature, it is superior to the influence of Fate, but that when it falls into sense, and becomes irrational and corporeal, it follows the natures that are beneath it, and living with them as with intoxicated neighbours, is held in subjection by a cause that has dominion over things that are different from the rational essence/ For again, it is necessary that there should be a certain genus of beings of this kind, which according to essence indeed is above Fate, bht according to habitude is sometimes arranged under it. For if indeed the beings which are wholly eternal are placed above the laws of Fate, but there are beings which according to the whole of their life, are arranged under the periods of Fate, it will also be necessary that there should be an intermediate nature between these two, which sometimes

662AND FATE.

663indeed is above the productions of Fate, and sometimes is under its dominion. For the progression of beings much more than the situation of bodies, leaves no vacuum; but there are every where media between the extremes, which also bind the extremes to each other. And not only Plato, but likewise the oracles of the Gods have revealed these things to us. For in the first place indeed, they order those divine men who were thought worthy to be the auditors of those mystic discourses, “ not to look upon nature , became the name of it is fatal” And again, they order them “ not to co-augment Fate.” Every where also, they exhort them to turn from the life which is according to Fate, and to avoid “ becoming corporeal with the fatal herds;” by all which they withdraw us from the senses and material desires; for through these we become corporeal, and are /• then acted upon from necessity by Fate. For similitude every where copulates * beings to each other; but that which is assimilated enjoys the same polity as that to which it is assimilated, whatever it may be, and consequently, is under the dominion of the ruler of that polity. For nothing is without a ruler and a principality in the universe, whether you speak of wholes, or of parts. But different things have different rulers, because these live in one way, and those in another. Afterwards, the oracles teaching concerning our most divine life, and that immaculate polity, which we enjoy when liberated from every polity of Fate, say,

664“ The souls that become venerable by understanding the works of the father l will escape the fatal wing * of Destiny”

66515. The soul, therefore, embracing this life, and such a life as this, will not rank among those souls that are led by Fate. But if it wishes to

666> In Morbeka captat instead of copulat.

667ON PROVIDENCE

668conform itself to body, aspires after what are called corporeal goods, and pursues honours, power and riches, it suffers the same thing as a philosopher who is chained, and in this condition enters a ship. For he becomes subservient to the winds that move the ship, [[and cannot help himself] if some one of the sailors should trample on him, or some fettered slave should insult him. Bidding farewell, therefore, to the things to which we are bound, we should direct our attention to the strength of virtue, and consider Fate not as effecting any thing in us, but in the things which surround us. For with respect, my friend, to all external circumstances that may befal us, enemies may demolish the walls of our city, and reduce its buildings to ashes, they may deprive us of our possessions, and leave us in a state of indigence; but all these being mortal and external, are in consequence of this in. the power of other beings, and not in ours. But with respect to the things which are in our power, there is no one so potent as to be able to take away any one of them, even though he should possess all human power. For if we are temperate, we shall still continue to be so, though these calamities may befal us, and if we are con tern plators of true beings, neither shall we be plundered of this habit; but all these dreadful events taking place, we shall still persevere in celebrating the rulers of all things, and in investigating the causes of effects.

66916 . By no means, therefore, must we reprobate the necessity of the soul from its ultimate energies, but looking to its first energies, we should admire its unconquerable power. And if we are thus wise, nothing will disturb us pertaining to the passions of the inferior parts of the sou); but when the body is disturbed, and we say that we sustain something of a dreadful nature, it is not we who thus speak, but it is the language of desire; ’ for the delights of the body, and therefore its sorrows pertain to this part. When also being robbed of our wealth, or not obtaining riches, we are grieved, this passion belongs to that power of the soul which is a lover of wealth. And again, when being reproached, and

670’ In Morbeka, toncupiteentia ; but in the Greek it was doubtless 9*ifafua$. This word as used by Plato and Aristotle, signifies an appetite of the soul directed to the possession and enjoyment

671AND FATE.

672falling from power, we are indignant, this is not the passion of the superior soul, but of that which dwells downward, about the heart. For this pertains to the part which is a lover of honour. But the reason which is in us, being in all such particulars deceived, follows and is at the same time disturbed with the subordinate powers of the soul, being a blind intellect, and not having that eye ' yet purified, by which it is able to perceive itself, and the natures prior and posterior to itself. When, however, it becomes purified from those things with which it was invested when it fell, it will then know what that is which is in its power, how it is " neither in corporeal natures; for these are posterior to reason; nor in those beings in whom there is the liberty of divine will; for they are prior to reason; but that it consists in living according to virtue. For this alone is free and unservile, and adapted to liberty, and is truly the power of the soul, and confers power on its possessor. For it is the province of all power to contain and preserve that which possesses it.

673IT. But he who directs his attention to vice, looks at the debility of the soul, though she should possess all other power. For the power of instruments is one thing, and the power of those beings that ought to use the instruments another. Hence, every soul, so far as it participates of virtue, and so far as it is [a rational soul], is free; but so far as it is vicious and debilitated, and is not Crational], it is subservient to other things/ and not to Fate only, but to every thing, in short, that is either willing to give that which is appetible, or is able to take it away. For he who possesses virtue is subservient to those beings who are alone sufficient to impart to and coaugment with him that which is desirable; but these are the Gods, with whom there is true virtue, and from whom that which is in our power is derived. Plato also somewhere says, that this voluntary servi-

674* « Et nondum puTgatus illud,” in Morbeka, i. e. ilium oculum.

675ON PROVIDENCE

676S> tude is the greatest liberty. For by being subservient to those who possess all the power of all things, we become assimilated to them, so that, as he says, we govern the whole world; i. e. when we are perfect and winged, and reign on high. This, therefore, pertains to the most divine of our souls, just as it pertains to the last of them, to be as it were bound in prison, and to live an involuntary, instead of a voluntary free life. But to the souls that have an intermediate subsistence between these, it belongs, so far as they are liberated from passions and the body, to ascend above necessity to a life which has dominion over generation.

67718. For again, if intellect and deity are prior to soul, but passions and bodies are posterior to it; and if to these it belongs to act from compulsion, but to intellect and deity, to act in a manner better than all necessity, and which is alone free, it is necessary that the soul betaking itself either to the former or to the latter, should either enter under the necessity of subordinate, or exert the liberty of more excellent natures; and that it should be subservient either to a supernal dominion, or to a dominion inferior to itself.' But if it is subservient, it must either rule in conjunction with the powers that rule over it, or be alone subservient in conjunction with subservient natures. Here, therefore, the soul ascending and resuming its power, which is virtue, will consider nothing as dreadful whatever it may be, that lakes place about and external to the body. For the passions of instruments do not pass to those that use them; but in whatever manner they may subsist, it is possible for the soul to energize according to virtue; strenuously indeed, if the body should happen to be languid, but moderately when it is sane. And when poverty is present, it may energize sublimely, but in affluence magnificently ; but every where from occurring circumstances, it may extol virtue that uses them; and being ameliorated by its inward strength may vanquish external calamities. For you must not suppose that you mechanists alone, are to be permitted to say, that you can move a given

678AND FATE.

679weight with a given power; for this you are well known to assert; but it is much more possible for those who live according to virtue, truly to adorn a power given from every circumstance by another power. And he who does this is generous and free; but the bad man is the slave of all things though he should rule over all things. For he resembles those who are punished in Egypt, by laughing vizards that surround them. Over these also, who are not able to govern themselves, necessity prevails. For being elongated from the Gods, the universe uses them as brutes.

68019. When, therefore, you wish to see that which is in our power, look at the soul living according to nature. But the soul which is not debile lives according to nature. For there is nothing debile in that which is conformable to nature. The soul, however, is not debile, which is not replete with vice, [the evil of the soul]; for in all things evil is debile. And if you consider the soul in this point of view, you will see what the nature is of that which is in our power. For you will see that it uses all circumstances rightly, and either prohibits them from taking place, or providentially attends to calamitous events when they occur. It also permits Fate to act upon those things which are posterior to Fate, and of which it is the lord; but is co-ordinated to the natures prior to itself, and from which being more excellent than itself, it is not divulsed. And thus much for the second particular which we proposed to discuss.

68120. In the third place, we will show what, and of what kind the modes of knowledge are; for if we suffer these to remain indistinct, we shall ignorantly err both about things themselves, and the doctrines of the divine Plato. Let us then direct our attention to that mode of knowledge divulged by Aristotle, and also Plato, which without the assignation of cause alone knows the truth of the on; or that a thing is; * because to souls beginning to be purified, these philosophers attribute opinion as the first mode of knowledge, and as adapted to those who are instructed

682ON PROVIDENCE

683in practical affairs, 1 without engaging in the contemplation of beings. For erudition is a purgation of the immoderation of the passions, reason in this case being copassive indeed, but moderately, and casting off all the rope of the passions.

68421. Such then being this mode of knowledge, another mode of an elevating nature is delivered to us from the same Gymnasium. But this knowledge is said to proceed from principles indeed as hypotheses, to know causes, and to form necessary conclusions in all its reasonings. And such is the knowledge obtained through arithmetic and geometry, which syllogize, conclude from things necessary, and are alone placed above doxastic knowledge. Because, however these sciences abiding in their principles, do not ascend to the causes of these, on this account they show themselves to fall short of the most perfect knowledge. For as Aristotle says,“ it is not the business of a geometrician to discourse with him who subverts the principles of his science.” Hence, in these sciences, that which is deduced from principles acknowledged by them will be manifest; but that which pertains to the principles themselves is obscure and unknown.

68522. In the third place, ascending higher, conceive me to speak of that knowledge of the human soul which ascends as far as to the one , and to that which is unhypothetical, through all forms or ideas, as I may say, dividing some, but analyzing others, and producing many things from one, and one thing from many. Socrates, in the Republic, defines this knowledge to be the defensive inclosure of the mathematical sciences, and the guest in the Epinomis asserts it to be the bond of them. For from this, geometry, and each of the other sciences, assume the theory concerning their principles, adapting * to themselves many principles, and which are divided or separated from the one principle of all things. For what the one is in all beings, that a point is in geometry, the monad in arithmetic,

686AND FATE.

687and in every thing, that which is most simple; from which principles the several sciences producing those things which are under them, frame their demonstrations. Each of these, however, is said to be, and is, a certain principle. For the principle of all beings is simply principle, and the highest ascent of the sciences, is as far as to this.

68823. There still remains for you to understand a fourth mode of our knowledge, which is more simple than the preceding, because it does not employ methods, or analyses, or compositions, or definitions, or demonstrations; but those who are able to energize according to it, celebrate it as contemplating beings by simple, and as it were self-visive projections; and they add, that they venerate it as intellect, and not as science. Or have you not heard that Aristotle in his demonstrative treatises says, that the intellect which is in us is our most excellent part, and is that by which we knowterms or boundaries’; and that Plato in the Timseus asserts that intellect and science are the knowledges of the soul about beings P For science indeed appears to pertain to the soul, so far as the soul is knowledge; but intellect pertains to it so far as the soul is the image of true and real intellect. For intellect perceiving intellectuals, or rather being one with them, Plato says, that it understands them by projecting energies, by intuition and contact, understanding itself, and beholding intelligibles in itself, on which account it intellectually sees what it is, and knows that it is at one and the same time both the perceiver and the thing perceived. The soul, therefore, imitating this as much as she is able, becomes herself intellect, running above science, leaving the many methods with which she was before adorned, elevating her eye to beings alone, and understanding them by contact in the same manner as intellect; from which she differs in this, that she comes into contact with different intelligibles at different times, but intellect passes into contact with all things at once.

68924. After all these modes of knowledge, I wish you (who have believed in Aristotle when he leads the soul upward as far as to intellectual energy, but insinuates nothing beyond this), to assume a fifth intelligence;

690ON PROVIDENCE

691in so doing, following Plato, and prior to Plato theologists, who aure accustomed to celebrate a knowledge which is above intellect, and have divulged this as a truly divine mania. But they say that this is obtained by exciting the profundity of the soul, which is no longer intellectual, and adapting it to union with the one. For all things are known by the similar, that which is sensible by sense, that which is the object of science by science, that which is intelligible by intellect, and that which is one by that which is charactertized by unity. For the soul indeed being intellective knows herself, and knows whatever she understands, by contact, as we have before observed. But being superintelligent, she is ignorant both of herself and of the objects of knowledge, and being near to the one y she loves quiet, having shut up her knowledge, becoming mute, and being silent with internal silence. For how can she be adjacent to the most ineffable of all things, except by laying asleep the garrulous matter that is in her ? Hence, she must become one that she may see the one , or rather that she may not see the one. For seeing, she will see that which is intellectual, and not that which is above intellect, and will intellectually perceive a certain one, and not the one itself. He, my friend, who energizes according to this most divine energy of the soul, trusting solely to himself, viz. to the flower of his intellect, causing himself to be at rest not from external, but from internal motions, and becoming a God as far as it is possible for the soul to be so, will understand how the Gods alone ineffably know all things, according to the one of themselves. But as long as we are rolled about things beneath, it will appear to us to be incredible that divinity knows all things impartibly and supereternally; eternal beings indeed, having a real existence, but things which are in generation, or becoming to be, subsisting temporally, neither time nor eternity subsisting in the one. So many indeed are the species of knowledge with us, by looking to which it is possible to solve all the doubts concerning the truth which the soul may know,' and concerning that which it is not possible for her to know, in the present life.

692AND FATE.

69325. Because, however, we have made three discussions which we said were necessary to a distinct survey of the objects of inquiry, let us now pass to the doubts, and give to each of them an appropriate solution. In the first place, therefore, you consider this as a sufficient argument that what is in our power is frivolous, and is the work alone of the celestial bodies, viz. that we men assert ourselves to be the causes of those events which are attended with prosperity ; but in things in which we are unfortunate, we transfer the cause to necessity, instead of ascribing them to choice. And thus doubting, you think you obtain this as a common conception concerning Fate, that it has a more principal power in practical affairs than our impulses. Indeed, I myself do not see men otherwise affected than as ascribing to themselves the cause of their success, but to others the cause of their errors. But in this we differ, that you indeed admit the opinion of the many as sufficient to form a judgment of things; while I conceive them to reason in this way through a certain immoderate love of themselves. Among wise men, however, to whom it belongs to look both to whole and parts, and not to neglect the order which they possess with reference to them, divinity is considered as the principal cause of all events from which good is derived to all things; but the next causes to this are, the period of the world, and time, in which events are co-adapted and co-ordinated to wholes, nothing being superfluously adventitious in the polity of wholes; and in the third place, they consider themselves as causes in those things in which they are allotted a deliberate choice, and in which by their impulses they co-operate to the completion of things.

69426 . When, however, any thing happens contrary to their choice, then they deservedly ascribe the event to wholes alone, and the efficiency of wholes, as the conquering cause. For it is every where necessary that partial natures should energize in conjunction with wholes, but wholes without partial natures. And after this manner intellectual men divide events, but not as you have divided them. Hear, likewise, Plato in the Laws exclaiming that divinity indeed governs all things ; but that after divinity, Fortune and Time rule over all human affairs; and that our art

695ON PROVIDENCE

696follows as the third after these. For during a tempest, the pilot's art contributes something, and in disease the medical art, and in short, in practical affairs, the political art.' If, therefore, our affairs are prosperous, Fate, Time, and Divinity, must be considered as the causes that they are so. Hence, there will be three causes of events, Divinity indeed causing that which comes to pass to be good; but Time and Fate causing it to be arranged in one concord with every thing. And in short, another cause is human. For every human work is a part of the universe, but the contrary is not true, because it is necessary that other animals also, since they are parts of the universe, should not only * act, but also suffer. For every part, indeed, of this mundane fabric and drama has for its end good; since no part of it is left inordinate, but is so woven with other parts, as to contribute to the well-being of the universe. The contrary, however, is not true, that every thing which is allotted good is co-ordinated with the mundane polity. For there is a supermundane life, and the life of the Gods, and of 6ouls that transcend Fate, and follow Providence alone.

69727. Where then does that which is in our power exist ? Since that which is generated, is connected with the period of the world, and again, since it is produced from that alone. Where else should we say it exists, than in our internal elections and impulses? For of these alone we are the lords; but things which take place external to us, have many other more powerful beings as their lords. For it is necessary that what is generated externally should become a part of the universe, that it may also be generated ; and that this should be effected through the consent and cooperation of the universe, that it may produce every thing in itself, by one part of itself acting on another, and being passive from another. On this account, therefore, in the actions of men, we praise these persons,

698' “ Et totaliter agibilium politicam.” So Morbeka. This in the original was, I suppose, x»t r01$ xgaxrots r%v woAjtixjjv.

699AND FATE.

700but we blame those, because through choice they were lords of their deeds, and we do not say that the universe, but the agent was the cause of the quality of the actions. For the quality of a deed is not derived from the universe, but from the life of the agent. It is, however, co-ordinated to the whole on account of the whole, and is again such as it is on account of a part. And that we assert these things with truth, the oracles of the Gods will manifest to you, since they often ascribe victory to our choice, and not to the order alone of the mundane periods; as for instance, when they say: “ On beholding yourself, fear.” And again; “ Know thyself.” And, “ Believe yourself to be above body, and you are.” In short, they say, “ that our sorrows germinate in us as the voluntary progeny of the particular life which we lead.”

70128. It is not fit, therefore, to refer all events to the order alone of the universe, as neither is it fit to refer them to our impulse alone. Nor again is it proper to separate the soul from those beings that have an absolute elective power, * and whose very being consists in deliberate choice alone, and in declining this thing, but embracing that; though the soul in those events which take place is not the mistress of the universe. For it is requisite that every cause should aspire after that thing alone which it is naturally adapted to obtain. But that which is in our power, is not only adapted to be active, but also to be essentially elective. It is also adapted to act electively in conjunction with other things, and either to err or act rightly on account of choice. For though the deed may be good, yet if the agent acts from a bad choice, we say that the action is bad. For that which is good in the deed, is on account of something else, but that which is depraved is on account of the choice of him who performs the deed. Hence, it is evident to all men that we are the lords of actions, so far as they are eligible.

70229> But after this question, you say that all of us are solicitous about futurity in all things, and even in those things which appear to be in our

703ON PROVIDENCE

704power. Speaking summarily, you say well. What then, if we are all lovers of divination, is there nothing in our power? I, however, on the contrary say, that if nothing is in our power, but events are compelled to take place from motion alone, we shall not be lovers of divination. For what occasion is there for divination in things which owe their existence to external compulsion, and the knowledge of which is as of things future or not future. For such knowledge is superfluous, when events are necessary; since it is impossible for that which is necessary not to come to pass, though we should a thousand times consult about, and be prescient'of it. If, therefore, events necessarily happen, we are in vain solicitous about futurity. We are not, however, in vain solicitous about it, since this is natural to us; for nothing which is according to nature is in vain. Hence, it is not proper to consider all things as produced by compulsion, in consequence of binding them by the circulation of the heavenly bodies; but we must admit that foreknowledge is in some things profitable to us, and that we do not live merely for the purpose of foreknowing events, but that by foreknowing we may contribute or not contribute something to things future, and may be more prompt in our energies. We must likewise admit that not divination only, but prayers, and the whole business of sacred rites contribute something to our advantage, or we must exile these, pouring oil on their heads, and crowning them with wool, and we must neither extend our hands upward, nor grant that we ought to worship those who are able to suspend the celestial influences. For men when in difficult circumstances will in vain indulge a hope of being liberated from them by invoking divinity, and Apollo himself will in vain give responses, unless ' by performing certain things it is possible to escape the punishment whiclj is suspended from the celestial periods, and by not performing them, the dreaded event will necessarily take place.

70530. Indeed, if this were not the case, would it not be perfectly absurd to make this division, and to allow conformably^ to the oracles of the

706AND FATE.

707Gods that something must be granted to our choice? But neither must we proclaim this of divinity [viz. that his oracles are given in vain], nor must we exterminate from human life, the utility of divination* and of the sacerdotal office; because you have all history both Barbarian and Grecian conjointly testifying that through divination, whether from divine inspiration, or from human art, many have frequently known what it was requisite to do, and through this knowledge have been liberated from evils, which would have been otherwise inevitable. This then I determine as appropriate to the present discussion, that sometimes' this much celebrated divination, and the performance of sacred rites contribute to a certain thing being effected or not, and sometimes * predominate over those generations which are introduced from the universe. When, therefore, since all things are in all, divine and dsemoniacal causes concur in one, and as it were assert the same thing, then the works of sacrifice are seen to be inefficacious; for it is impossible for a part to oppose and effect things contrary to the whole; and foreknowledge, in this case, neither adds nor takes away any thing from the events which are the subjects of divination. But when, in consequence of there being many things of this kind, these effect one thing, and those another; as for instance, these effect the destruction, but those the safety of the diseased, through the operations of the celestial bodies upon us, as is evident from all history, then the performance of some sacred right, by employing co-operative powers, liberates us from the noxious defluxions, by those that are beneficial. And the consideration of the future contributes much to effects. In short, that which is in our power being co-ordinated with these, or with other causes, as in calamities, in consequence of receiving a greater increase through its own motion, exhibits sometimes one, and sometimes another end. And know that this takes place in things which are externally produced. Every where, however, the quality of the impulse has a prior existence, and choice characterizes that which is in our power. This also is the work of the soul, which abides in it and is not to be referred

708ON PROVIDENCE

709to the universe. * Conformably, therefore, to these things, as it appears to me, you say that the universe governs all animals, and that we and other animals have a diminished life imparted from the air, and the first circulation. And that the rational part indeed is in the brain; but that what is called sense is in the organs of sense, and is conversant with different sensibles, but that the sight, the hearing, and the other senses, differ only in their subjects, but are essentially one and without diversity.*

71031. Hearing you make this arrangement, I was surprized that a lover of philosophy and intellectual speculations, and why do I say of intellectual speculations, but who is also skilled in the paths of erudition and in the inventions of geometry and arithmetic, should attribute as much to the senses as to our rational and intellectual essence, though they scarcely come into contact with the objects of knowledge through debile organs, and should conceive that they only differ from each other, and from the rational part by a certain diversity of organs. For we have indeed elsewhere and prior to this shown that all the senses are inseparable from body, and incapable of being converted to themselves, but that the rational and intellectual life is naturally adapted to know itself, and in consequence of this knowledge to be converted to itself. For every thing gnostic is according to energy converted to the object of knowledge; and therefore that which is gnostic of itself is converted to itself. What identity, therefore, do you see between the intellectual and the sensitive soul, between that which looks downward, and that which tends upward ? And in short, what identity do you perceive between the soul which is buried in bodies, and the soul which is unmingled with bodies ? Between that which can never know truth, and that which always extends itself to real being ?

71132. But if the appetite which is according to nature is not in vain in auy thing else, neither is it in that which is sometimes allotted the

712* “ Inecferribile in umrenum.” Morbeka.

713AND FATE.

714perceptiou of truth. 1 omit to say that it is ahsurd to assert that the essence of a divine soul flows downward from ether, if it is proper to call that which is impossible absurd. For the souls which are derived from ether are allotted a corporeal generation; but the Athenian guest demonstrates that the rational soul is more ancient than all bodies. But if by ether you do not mean a body, but an etherial intellect, or an intellectual soul surrounding ether, neither thus do you appear to me to have discovered the most true cause of the soul. For there is another fountain of souls from which etherial souls, the souls of the sublunary elements, dsemoniacal souls, and ours are derived. And it is necessary to look to that cause which Plato concealing the truth, as it appears to me, calls the Crater; in which he represents the demiurgus mingling the soul of the universe, as Timaeus says, not from ether, but prior to bodies. The Chaldean oracles also celebrate the essential fountain of every soul, viz. of the empyreal, etherial, and material, and separate this from the whole vivific goddess; from which also suspending the whole of Fate, they make two series, the one psychical, and the other fatal. Deriving the soul, therefore, from one of these series, they assert that it sometimes becomes subservient to Fate, when becoming irrational it changes its lord, viz. Fate for Providence.

715. 33. That, as I have said however, you have not asserted any thing worthy the intellectual energy of Geometry and Arithmetic, in co-ordinating our soul with the senses, you may learn, by considering that the first employment of these sciences is to separate the soul from that energy which subsists in conjunction with the senses, to withdraw it from them as much as possible, to accustom it to look within, to see immaterial reasons, and to investigate demonstrations, the conclusions of which are contrary to the informations of the senses. For they indeed reject impartibility, but these sciences require it, and derive their existence from impartibles; since partibles are the principles of the former, but impartibles of the latter. And the knowledge of the senses indeed is confined to particulars; but universals, and those things the nature of which is always the same, are the objects of the knowledge of the above-mentioned

716ON PROVIDENCE

717sciences; which they do not derive from the senses, for imperfect are not the causes of perfect things ; but supernally from intellect, on which account also they sit in judgment on the senses, reprehend the grossness of their knowledge, the passivity of their perceptions, and their indefinite motions.

71834. For indeed the knowledge of the senses is truly ludicrous; but the intention of the mathematical sciences is to liberate us from things ludicrous, and accustom us instead of pursuing these, to investigate the knowledge of real being. It belongs to the sensible life therefore, to be under the dominion of Fate, and to be acted upon differently at different times, in conjunction with bodies, in which the necessity from Fate consists. For every form inseparable from matter, is ingenerated in, and contained by it; since it does not pertain to it, through being converted to itself to say, that what externally accedes to it is one thing, and that which is true another. But it alone says that it announces passion, on which account it belongs to alter-motive natures, in consequence of not having an energy perfectly liberated from them. The intellectual life however, is according to its own nature converted to itself,' and cannot endure to follow the violent passions of sense, but contains in itself criteria of the fallacious motions externally introduced, and adds indeed what is deficient to the passive perceptions of sense, and confutes the fallacy of its information ; accomplishing at the same time all this by its own proper energy. For it is not the province of things which pertain to sense to form a judgment of sense, but this belongs to intellectual reasons, which the knowledge of sense is incapable of receiving. The immaterial therefore and separable life, and which energizes in itself, must be admitted to be contrary to that of sense; and to this must be given a choice of inclination, upward and downward, to intellect by which it was produced, and to sense which it generates; but we must admit that sense and all corporeal lives are without choice, because this is also the case with bodies. For the rational soul being a medium between intellect and sense,

719AND FATE.

720tends to both on account of the unstable inclination of choice; but it becomes according to habitude each of the extremes, of which it is essentially neither. But the perfection which it derives from intellect, and the deception which it receives from sense, manifest its middle nature. And such, as it appears to me, is the correction 1 of the dogma.

72135. With respect to your opinion concerning good which you have introduced into the midst of your enquiries, viz. that what is delectable to the several individuals of mankind is good, and that this exists by position,since different things are considered as legal by different nations; I should be ashamed indeed, if in writing to a friend I did not manifestly assert that I conceive this opinion to be unworthy both of my choice arid my years. For it does not appear to me to be at all wonderful that a young man in consequence of looking to the opinions of men in many things, should form such an opinion. But I think he who admits that an aged intellect ought to preside as a judge, will adopt the decisions of intellectual conceptions, and not those which the rumour and unbalanced motions of the multitude have spread abroad. Now therefore, because to the Persians, some things appear to be delectable, and also certain things which are congruous to these delectables are considered by them as legal; but to the Greeks other things appear to be delectable and legal; and to other nations other things; on this account a different thing is imagined to be good and delectable by different people. And whoever is allotted a delight which is naturally good to every one, will possess an end adapted to man; but whoever errs from this end, though he should be a thousand times delighted with things which are present to him and appear to be good, yet he will reap but an imperfect fruit of such delight.

72236. But it is, as it seems, true, that one inconvenience being given, others follow, which you also appear to me to suffer. For placing the soul under the dominion of Fate, you have co-ordinated her with the irrational senses, aud collecting these into one and the same thing, you

723ON PROVIDENCE

724have mingled good with that which is debile. It is necessary however to eject both the former and this from the soul, that we may not ignorantly ascribe the same things to men as to brutes, whose life is without conversion to itself, and is naturally bent to earth, and whose knowledge is mingled with material passions. These things also are unfolded by Plato with, as I may say, adamantine arguments. For says he that which is not good is not f truly] delectable, though all oxen should assert it to be so. For we are not to adduce the testimony of oxen, but of the Gods, with whom there is intellect, and the good of being, which is more divine than intellect itself. These things being clearly asserted in the Gorgias, the Philebus, and the Republic, I think it would be superfluous to dwell on them any farther.

72537* This however, I will add to what has been said, that the investigation of good is not to be mingled with the delectable, (for thus the petulance of delight will cause us to be foolish) but the all-various diversities of human customs and legal institutions^ are to be referred to the different lives of souls, viz. ,to the rational, the irascible and the epithymetic forms of life ; for the former germinate from the latter; since, as it is said, they are not derived from an oak, nor from a rock. But the many-headed beast persuades these to establish such things by law as the Persians established ; the leonine soul persuades others to adopt such things as the Thracians adopted ; and in others reason prevails in the adoption of legal and true good. And the delectable indeed, is common to all these. For the appetible when present is delectable to every one, but good is not delectable to all men, but to those in whom reason presides. For the passions do not see good, but this is alone the province of reason. And to reason indeed, the delectable and the good are the same; but the fabrication of things did not give to the blind passions the investigation of good, but of the delectable; for every species of life when it energizes without impediment is delighted. Hence there are many legal institutions, and all-various delectables, and they are different to different persons; but good is alone with those in whom reason predominates over the passions. For dominion must not be given to desire, that we may

726AND FATE.

727not be affected in the same manner as asses; nor to anger, that we may not resemble lions; but it must be giveh to that which is the most excellent part of our nature, which we alone are, or according to which we principally subsist. For the being of every thing which consists of many things, some better, and others worse, is according to ;that which is the best among them. For that which is best sagaciously conjectures the nature of good.

728S8. As to what you afterwards write fn the way of doubt, you seem to me to have written it in consequence of hearing Socrates in many places asserting that he knew nothing, deriding those who say that they know all things, and farther still contending that when we depart from hence we shall especially know the truth, and be in possession of more certainsciences, and also inferring that the mathematical are not truly sciences. You doubt therefore from all this whether it is not perhaps impossible to know the truth, and whether we do not only dream about it. Indeed it is requisite you should at the same time understand, that if it is not possible for us to know the truth, we do not more know if there is any thing in our power than if there is not. For our ignorance of both similarly prevents our adoption of either of these positions. IIow there- ' fore, can we use the ignorance of truth in order to show whether there is any thing which is in our power ? Since with respect to the existence, and non-existence of this, ignorance possesses the same power, or rather impotency.

72939. That we may not however, suffer any thing of this kind, we have already enumerated all the modes of knowledge ; and have shown what the modes are of which the soul can participate here, and what those are when she assumes a supreme order. And of these indeed, Socrates possessing the former, but hoping that he shall obtain the latter on being liberated from the body, says, “ that arriving thither he shall know the truth." For other measures and other objects of knowledge afforded him an opportunity of indulging such a hope. Because it is a thing usual with the friends of Plato to inquire whether it is possible for the soul to

730ON PROVIDENCE

731live not only catliartically, but also theoretically, while surrounded with this gross bond the body. And 1 think the subject has been sufficiently discussed, and has been brought to this conclusion, that perhaps it is possible to live theoretically even here, like the coryphsean philosopher in the Tbesetetus, astronotnizing above the heavens,' and investigating on all sides all the nature of beings, and also like those guardians in the Republic, who ascend as far as to the good itself, through that dialectic, which Plato calls the defensive inclosure of the mathematical sciences. Again, however, that it is impossible while here to lead a theoretic life in perfection, is evident from the causes which are enumerated in the Phsedo, viz. the occupations and molestations of the body, which do not suffer us to energize theoretically without impediment, and disturbance. For the life is theoretic, but the energy is called contemplation, and the contemplation of the one.

73240. When also Socrates does not permit us to call the mathematical sciences [truly] sciences, he does not do this as denying that they have a necessity of demonstrations, but as falling short of the supreme of sciences. And why should I not say, at falling short of dialectic, which no longer considers a point, or the monad, as a principle, but the good , and considers the principle of all things. Whence also, as I conceive, Socrates in the section of a line * [in the 6th book of the Republic] assigns the second part to the mathematical sciences ; but to perfectly immaterial and separate forms, he assigns a part, and a knowledge prior to these; the former proceeding from hypothesis, but the latter, being unhypothetical. And with Socrates, the author of the Epinomis likewise accords. For he calls dialectic the bond of the mathematical sciences, as uniting the principles of all of them.

73341. But if Socrates asserted that he knew nothing, and the Pythian oracle pronounced him to be on this account the wisest of all men, as he himself informs us, consider the profound meaning both of the Pythian

7341 too oogwou wrigaargo nfi owra. So Plato.

735AND FATE.

736deity and of Socrates, and how by the assertion of knowing nothing this is implied, that the good alone possesses an exempt transcendency,' but not he who possesses scientific knowledge; and this it is to know that he does not know. For the attainment of such a knowledge as this appears to b<* the principal business of those who intend to be wise. For in reality, he is truly wise, who knows that he is not truly wise, and is not ignorant of this. For to whom does it belong to know that he does not scientifically know every thing, but to him who possesses knowledge. For it is indeed necessary that he should perfectly know that he does not know [every thing]; since he will know himself not to possess a scientific knowledge [of all things]. Hence no one will perfectly know that he does not possess scientific knowledge [in perfection], till he knows that he possesses scientific knowledge. For then he will at one and the same time know that he knows, and what the things are which he does not know, and will both know that he knows and that he does not know, possessing a middle knowledge, and science alone, which subsists between those natures that know truth wholly, and those that do not know it at all,' of which the former is intellect, but the latter sense. For sense neither knows real, being, nor the essence itself of sensibles, of which it is feigned to be the knowledge; but intellect knows essence itself, and the real truth itself of being.

73742. The soul therefore, being a medium between these, knows the essences of things as being prior to sense, and does not know them as being posterior to intellect. He therefore that is wise, will both know that he knows, and that he does not know. And thus much, my friend, in answer to the assertion of Socrates, and concerning that which is real wisdom. Hence, it is not proper to exterminate the reasons pertaining to science, neither on account of the mathematical sciences being distin-

738ON PROVIDENCE

739guished from the first science, nor on account of the hope of obtaining true knowledge after a separation from hence, nor on account of the answer of the Pythian deity. For it is Plato himself who exclaims, that if science is destroyed, it will no longer be possible to make an assertion about any thing, and not even about that which is contingent. But he shows indeed, what the knowledge is which the soul may assume while it is united to the body, and what it may obtain when it is freed from its bonds; and also what that is which is at the same time knowledge and not science. He likewise shows that there is one knowledge which is true science, an intellect better than science, and an intelligence which deifies intellect; and that the soul perceiving this knowledge, and not being able to obtain it in this life, desires a departure from body, that she may then be allotted this supernatural and divine comprehension of beings. But of these things enough.

74043. In consequence however of what you have said, you doubt, why good men are in a "worse condition, in consequence of failing to obtain the end which was the object of their wishes, but bad men are allotted the things which they desire. You therefore indeed, think that this also is an argument in favour of the non-existence of any thing which is in our power. And indeed, if this is an argument of the non-existence of any thing in our power, that things do not happen to the good according to their wishes, the success of bad men in gaining the objects of their desire, will be an argument in proof of the existence of something which is in our power. It is better however, not to adduce opposing arguments to what you say, but merely to show you that this doubt was proposed by some of the ancients not only with a view to the subversion of that which is in our power, but also with a view to the investigation whether providence has any existence. And this inquiry of the ancients has been extended to Plotinus himself, to Iamblichus, and your namesake fTheodorus Asinaeus]. For the unexpected introduction of fortunate events, shakes in reality our invincible preconceptions of providence, and the affair requires intellectual inspection, if the objector being saved from that doubt, ought to commit every thing to providence.

741AND FATE.

74244. If therefore, we are not the lords of any thing, and have not an elective life from ourselves, and neither good nor evil is from us, but these are externally produced, there is no longer any occasion to doubt of events, as if they happened contrary to desert, since both good and evil derive their subsistence from an external source. For if we do not cause ourselves to be such characters as we are, it will not be requisite that there should be any retribution for our life; nor in short, is any thing due from those, who are not the causes of the life which they lead. Hence, if the retribution of fortunate events is contrary to desert, we ourselves shall be the cause of the lives, the desert of which it is said we are allotted in the distributions from the universe; because, of all the things that surround us, we do not require to have retribution in what we derive from wholes, but in those things in which we co-operate something. If there* fore, there is nothing in our power, we shall have nothing from ourselves. And if this be the case, neither should we desire retributions of those things which we derive from an external source. And this being admitted, neither should we accuse the distribution of events as contrary to desert.

74345. If, therefore, there is nothing in our power, it is not fit to enquire why good men fail in obtaining the end they desire, contrary to desert, but bad men obtain this end. But admitting there is something which is in our power, and that Providence has dominion over all things, we say, adducing to you persuasion after violence, that what is in our power does not predominate over, but co-operates with things external. The rational soul therefore very properly disposes things that are internal according to its own power, but it cannot do this with externals, because these require other things in order to their distribution, which are not inherent in it. I am delighted however with these doubts of yours, perceiving in you a generous proselyte whom I frequently desire not to confound those things which are in our power with those which are not, nor to be so disposed with respect to things which are not in our power, as if they ought entirely to take place, in order that we may bear them without difficulty, when they do take place. Now, however, the doubt

744ON PROVIDENCE

745happens, from things which are out of, not conforming themselves to things which are in our power, though we fancy that they ought, and also from supposing that to be good for us which is not, and seeking for its accomplishment. But it would be better for us always to explore the true and real beings that are in us, and acquire them for ourselves, and to leave things external, and which are not in our power to the causes of them, as to masters who know what they do. We should likewise be prepared for those things which are not, by those things which are in our power. In what manner, therefore, the doubt pertains to that which is in our power, we have shown you through such arguments as these. But you ought rather to refer it, as we have said, to the doubt concerning Providence. And many things, as I have before observed, have been said on this subject by the ancients, and they thus solve the doubt.

74646. Again, therefore, you inquire what that which is in our power is. Which it was requisite to investigate in the beginning of the discussion. And afterwards you doubt concerning it. But inquiring about it, you define it to be that which is of itself uncircumscribed,' and self-energetic. If, however, this be the case, it is entirely incorruptible, and most powerful, and alone pertains to the ruler of all beings, but is not adapted to that which is in our power. I, therefore, consider this definition to be very remote from that conception of what is in our power, which the ancients adopting, attributed this to human souls. But do you also consider the truth of what I say. For they assumed that which is in our power as indicative of the energy of choice, making us to be the lords of choice and aversion, and as indicative of the choice of some good, or the contrary. For they did not consider choice and will to be the same ; but they asserted that the latter pertains to good alone, but the former both to good and evil; just as false opinion pertains to that which is not good. Hence also, they said that election or choice characterizes the soul, which extends itself both to what is good, and what is not good, and that this pertains to the middle nature of that being which is

747*. Morbeka has «uroT»giyf«xr*y \ but it should obviously be eanotcrtf lygawrov.

748AND FATE.

749converted to both these. This also common rumour testifies. For we praise the choice of these, but blame the choice of those. Evil, however, is not wished for by any one. And evil indeed appears to be good to those that choose it; for no soul knowing a thing to be evil would choose, but would avoid it. On account of ignorance, however, the soul is busily employed about it; for she naturally possesses an acute love of good, but sometimes is powerless with respect to the attainment of it.

75047. The soul, therefore, essentially possessing an inclination to both, viz. to good and evil, the ancients called this power of lier elective, on account of which we are naturally adapted to choose one thing instead of another. And indeed, you may obtain from division such a definition of this power. Because all power is cither rational or irrational, it is necessary that choice should be in one of these. But since it is not irrational; for we all say that the irrational power is without choice, it will be a certain rational power. But every rational as well as every irrational power, is either gnostic or appetitive. Choice, however, being election and desire, will be a certain appetite. But every appetite either alone looks to that which is real good, or to that which is only apparent good, or to both these. We say, however, that choice does not look to real good alone; for if it did, it would never be justly blamed ; nor to apparent good alone ; for in this case, it would not frequently be praised. Hence such a power is naturally adapted to look to both these.

75148. Election, therefore, is in short, a rational power, desirous both of true and apparent good, leading the soul to both, on account of which she ascends and descends, errs, and acts with rectitude. The ancients perceiving the energy of this power, called the inclination of it both to real and apparent good, a twofold path in our nature. . Hence the elective and that which is in our power, will be the same thing. And according to this power, we differ from divine, and from mortal natures; for each of these is unreceptive of this twofold inclination; since the former, indeed, on account of their transcendent excellence are alone established in true good; but the latter on account of defect, in apparent

752ON PROVIDENCE

753good. For intellect indeed characterizes the former, but sense the latter. And the former is our king, but the latter our messenger. "YVe, however, being of a middle nature are established in choice; and are capable of being moved both to true and apparent good. But wherever we move, we are on all sides comprehended by wholes, from which we are allotted what is, according to desert. And if indeed we tend to that which is better, we thus tend as intellect; but if to that which is subordinate, as sense. That which is in our power, therefore, is not capable of effecting all things. For that which can effect all things is a power characterized by unity, and on this account can effect all things, because it is one and boniform. But the power which is elective is dyadic, and on this account cannot accomplish all things ; because by its twofold inclinations, it falls short of that nature which is prior to all things. It would, however, be itself effective of all things, if it had not an elective impulse; for then it would be will alone. For a life characterized by will subsists according to good, which causes that which is in our power to be most powerful, and is truly deiform, on account of which the soul also becomes a God, and as Plato says, governs the whole world.

75449. Hence that which is in our power, neither pertains to the first, nor to the last of things, but to the medium between both. You, however, as it seems, have conceived it to be a power ruling over all things, leading all things according to its own impulse, and obtaining every thing which it desires; for you do not define it to be a power over the objects of desire within the soul, and which cause the electing soul to be such as it is; but you ascribe to it a power over things which are not in its power. For things external to the soul are not in our power; on which account also our life is mingled from things which are not, and from things which are in our power. And with worthy men, indeed, there is much of that which is in our power; for they use all things, modifying even those that are out of our power on account of virtue, and always adorning the present circumstance. But with the multitude, there is more of that which is not in our power; for they follow things external to themselves, not possessing a life within, which is able to assimilate them

755AND FATE.

756to themselves. Hence worthy men, indeed, are said to be free, and are so on account of the energy both of that which is in, and of that which is not in their power. But the multitude are called into servile necessity, in consequence of burying those things which are in their power, with those that are not, and possessing all things not in themselves.

75750. After all this, you have added the colophon (or summit) of the doubts, by asking whether divinity knows or does not know events which are future to us. And if, indeed, he does not know them, you will say that he does not at all differ from us, who have no knowledge of futurity. But if he does know them, that which he knows will entirely and from necessity come to pass. This, however, as it would seem, not only destroys that which is in our power, but likewise every thing which is said to be contingent. This also, is usually said by those who conceive all things to exist by compulsion, and as I may say, has been asserted a thousand times. But they all reason as follows : if divinity knows every future event, that which is future will be from necessity. And they indeed assert it to be false that divinity knows every thing definitely; but they say that his knowledge is indefinite of things which indefinitely come to pass, in order that they may save what is contingent. Others, however, attributing a definite knowledge to divinity, admit necessity in every thing which comes to pass. These are the dogmas of the Peripatetic and Stoic sects. But Plato, and whoever is a friend to Plato, affirm that divinity definitely knows future events, and that nevertheless' some things are produced definitely, and others indefinitely, according to their respective natures. For those things which in effects subsist with division and contrarily, are antecedently comprehended in the Gods according to a more excellent condition only.

75851. I say, for instance, the causes of generated natures, whether they are incorporeal or corporeal, subsist incorporcally with the Gods; and in a similar manner their knowledge is incorporeal. And again, the

759ON PROVIDENCE'

760causes of intellectual, and of non-intellectual beings, subsist with the* Gods both essentially, and according to science. For they also know' things which are not intellectual intellectually. And again, of things which are produced by them, that are either temporal or without time,, there is with them a cause and a knowledge exempt from timei Hencebecause of effects some are definite, but others indefinite, the Gods; antecedently assume the knowledge of both these according to the moreexcellent mode, viz. according to the definite. Moreover, the form of knowledge is not such as the object of knowledge, but such as thegnostic nature. For knowledge is not in that which is known, but im that which knows. Hence, it is similar and of the like form to that in* which it is, and not to that in which it is not. If, therefore,, that whichis known is indefinite, but that which knows it is definite, the knowledge is not also indefinite on account of the thing known,, but definite on< account of that which knows. For it is possible to know that which issubordinate after a more excellent mode, and that which is supreme after, an inferior mode.

76152. Hence, because the Gods are better than all things, they antece* dently comprehend all things after a more excellent mode. And beings indeed, they comprehend super-essentially ; 1 tilings which are according to time, as we have already said, prior to time; corporeal natures, incor-

762AND FATE.

763of the future machine; and the astrolabe was corporeally fashioned from an internal knowledge which is not corporeal. If this, however, is the case in your art, what ought you to say of the foreknowledge of the Gods, in which all things subsist in a manner truly ineffable, and not to be circumscribed by us ? Is it not evident, that this mode of comprehension is different from, and in no respect allied to the things which are produced by it ? Hence the Gods know divinely, and in a way unaccompanied by time those things which are in our power, and we energize, as we are naturally adapted. Whatever we choose also, is foreknown by them, not on account of the boundary which is in us, but on account of the boundary which is with them.

764Such, tny friend, is my answer to your inquiries, independent of which* I am able to show you that there is something in our power, from praise* and blame, from counsel, from exhortation and dehortation, from judicial affairs, from accusation and defence, from all political erudition, from< legislation, from prayer, from sacerdotal methods, and from philosophy itself. For you well know that my preceptor [Syrianus,] used frequently to say, that if that which is in our power were destroyed, philosophy would be superfluous. For what should it instruct, when there is nothing:; which cau be instructed, when there is nothing in us by which we may become better ? Reconsidering, therefore, these things again and again,, if you still have any doubts, do not be averse to write to me. For what subjects can we more aptly discuss than those,, in the disquisition.of which no one will accuse us of nugacity ?

765EXTRACTS

766FROM THE

767TREATISE OF PROCLUS,

768ENTITLED

769TEN DOUBTS CONCERNING PROVIDENCE.

7701. Whether Providence extends to all things, to wholes and parts, and as far as to the most indivisible natures in the heavens and in the sublunary regions, in things eternal arid things corruptible? This Proclus affirms, and says that every particular, even of the minutest things, depends on the beneficent providence of divinity. For nothing escapes that one whether you speak of the essence of a thing, or its being known. It is said indeed, and is rightly said, that the whole circle is centrally in the centre, since the centre is the cause, but the circle the thing caused, and for the same reason every number is monadically in unity. But in the one of Providence, all things subsist after a more exalted mode, since that is more transcendently one than a centre and the monad.

7712. How divinity foreknows and provides for things contingent? Proclus answers, that divinity, on account of his most perfect nature.

772CONCERNING PROVIDENCE.

773knows in their seeds and causes things indefinite definitely, as he also knows things distant and corporeal, without distance and incorporeally.

7743. Whether Providence is the cause of things definite and indefinite according to the same, and after the same manner? Prod us answers that to provide for is nothing else than to benefit; and that hence every thing participates of that one good according to its own measure and order, so that Providence retains its unity and liberty even in things indefinite. In the same chapter also he proves that divinity provides for things contingent and indefinite, that they may not be as it were superadventitious in the universe. For, says he, if the Gods are willing and able to provide definitely for things indefinite, as being the authors of them, they will entirely provide for them, and providing will know the desert of the subjects of their providential energy. And the Gods indeed,, with an exempt transcendency, extend their providence to all things, but daemons dividing their superessential subsistence, receive the guardian-

775- ship of different herds of animals, distributing the providence of the Gods, as Plato says, as far as to the most ultimate division. Hence some of them preside over men, others over lions, or other animals, and others over plants; and still more partially, some are the inspective guardians* of the eye, others of the heart, and others of the liver. All things, however, are full of Gods, some of whom exert their providential energies immediately, but others through daemons as media; not that the Gods are incapable of being present to all things, but that ultimate are of themselves incapable of participating first natures.

7764. Mow the participations of the Gods are effected, or how the Gods energize providentially on inferior natures? Proclus answers that the participations are according to the aptitude of the participants; viz. they subsist rationally in rational, but intellectually in intellectual natures, and imaginably and sensibly in those beings that live according to imagination and sense. And they subsist essentially and through being alone, in those things which are without life, lienee, Providence being established above all beings, according to divine union itself, and ener-

777TEN DOUBTS

778gizing according to one energy adapted to the one , every thing which accedes to it participates of it according to its natural adaptation. With respect to the failure of the oracles he says, that the energy of divinity remaining always the same, places or men become unadapted to its participation, just as if a certain statue always remaining the same, a mirror should at one time exhibit a fulgid image of it, but at another, an obscure or debile, or indeed no image of it at all. He adds, If, therefore, it should be said that oracles sometimes participate of the Gods who are the sources of divination, but at other times fail, becoming inefficacious, and as it were without spirit, for a certain period, the causes of this irregularity must be referred to the vapours that are the instruments of inspiration failing, through an inability of always being the participants of divine influence. For the oracles are true which give completion to the phenomena, and angels, daemons and heroes are veracious, which the Gods and the perpetually existing allotments in the universe illuminate, though certain waters and openings of the earth cannot always participate of them, on account of their unstable nature. Or if it should be said, that the powers of sacred rite6, sometimes entering into statues, causing them to be vitalized, and filling them with divine inspiration, fail in certain periods of time, the failure of these also, I should think it proper to refer to the recipients, and not to any variation of the energy of the Gods that inspire them. For neither do we dare to accuse the sun as the cause of the eclipse of the moon, but the conical shadow of the earth into which

779CONCERNING PROVIDENCE. 499

780Intervene as a medium, which are endued with reason, anger and desire, and rejoice in freedom of will.

7816. If Providence is, why are good men oppressed with evil, but bad men triumph ? Proclus answers, that notwithstanding this, virtue and the matter of virtue are not wanting to the good ; and also, that this praise is peculiar to them, that they had rather cultivate naked Virtue, than Vice with all her abundance. That it is not an evil to be deprived 1 of the incentives to evil; that some have even earnestly desired adverse \ fortune; and.that wise men have always borne it with fortitude. Nor is it expedient that wise men should at one and the same time abound with every kind of good. For it is necessary that they should have a certain experience of the evils of the present life, by which the soul being excited, desires a transition from hence to that place which is beyond the reach of evil. He adds, that many through adversity have arrived at greater attainments in virtue; and that in short, those things only are evil which we ourselves perpetrate, and not those which we suffer [from an external cause]. That all bad men are without glory, and without honour, though they should be surrounded by thousands of flatterers. To the question which he adjoins to this,why Providence distributes equal to unequal things, according to arithmetical, and not according to geometrical equality, as when a whole city perishes, there is a similar destruction of dissimilar men, viz. of the good and the bad, he answers as follows. In the first place, indeed, they do not suffer this similitude of punishment so far as they are dissimilar, but so far as they are similar; in consequence of voluntarily inhabiting the same city, or entering the same ship, and fighting together, or mutually suffering any thing else of the same species; and so according to the energy of that species, they suffer a certain something which is the same. So far, however, as they are better and worse, they participate differently of the common calamity; since the latter perish, bearing it impatiently, but the former enduring it mildly. And after a separation from the present life, the place destined to be the habitation of more excellent beings receives the former, but the abode of subordinate beings receives the latter. Proclus afterwards adds, that

782TEN DOUBTS

783there is a certain order and a period of common fate, terminating from different principles in the same end, and a concurrence of progressions, where the less principal parts are compelled from necessity to be copas$ive. And that we are ignorant of the true equalities of souls.

7847. If Providence extends as far as to the lowest beings, whence is the great inequality in the allotments of brutes, their mutual devolutions, and the like, derived ? Proclus answers, that if there is any thing in them of a self-motive nature, the cause of this must be investigated from a higher source; but if they are only corporeal, it is of no consequence if they suffer the same thing as a shadow all-variously transformed, and are subject to Fate.

7859. Why punishments do not immediately follow after crimes, but are inflicted at length after the commission of them, and this sometimes is yery long after ? 1 Proclus answers, that the implanted root of wickedness (just as the earth bearing thorns, though the germes are a thousand tames cut off, still produces the like) renders the same energies, in consequence of continuing inflexible by punishment Providence, therefore, waits fpr an appropriate time, not such as may be pleasing to the vulgar, but such as it knows will contribute to the health of souls, and instructs many by endurance. For, together with the Gods, says Plato, Fortune and Time govern all things, whether it be requisite that some good should be imparted, or that there should be a purification from something contrary to good. In the next place, vice is a punishment to itself, and the most grievous injury the soul can sustain. Precipitate anger also is not a good dispensator of punishments. Plato once, being about to chastize a slave, was seen holding his hand in an elevated position for some time, and being asked why he did so, said that he was punishing his own impetuous anger. Archytas said to his servants in a field, who had not done what he had ordered them to do, and expected to be punished for their negli-

786CONCERNING PROVIDENCE.

787gence, ** It is well for you that I am angry.” And Theano said to. one off her servants, “ If I were not angry I would chastize you.” Among the Egyptians there was a law, that a pregnant woman who was judged worthy of death, should not be put to death till she was delivered. What wonder, therefore, is it that Providence should for a time spare those who are deserving of death, but are able to perforin not trifling, but illustrious actions, till they have accomplished them ? If Themistocles had been immediately punished for 'what he did when he was a young man, who would have delivered Athens from the Persian evils? Who also would have explained the Pythian oracle: If Dionysius had perished in the beginning of his tyranny, who would have freed Sicily, which was thought to be irremediably lost, from the Chalcedonians ? If the punishment of Periander had not been deferred for a long time, who would have freed the pleasant island of Leucadia, who would have liberated Ana’xoriom from its adversaries?—To which may be added, that the time of deferred punishment seems long to our feeble vision, but is nothing to the eye of Providence, just as the place also in which we live, and carry about these bodies is perfectly small for the punishment of great offences; but there are many and indescribable places of punishment in the infernal regions, and excessive torments for the offenders that are there.—On account of the magnitude of the punishment likewise, the whole of it is not inflicted at once. Souls also are naturally adapted to feel remorse, which is the forerunner of their greatest sufferings. For they say that Apoliodoms the tyrant saw himself in a dream scourged and boiled by certain persons, and his heart exclaiming from the kettle, I am the cause of these thy torments. But Ptolemy who was surnamed Thunder, thought m a dream that he was called to judgment by Seleucus, and that vultures and wolves sat there as his judges. Such are the preludes to the vicious of impending punishment.

7889. How the crimes of other persons, as for instance of parents or potentates are punished in children and subjects? For that certain persons are said to have suffered punishment for the crimes of their ancestors, both revelations and the mysteries manifest, and certain liber-

789TEN DOUBTS

790ating Gods arc said to purify from them. Prod us answers, that a nation, or a family, or a city, must be considered as one body, and that these have kindred powers that preside over them, so that such crimes are not foreign, on account of this conjunction and similitude. Why, therefore, should it be any longer paradoxical, that souls when transferred into other bodies, should suffer punishment for the crimes which they have committed in former bodies?

79110. Since the providence of divinity knows all things and reduces them to good, how are angels and demons, and if you are also willing, heroes and souls that govern the world in conjunction with the Gods, said to exert a providential energy? Proclus answers, that divinity provides for all things universally and totally, but the other powers partially, subordinate^, and for certain things only.

792In order to supply as much as possible the loss of the entire treatise of Proclus on this subject, the following admirable observations on Providence, are added, translated from his Commentary On the Parmenides of Plato; a work, which to the disgrace of Europe, is still only extant in manuscript.

793“ The Athenian guest in the Laws clearly evinces that there is a providence, where his discourse shows that the Gods know, and possess a power which governs, all things. But Parmenides, at the very beginning of the discussion concerning Providence, evinces the absurdity of doubting divine knowledge and dominion. For to assert that the conclusion of this doubt is still more dire than the former [i. e. that divinity is not known by us] sufficiently shows that he rejects the arguments which subvert providence. For it is dire to say that divinity is not known by us who are rational and intellectual natures, and who essentially possess something divine; but it is still more dire to deprive divine natures of knowledge; since the former pertains to those who do not convert themselves to divinity, but the latter to those who impede the all-pervading goodness of the Gods. And the former pertains to those who err respecting our essence, but the latter to those who convert themselves erroneously about a divine cause. But the expression still more dire (&*wot*$ov) js not

794CONCERNING PROVIDENCE.

795used as signifying a more strenuous doubt, in the same manner as we are accustomed to call those dire (8««t/oi) who vanquish by the power of language, but as a thing worthy of greater dread and caution to the intelligent. For it divulses the union of things, and dissociates divinity apart from the world. It also defines divine power as not pervading to all things, and circumscribes intellectual knowledge as not all-perfect. It likewise subverts all the fabrication of the universe, the order imparted to the world from separate causes, and the goodness which fills all things from one will, in a manner adapted to the nature of unity. Nor less dire than any one of these is the confusion of piety. For what communion is there between Gods and men, if the former are deprived of the knowledge of our concerns? All supplications, therefore, of divinity, all sacred institutions, all oaths adducing the Gods as a witness, and the untaught conceptions implanted in our souls concerning divinity, will perish. What gift also will be left of the Gods to men, if they do not previously comprehend in themselves the desert of the recipients, if they do not possess a knowledge of all that we do, of all we suffer, and of all that we think, though we do not carry it into effect ? With great propriety, therefore, are such assertions called dire. For if it is unholy to change any legitimately divine institutions, how can such an innovation as this be unattended with dread ? But that Plato rejects this hypothesis which makes divinity to be ignorant of our concerns, is evident from these things, since it is one of his dogmas, that divinity knows and produces all things. Since, however, some of those posterior to him have vehe* mently endeavoured to subvert such-like assertions, let us speak concerning them as much as may be sufficient for our present purpose.

796Some of those then posterior to Plato, on seeing the unstable condition of sublunary things, were fearful that they were not under the direction of Providence and a divine nature; for such events as are said to take place through fortune, the apparent inequality respecting lives, and the disordered motion of material natures, induced them greatly to suspect that they were not under the government of Providence. Besides, the persuasion that Divinity is not busily employed in the evolution of allvarious reasons, and that he docs not depart from his own blessedness.

797TEN DOUBTS

798induced them to frame an hypothesis so lawless and dire. For they were of opinion that the passion of our soul and the perturbation which h sustains by descending to the government of bodies, must happen to divinity, if he converted himself to the providential inspection of things. Farther still, from considering that different objects of knowledge are known by different gnostic powers; as for instance, sensibles by sense, objects of opinion by opinion, things scientific by science, and intclligibles by intellect; and, at the same time, neither placing sense, nor opinion, nor science in divinity, but only an intellect immaterial and pure;— hence they asserted that divinity had no knowledge of any other things, than the objects of intellect. £And this was the opinion of the more early Peripatetics.] For say they, if matter is external to him, it is necessary that he should be pure from apprehensions which are converted to matter ; but being purified from these, it follows that he must have no knowledge of material natures. Hence the patrons of this doctrine deprived him of a knowledge of, and providential exertions about sensibles; not through any imbecility of nature, but through a transcendency of gnostic energy; just as those whose eyes are filled with light, are said to be incapable of perceiving mundane objects, at the same time that this incapacity is nothing more than transcendency of vision. They likewise add, that there are many things which it is beautiful not to know. Thus to the entheastic, (or those who are divinely inspired) it is beautiful to be ignorant of whatever would destroy the deific energy; and to the scientific, not to know that which would defile the indubitable

799CONCERNING PROVIDENCE.

800Others again affirm that divinity has a knowledge of'himself, but that he has no occasion to understand sensibles in order to provide for them, since by his very essence lie produced all things, and adorns whatever ho has produced, without having any knowledge of his productions. They add, that this is by no means wonderful, since nature operates without knowledge, and unattended with phantasy; but that divinity differs from nature in this, that he has a knowledge of himself, though not of tbe things which are fabricated by him. And such are the assertions of those who were persuaded that divinity is not separated from mundane natures, and of those who deprived him of the knowledge of inferior concerns, and of a knowledge operating in union with providence.,

801With respect to these philosophers, we say, that they speak truly, and yet not truly, on this subject. For if providence has a subsistence* neither can there be any thing disordered, nor can divinity be busily employed, nor can he know sensibles through passive sense: but these philosophers in consequence of not knowing the exempt power and uniform knowledge of divinity, appear to deviate from the truth. For thus we interrogate them: does not every thing energize in a becoming manner when it energizes according to its own power and nature ? as for instance, does not nature, in conformity to the order of its essence, energize physically, intellect intellectually, and soul psychically, or according to the nature of soul ? And when the same thing is generated by many and different causes, does not each of these produce according to its own power, and not according to the nature of the thing produced? Or shall we say, that each produces after the same manner, and that, for example, the sun and man generate man, according to the same mode of operation, and not according to the natural ability of each, viz. the one partially, imperfectly, and with a busy energy, but the other without anxious attention, by its very essence, and totally ? But to assert this would be absurd ; for a divine operates in a manner very different from a mortal nature.

802If therefore, every thing which energizes, energizes according to its own nature and order, some things divinely and supernaturally, others naturally, and others in a different manner, it is evident that every gnostic being knows

803TEN DOUBTS

804according to its own nature, and that it does not follow that because the thing known is one and the same, on this account, the natures which know, energize in conformity to the essence of the things known. Thus sense, opinion and our intellect,know that which iswhite, but not in the same manner: for sense cannot know what the essence is of a thing white, nor can opinion obtain a knowledge of its proper objects in the same manner as intellect; since opinion knows only that a thing is, but intellect knows the cause of its existence. Knowledge therefore subsists according to the nature of that which knows , and not according to the nature of that which is known. What wonder is it then that Divinity should know all things in such a manner as is accommodated to his nature, viz. divisible things indivisibly, things multiplied, uniformly, things generated, according to an eternal intelligence, totally, such things as are partial; and that with a knowledge of this kind, he should possess a power productive of all things, or, in other words, that by knowing all things with simple and united intellections, he should impart to every thing being, and a progression into being? For the auditory sense knows audibles in a manner different from the common sense; and prior to, and different from these, reason knows audibles, together with other particulars which sense is not able to apprehend. And again, of desire which tends to one thing, of anger which aspires after another thing, and of proairesis, or deliberate choice, there is one particular life moving the soul towards all these, which are mutually motive of each other. It is through this life that we say, I desire, 1 am angry, and I deliberately choose this thing or that; for this life verges to all these powers, and lives in conjunction with them, as being a power which is impelled to every object of desire. But prior both to reason and this one life, is the one of the soul, which often says, I perceive, 1 reason, I desire, and I deliberate, which follows all these energies and energizes together with them. For we should not be able to know all these, and to apprehend in what they differ from each other, unless we contained a certain indivisible nature, which has a subsistence above the common sense, and which prior to opinion, desire and will, knows all that these know and desire, according to an indivisible mode of apprehension.

805CONCERNING PROVIDENCE.

806If this be the case, it is by no means proper to disbelieve in the indivisible knowledge of divinity, which knows sensibles without possessing sense, and divisible natures without possessing a divisible energy, and which without being present to things in place, knows them prior to all local presence, and imparts to every thing that which every thing is capable of receiving. The unstable essence therefore, of apparent natures is not known by him in an unstable, but in a definite manner; nor does he know that which is subject to all-various mutations dubiously, but in a manner perpetually the same; for by knowing himself, lie knows every thing of which he is the cause, possessing a knowledge transcendently more accurate than that which is co-ordinate to the objects of knowledge; since a causal knowledge of every thing is superior to evety other kind of knowledge. Divinity therefore, knows without busily attending to the objects of his intellection, because he abides in himself, and by alone knowing himself, knows all things. Nor is he indigent of sense, or opinion, or science, in order to know sensible natures : for it is himself that produces all these, and that in the unfathomable depths of the intellection of himself, comprehends an united knowledge of them, according to cause, and in one simplicity of perception. Just as if some one having built a ship, should pilace in it men of his own formation, and, in consequence of possessing a various art, should add a sea to the ship, produce certain winds, and afterwards launch the ship into the new created main. Let us suppose too, that he causes these to have ap existence by merely conceiving them to exist, so that by imagining all this to take place, he gives an external subsistence to his inward phantasms, it is evident that in this case he will contain the cause of every thing which happens to the ship through the winds on the sea, and that by contemplating his own conceptions, without being indigent of outward conversion, he will at the same time both fabricate and kn6w these external particulars. Thus, and in a far greater degree, that divine intellect the artificer of the universe, possessing the causes of things, both gives subsistence to, and contemplates, whatever the universe contains without departing from the speculation of himself. But if with respect to intellect one kind is more partial, and another more total, it is evident

807TEN DOUBTS CONCERNING PROVIDENCE.

808that there is not the same intellectual perfection of all things, but that where intelligible have a total and undistributed subsistence, there the knowledge is more total and indivisible, and where the number of forms proceeds into multitude and extension, there the knowledge is both one and multiform. Hence, this being admitted, we cannot wonder on hearing the Orphic verses, in which the theologist says:

809EXTRACTS

810FROM THE

811TREATISE OF PROCLUS

812SUBSISTENCE OF EVIL.

813Iir this treatise Proclus inquires, first, Whether there is such a thing as evil? secondly, If there is, whether it is in intellectual natures? thirdly. If evil is in sensibles, whether it subsists according to a principal cause ? fourthly. If it does not subsist according to a principal cause, whether any essence must be assigned to it, or whether it must be admitted to be perfectly unessential, and without hypostasis? fifthly, And if this be the case, how does it subsist, another principle existing, and whence does it originate, and how far does it proceed ? And farther, still, sixthly, how, since Providence exists, does evil subsist, and whence is it derived ? If the father of the universe not only produced the nature of good, but was also willing that there should be nothing evil any where, by what contrivance or art does evil subsist, which the Deraiurgus did not wish to subsist? For it is not lawful to assert that he was willing some things should subsist, but produced others, since in divine natures

814ON THE SUBSISTENCE

815to be willing, and to produce are simultaneous and conjoined. Hence evil is not only a thing contrary to the will of divinity, but is also without hypostasis, divinity not only not producing it (for this it is not even lawful to suppose) but not suffering it to subsist. Proclus answers, that physical evil, viz. the evil which is corruptive of the essence, power and energy of a thing, is not evil but good, because it subsists on account of good, and because generation is from corruption, of which two the world consists, and by which the order of the universe is adorned. There is not, however, such a thing as unmingled evil, and evil itself, or an eternal idea, form and essence of evil, but moral evil is mixed with good, and so far as it is good, it subsists from divinity, but so far as evil, it is derived from another cause which is impotent. For evil is nothing else than a greater or less declination, departure, defect and privation from the good itself, and which is good alone, in the same manner as darkness from the sun. It is the debility and absence of power in energizing, but is not power. And that which is evil to partial natures, is not evil to the universe.

8162. Evil is not in the Gods, nor in the triple government of the better genera, viz. it is neither in angels; (for how could we call them messengers and elucidators of the Gods, if evil of any kind was in them who are the images of the divinities, and who dwelling in the vestibules of deity participate of its goodness ?) nor in daemons, nor in heroes. If divinity produced evil, he either produced it contrary to his nature, or every thing thence subsisting will be boniform, and the progeny of the goodness that abides in him. But as it is said, it is not the property of fire to impart cold, nor of good to produce evil from itself. Either, therefore, it must be said that evil is not, if it is necessary to its existence that it should be produced by divinity, or that it is, and does not originate from deity. Against those who assert that evil is primarily in daemons, he observes as follows: There arfe certain persons who attribute passions to daemons, and say that some of their passions are according to nature as when they tragically speak of their deaths, and different generations; but that others are from choice only, as when they denominate certain daemons base and

817evil, who, they also say, defile souls, lead them to matter, and draw them down from their journey to the heavens to the subterranean region. It is necessary, however, to ask these persons, whether are the daemons, which you say are evil, such to themselves [or in their own nature,] or not to themselves, but to others ? For if they are evil to themselves, one of two things must follow, either that they must remain in evil for ever, or that they must be susceptive of transmutation. And if indeed they are always evil, how can that which subsists from the Gods be perpetually evil ? For it is better not to be at all, than to be always evil. But if they are transmuted, they are not essentially evil, but are evil from habitude, in which there is the better and the worse, and another species of life. Daemons, however, are always in the ratio of daemons, and each of them is always in its own order. But if they are indeed good to themselves, but eVil to others whom they lead into a worse condition, it is just as if some one should call teachers depraved, and certain pedagogues, who ranking as the chastisers of offences, do not suffer the offenders to pursue a better order in a fluctuating manner, instead of an order which is adapted to them. Or as if some one should denominate those [officers] evil, who standing before things of a sacred nature [in temples] keep the impure from entering into the sanctuary, because they prohibit them from the participation of the interior rites. Hence, it is not evil to perform this office, but to be of such an order, and to deserve such a prohibition.' If, therefore, of the daemons that are in the world, some lead souls upward, but others keep such in their own manners, as are not yef able to ascend, we cannot justly call either of them evil, neither those

818' The Pseudo-Dionysius, the Areopagite, in his treatise On the Divine Names has evidently taken what follows from this passage of Proclus : ovx otga ou8f tv ayyeXos; wti to xaxo y, aAAa xoA afysv Tovg afiMgrotvorrag n<ri xctxos. tovtco you* too Xoya xas os (rcofgovsoTas twv Aouvraiv xaxoi.

819ON THE 'SUBSISTENCE

820that separate from nor those that detain souls [in a corporeal life.] For it is necessary that there should also be those daemons who coerce the soul that is defiled with vice, and is unworthy of a progression into the heavens, in the place which surrounds the earth. Neither, therefore, in these, does reason appear to discover evil. For whatever they do, they perform according to their own nature, and always after the 9ame manner. But this is not evil.

8213. Evil in souls is a debility of not always and uniformly adhering to better natures, and to good. Hence arises their descent to things subordinate, their oblivion, their malefic inclination to things conversant with body, and their discord with reason. According to some, matter is that which is primarily evil, and evil itself, and the debility of souls arises from their lapse into matter. This Proclus denies, and says that both body and matter originate from deity, and that both are the progeny of divinity. He adds, that matter is the first indefinite, and that essential infinity, in the same manner as a mixed body, depends on one cause, divinity. That souls sinned before they were thrust into matter. That there are not two principles [matter and deity.} And that matter is neither good nor evil, but a thing necessary, and distant in the last degree from the good itself.

8224. Of good there is one eternal, definite, universal and producing cause, viz. God ; but of evils the causes are manifold and infinite, some to souls, and others to bodies. They are also fluctuating, indefinite, inordinate, and particular, surrounding the nature of souls and bodies from necessity, and arising from impotency, incommensuration void of design, unadaptation, debility, and the victory of a subordinate nature. Good has an hypostasis, but evil a parhypostasis or a deviation from hypostasis. Good is form, but evil is without form, and is as it were privation.

8235. Evil possesses its power of acting, and its capability from a contrary good, which becomes debile and inefficacious on account of the mixture of evil; and evil is allotted its efficacy and energy on account of the

824presence of good, for both are in one. Thus in bodies, that which is preternatural, debilitates that which is according to nature, the energy, of nature being in this case dormant, and order, in which good consists, being dissolved. Thus also in souls, evil when it vanquishes good, uses its power, viz. the power of reason, to its own purposes, and makes it subservient to desire. Each of these also imparts something according to its own nature, viz. the one power, but the other debility ; because of itself evil is neither adapted to act, nor to possess power; for all power is good, and all energy is an extension of power. And this Plato knowing, says, that injustice itself is of itself debile and inactive; but through the presence of justice possesses its power, and is led forth into energy, not abiding in its own nature. Nor does evil alone consist in a privation of life, because being which subsists prior to life, gives also to evil a participation of life. All life, however, is of itself power; but evil subsisting in a foreign power is contrary to good, employing its own power for the purpose of opposing good. And the more power indeed is inherent in it, the greater are the energies and works of evil, and the less it possesses of power, the less are its energies and works. In bodies too as soon as the powers of nature cease, the preternatural energy which is in them ceases also; and hence, all order is entirely dissolved, that which is preternatural being more abundant. When the soul, therefore, receives an increase from that which is contrary to good, according to its base and formless nature, but is diminished according to virtue and energy, then it becomes at the same time debile and inefficacious. For the augmentation is not then from power, that the transition might be to something greater; but it arises from the presence of the contrary to power, just as if frigidity should use the power of heat to the accomplishment of its own work, vanquishing and subjecting its power. The soul, therefore, being deficient through the absence of good, and possessing more of privation in proportion as it has more of deficiency, becoming also more debile in its energies through a diminution of virtue, is indeed more evil, but performs less.

825ON THE SUBSISTENCE

826And how indeed could the increase since it is evil be from power, if the work of all power is to preserve that in which it is, but evil dissipates every thing of which it is the evil. Hence evil is of itself inefficacious and impotent. If also, as Plato says, it is involuntary, it will not be the object of the will. And thus it will be a privation of the first triad of the good, viz. of will, power, and energy. For good indeed, is the object of the will, and is in its own nature powerful aud efficacious ; but evil is unwished for, is debile and inefficacious. For that is not the object of the will to any thing which is corruptive of it, nor does power wish for that which may corrupt it, nor does energy wish not to have its hypostasis according to power. But evil is desired in consequence of appearing to, * be good ; and we say that evil seems to be an object of the will, on account of the mixture of good with it. Power, therefore, and energy are apparently in evil, [but are not so in reality] because they are not essentially inherent in it, nor so far as it is evil, but they extrinsically accede to it, as that to which a parhypostasis belongs. Hence, as it appears to me, this is what Socrates shows in the Theaetetus to those who are able to understand his meaning, viz. that evil is neither privation, nor the contrary to good. For privation is not able to effect any thing, nor does it in short possess any power ; nor does that which is contrary to good of itself possess either power or energy. But he denominates evil in a certain respect subcontrary to good, because of itself indeed, or essentially, it is privation, yet because it is not altogether perfect privation, but in a similar manner with habit changes from capacity, it is from thence constituted in energizing in the part of contrariety, and is neither perfect privation, nor contrary, but subcontrary to good.

8277. There are these three things which may debilitate, and in which there is evil, viz. a partial soul; the image of soul in animals ; and body. The evil to body is to have a preternatural subsistence; the evil to the image of soul is to be in a state of deviation from reason; and the evil to soul [i. e. to the rational soul,] is to deviate from intellect. The defect of life according to reason is the malady of this life; but ignorance and a privation of intellect are baseness, whether this takes place about the

828dianoetic or the doxastic power; and if about the former it is a want of science, but if about the latter, of art. Baseness, however, and malady, subsist in one way in cognitions, and in another in impulses. For the irrational appetites are hostile to the life which consists in action, and the many senses and precipitate imaginations intervening in the contemj> lative energy destroy its purity and immateriality. Hence unbecoming imaginations, or evil consent and base choice arise, either from an external source and in various actions, or internally according to anger and desire. That also which is preternatural is twofold. For in the body, it is either deformity, as in monsters, or malady, in consequence of the order and commensuration of the body being dissolved, as in corrup¬

829ON THE SUBSISTENCE

830that Plato ’ when he places all things about the king of all, and says that all things are for his sake, (even things which are not good appearing to be good, and in a similar manner belonging to beings) calls him the cause of every thing good, and not at once the cause of all things, for he is not the cause of evil, but is the cause of every being, and of every thing so far as it is good. If, therefore, we assert these tilings rightly, all things will be from Providence, and evil will have a place among beings. Hence also the Gods produce evil, but they produce it as good ; and they know, as possessing a unical knowledge of all things, partibles impartibly, evils according to the form of good, and multitude according to the form of the one. For there is one knowledge of soul, another of an intellectual nature, and another of the Gods themselves. For the first of these indeed, is a self-motive, the second, an eternal, and the third an indivisible and unical knowledge, knowing and producing all things by the one.

831For the further information of the reader on this most important subject, the Subsistence of Evil, the following admirable extract is added, from the Commentaries of Proclus On the Timaeus, (p. 112.) The Comment is on these words, 4 * Divinity being willing that all things should be good, and that as much as possible nothing should be eviland is as follows :

832“ The divine fabrication and intellectual production, proceeds from things impartible to such as are partible, from the united to the multiplied, and from things without interval to corporeal masses that are every way distended with interval. This also the discourse about it adumbrating, in the first place, enunciatively celebrates the final cause, afterwards discursively r, and in the third place, delivers in an evolved manner , the whole orderly distribution and progression from it. For the words “ he was good,” uniformly indeed comprehend every thing final, and the most

833' In his 2d. Epistle.

834divine of causes. But the words, “ In that which is good, envy is never inherent about any thing ; and being without this, he was willing that all things should be generated as much as possible similar to himself," effect this discursively. 1 For after the one will of intellect, he introduces the divided contemplation of it. And in the present words, he delivers to us the intelligence of divinity now proceeding into all multitude and interval, evolving every demiurgic providence, and all the parts of fabrication. Moreover, the third of these is in continuity with the second, and the second with the first. For since the first particle was, “ he was good," on this account the second begins from the good, but proceeds as far as to the will of the father. But the third beginning from will, delivers the whole of his providential energy. For if he was good, he was willing to make all things good. But if he was willing, he made them to be so, and led the universe into order. For providence indeed, is suspended from will, but will from goodness. And thus much concerning the order and connexion of the words.

835Let us however consider what this will is, in order that we may understand how it is conjoined with goodness. Superessential union itself therefore, and which is of itself exempt from beings, is indeed one, ineffable, and indefinite, having the uhcircumscribed, and the incomprehensible in the one itself. If therefore, it be requisite to survey in this, the above mentioned uniform triad, goodness indeed has the precedency, but will is the second, and providence is the third; goodness indeed, producing the perfect, the sufficient, and the desirable; but will exhibiting exuberant plenitude, the extended, and the generative; and providence imparting the efficacious, the perfective, and the undefiled. According to this ineffable and united hyparxis of the triad, the intelligible also is triply divided into essence, power, and energy; essence indeed, being fiinly established in it, and being self-perfect; but power having a neverfailing and infinite progression; and energy being allotted perfection, and essential production. And again, intellect after the same manner is triply divided, into being, life, and the intellectual. For the first of these

836ON THE SUBSISTENCE

837indeed, is the supplier of its existence, the second of its life, and the third. Of its gnostic power. After these also, soul is divided, into that which is the object of science, into science, and into that which is scientific. For the first of these is that which is known, the second is knowledge, and the third is that which derives its completion from both these. These triads therefore being four, as goodness is to will, so is essence to power, being to life, and the object of science to science. And as will is to providence, so is power to energy, life to intellect, and science to that which is scientific. For essence, being, and the object of science, have an order analogous to goodness. For the connective, the stable, the uniform, and the perfective, pertain to goodness. But power, life, and science, are analogous to will. For the self-begotten, and that which comprehends and measures all things, belong to will. And energy, intellect, and that which is scientific, pertain to providence. For the efficacious, and that which proceeds through and antecedently comprehends all things, are the resemblances of divine providence. Since therefore, the demiurgus also is a God, and an imparticipable intellect, 80 far as he is a God indeed, he possesses goodness, will, and providence; but as intelligible, he has essence, power, and energy ; and as intellect, he is, and has life, and a knowledge of wholes. The monad also which he possesses is suspended from unity. And thus much concerning will.

838Consequent to this, it remains to enquire how the demiurgus wished all things to be good, and if this is possible, and in what manner. For it may be said, if he was willing that this should be the case, it would be requisite that the progression of things should stop at the Gods and undefiled essences. If however, he not only fabricated these, but also brutes, and reptiles, and men, and every thing material, he was not willing that all things should be good. For he was not willing that better natures should exist, but also fabricated such as are worse. If he had been willing therefore, that all things should be good, he would have stopped ♦ his fabrication at the Gods. We reply however, that if the progression

839of things was only as far as to the Gods, all things would not be good. For first natures being allotted the last order, the good would be destroyed; since being able and willing to generate through their good-

840ness, yet in consequence of an arrangement as the last of things, they would become unprolific and not good. Our opponents therefore say, if all things are good, the progression is as far as to the Gods. But we say, if the progression of things extends only as far as to the Gods, all things are not good. For if a divine nature is unprolific how is it good ? But it will be unprolific, if it is the last of things. For every thing which generates is better than that which is generated. But the less excellent nature not existing, that which is more excellent will have no subsistence. Let there be the Gods therefore, and let them have the first order. But after the Gods, let there be a progression' as far as to matter itself; and let us give a transition to all beings, from the first to the last of things. And neither let there be any thing wanting even of the last of beings, nor any vacuum. For what vacuum can there be, when things characterized by itself x have the first subsistence, those that rank as the second proceed from these, those of the third order, proceed from these and others, those in the fourth rank, are generated from things characterized by the term another , and those in the fifth rank being others only; and on each side of these those natures subsisting which are dissimilarly similar?’ Such therefore, being the continuity in things, what can be deficient? Immoveable natures being first established, self-motive natures having the second, and alter-motive natures the third rank, all of which are the last of things. For all beings derive their completion from the above-mentioned orders. In short, the production of things may be shown to be continued in many ways; and if you are willing so to speak, analogy subsisting from on high as far as to the last of things, according to the well-ordered progression of ail beings from the one.

841Let therefore, all these things be acknowledged, and let the generation of beings be extended as far as to nothing; but whether is there nothing evil in these, or shall we admit that there is in a certain respect, and that

8421 gfooSov is omitted in the original.

843ON THE SUBSISTENCE

844there is what is called depravity in bodies, and in souls ? For some have been led by this doubt to take away evil entirely; but others have been induced to deny a providence, in consequence of believing, that if providence has a subsistence, all things are good. For if indeed divinity was willing there should be evil, how can he be good ? For it is the province of that which is essentially good to benefit every thing, just as it is of that which is essentially hot, to give heat. But it is not lawful for the good to effect any thing else than what is good. And if divinity was not * willing there should be evil, how can it have a subsistence? For something will exist contrary to the will of the father of all things. Such therefore is the doubt.

845We must say however, conformably to the doctrine of Plato according to our preceptor, that the habitude of divinity with respect to things subsists in a different manner from that of ours. And again, that the habitude of things with reference to deity is different from their habitude with reference to us. For wholes have a relation to parts different from that of parts to each other. To divinity therefore nothing is evil, not even of the things which are called evil. For he uses these also to a good purpose. But again, to partial natures there is a certain evil, these being naturally adapted to suffer by it. And the same thing is to a part indeed evil, but to the universe and to wholes is not evil, but good. For so far as it is a being, and so far as it participates of a certain order, it is good. For this thing which is said to be evil, if you apprehend it to be destitute of all good, you will make it to be beyond even that which in no respect whatever is. For as the good itself is prior to being, so evil itself is posterior to the nothingness of non-entity. For that which is most distant from the good is evil, and not that which has no kind of subsistence.* If therefore, that which in no respect whatever is, has more of subsistence than evil itself, but this is impossible, it is much more impossible that there should be such a thing as evil itself.

846' [Ly is wanting in the original.

847» The good itself is prior to beipg, Nothing pr non-being is not that which is most distant from the good; for it is that in which the procession of being ends, but that which is most distant from the good is evil itself. Hence, evil itself is posterior to non-entity.

848If however, that which is entirely evil has no subsistence, but evil is complicated with good, you give it a place among beings, and you make it good to other things. And indeed, how is it possible it should not, if it ranks among beings ? For that which participates of being, participates also of unity, and that which participates of unity, participates likewise of good. Hence evil if it is, participates of good; because evil has not an unmingled subsistence, and is not entirely deprived of order, and indefinite. Who therefore made it to be such? Who imparted to it measure and order, and bound ? It is evident that it is the demiurgus, who rendered all things similar to himself. For he filled both wholes and parts with good. But if he benefits all things, and colours evil itself with good, there is nothing evil according to the power of divinity and of recipients. For power is twofold, one being that of divinity, which benefits the depravity that is so abundantly seen ;' but the other being that of recipients, which participate of the goodness of the demiurgus according to the measure of their order [in the scale of beings]. In consequence therefore of the demiurgus being willing that there should be nothing evil, nothing is evil. But if certain persons accuse him as the cause of evil, because he gave subsistence to partial natures, they take away the fabrication of the world, subvert the prolific power of wholes, and confound the nature of things first and last.

849That we assert these things however, conformably to the opinion of Plato, may be easily seen from his writings. For in the Politicus, he clearly says, “ that the world obtained from 1 its maker all beautiful things, but from its former habit, all such injustice and evil, as are produced within the heavens.” For because there is generation, and also corruption, that which is preternatural has a subsistence. And because the deformity of matter fills partial souls with inelegance, through an association with it, on this account that which is not conformable to reason is allotted a certain resemblance of subsistence. At the same time however, all these particulars become beautiful through the goodness of the maker of the

850ON THE SUBSISTENCE

851universe. But in the Republic, Plato assigns no other cause of good than God, and says that certain other causes of evils are to be investigated; through which he manifests that evils do not derive their subsistence from divinity. For it is not, says he, the province of fire to refrigerate, nor of snow to heat, nor of that which is all-good to produce evil. And he asserts that certain partial causes of these are to be admitted, and such as are indefinite. For it is not in evils as in things that are good, viz. that the one, and what is primarily good, precede multitude; and this on account of the indefinite diffusion of evil. The words others therefore and certain , evince that the causes of evil are partial and indefinite. But in the Theaetetus he says “ that it is neither possible for evils to be abolished, nor for them to be in the Gods, but that they revolve from necessity about the mortal nature, and this place of our abode." If therefore, evil revolves necessarily in the mortal place, it will not be according to Plato, that which in no respect whatever has a subsistence, and which is exempt from all beings. So that according to him evil exists, is from partial causes, and is benefited through the boniform providence of the demiurgus, because there is nothing which is entirely evil, but every thing is in a certain respect accomplished conformably to justice and divinity.

852For we may make the following division: Of all that the world contains, some things are wholes, but others parts'. And of parts, some eternally preserve their own good, such as a partial intellect, and partial daemons, but others are not always able to preserve their proper good. And of these, some are alter-motive, but others self-motive. And of self-motive natures, some have evil established in their choice; but in others, it terminates in actions. With respect to wholes therefore, they are perfectly good, supplying not only themselves, but also parts with good. Such things however, as are parts, and yet preserve their own good, possess good secondarily and partially. But such as are parts, and alter-motive, deriving their subsistence from other things, are suspended from the providence of them, and are transmuted in a becoming manner, as is the case with such bodies as are generated and corrupted. For if it is. necessary that there should be generation, it is also necessary that there

853should be corruption. For generation subsists according to mutation, and is a certain mutation. But if there is corruption, it is necessary that the preternatural should be secretly introduced. As therefore, that which is corrupted, is indeed corrupted with reference to itself, but is not destroyed with reference to the universe; for it is either air or water, or something else into which it is changed; thus also that which is preternatural, is indeed with respect to itself disordered, but with respect to the universe has an orderly arrangement. For, if though it should be destroyed and entirely deprived of order, it would not dissolve the order of the universe, how is it possible that when having a preternatural subsistence which is of itself nothing when deprived of all order, it can destroy the whole arrangement of things? But again, partial natures which are self-motive indeed, and whose energy is directed to externals cause that which is effected by their energy to be evil to themselves, yet in a certain respect this also is good, and conformable to divinity. For since impulses and actions are from choice, actions follow elections according to justice, when he who chuses not only deserves the retribution consequent to his choice, but that also which follows from his conduct. And simply indeed, the action is not good, but to him who chuses a certain thing, and is impelled in a certain way, it is introduced according to justice; and is good to this individual and this particular life. For of goods, some are good to all things, others to such as differ according to species, and others to individuals, so far as they are individuals. For hellebore is not good to all men, nor to all bodies, nor yet to all diseased bodies, but it is good to one who is diseased in a particular manner, and is salutary from a certain principle. Whether therefore, the action is intemperate or unjust, to those who perform it indeed it is good, so far as it is conformable to justice, but simply it is not good, nor to those by whom it is done, but is to them the greatest evil. And so far as it proceeds from them and is directed to them, it is evil; but so far as it proceeds from the universe to them, it is not evil. And so far as their energy is directed to themselves, they destroy their life, becoming actually depraved ; but so far as they suffer from the universe, they undergo the punishment of their choice ; (just as it is said, that those who deliberate Proc. Vo^. If. 3 T

854ON THE SUBSISTENCE

855about betraying a suppliant, subvert divinity); or they suffer the punishment of their will.

856Let us however, direct our attention to what remains, viz. to such partial natures as energize self-motively, and who stop their depravity as far as to their choice. For they suffer the punishment of their cogitation alone. For, as it is said, there is a certain punishment of mere imagination, impulse and will; since the Gods govern us inwardly, and as they reward beneficent choice, so likewise they punish the contrary. But it may be said, how can choice itself have that which is conformable to justice and divinity ? May we not reply, because it is necessary there should be an essence of this kind and a power of an ambiguous nature, and which verges to different lives. If therefore that which has dominion over choice is from divinity, choice also is from divinity, and if this be the case, it is good. For the electing soul alone, is transferred to another and another order. For all choice either elevates the soul, or draws it downward [to an inferior condition of being]. And if indeed the choice is from a depraved * soul, it is evil; but if it transfers that which chuses to its proper order, it is according to justice and good. For the choice itself introduces punishment to the electing soul. Or rather, the choice becomes punishment in him who chooses, causing the soul to apostatize from good. For as a beneficent choice becomes truly the reward of itself, so a depraved choice becomes its own punishment. For this is the peculiarity of self-motive powers. Hence there is no evil, which is not also in a certain respect good; but all things participate of providence.

857If however, certain persons should ask on what account an evilproducing cause had at first a subsistence, though it should not rank among wholes, but is of a partial nature, to these it must be said, that the progression of beings is continued, and that no vacuum is left among them. Whether therefore, is it necessary that there should not be every self-motive life P But we shall thus take away many natures that are divine. Or shall we say it is necessary there should be wholes that are self-motive, but there is no necessity there should be self-motive parts P

858* i* omitted in the original.

859But how is it possible they should be wholes, if deprived of their proper parts ?' And how will the continuity of beings be preserved, if wholes and self-motive natures have a prior existence, and also partial and alter-motive natures, but we entirely destroy the intermediate natures, via. such as are self-motive indeed, but at the same time partial ? And which through the partial form become connected with habitude, but through the self-motive power, are at a certain time liberated from habitude. It is necessary therefore, that there should be this life also, which is a medium in beings, and the bond of things which have as it were an arrangement contrary * to each other. Evil however, is not on this account natural to the soul; since she is essentially the mistress of her choice. For the animated body has an essential tendency to disease; for it is essentially corruptible ; and yet disease is not according to nature. Hence disease is indeed evil to the partial nature which is allotted to connect this particular body, but is good to the wholeness of bodies. For it is necessary that what is generated from other things, should be changed into another thing. As therefore, to the nature which is in us, it is good for the nutriment to be changed, in order to the preservation of the animal; thus also to every nature it is good for a part to be corrupted, in order that the wholes may be preserved, which are always prior to parts. For if parts were generated from wholes, and the things generated should remain, all things would be rapidly consumed, in consequence of wholes becoming partial natures. For a continued ablation taking place from things of a finite nature, the whole must necessarily fail. But wholes not existing, either generation will be stopped, or mutation to partial natures will be derived from other things. Hence that which is evil to a partial nature is good to the whole life of the world.

860Farther still therefore, resuming the enquiry after another manner from the beginning, if we are asked whether divinity was willing there should be evil, or was not willing, we reply that he was both. For he was willing indeed, considered as imparting being to all things. For every

8611 for the proper parts of a self-motive whole, are also self-motive,

862ON THE SUBSISTENCE

863thing in the universe which has any kind of being proceeds from the demiurgic cause. But he was not willing, considered as producing all things good. For he concealed evil in the use of good. And if you are willing to argue physically, evil is produced essentially indeed from a partial soul, but accidentally from divinity, so far as it is evil, if it is admitted that divinity gave subsistence to the soul. Evil also so far as it is essentially good, originates from a divine cause, but accidentally from the soul. For so far as it subsists according to justice, it possesses good. Again, Plato in the Laws defines what punishment is, viz. that it appears to consume him who suffers it, and resembles the opening of ulcers. And he who is incapable 1 of being healed without a certain action, is incited to the performance of it, in order that the soul being liberated from her parturiency and stupid astonishment about that which is base, and repenting of her own evils, may begin to be purified. For base and unjust actions, when they are the objects of hope, are lovely to those that vehemently admire them, but when accomplished, fill those that perform them with repentance. And when indeed, they are the subjects of meditation, they cause the soul to be latently diseased ; but when they have proceeded into energy, they demonstrate their own imbecility, but liberate the soul from the most disgraceful parturition. And some indeed, exhibit this punishment according to the whole of their life; but others according to partial energies. For he who does any thing irrational, does it from choice, is impelled to that which is the object of his choice, and leads into energy that which pre-existed m his imagination.

864In short, evil is neither in intellectual natures ; for the whole intellectual genus is free from all evil; nor in whole souls, or whole bodies; for all wholes are exempt from evil, as being perpetual, and always subsisting according to nature. It remains therefore, that it must be in partial souls, or in partial bodies. But neither is it in the essences of these; for all their essences are derived from divinity; nor in their powers; for these subsist according to nature. Hence it remains, that it must be in their energies. But with respect to souls, it is neither in such as are

865rational; for all these aspire after good; nor in such as are irrational; for these energize according to nature. But it subsists in the privation of symmetry * of these with reference to each other. And in bodies, it is neither in form ; for it wishes to rule over matter; nor in matter; for it aspires after the supervening ornaments of form. But it consists in the privation of symmetry between form and matter. From which also it is evident, that every thing evil exists according to a parypostasis, or resemblance of subsistence , and that at the same time it is coloured by good; so that all things are good through the will of divinity, and as much as possible nothing is destitute of good. For it was not possible, that generation existing, evil also should not have a shadowy subsistence, since it is necessary to the perfection of the whole of things. And from what has been said, it is evident, that the will of divinity is not vain. For all things are good with reference to him, and there is not any being which is not vanquished by a portion of good. Nor are the words, “ as much as possible ,” written superfluously. For they do not signify an: imperfect power, but that power which rules over all things, and benefits all things through an abundance of good.”

866' For rup'p.prgi* here, it is necessary to read atruppurgia.