The Brahma Sutras

Adhyaya 1, Pada 1

1Then therefore the enquiry into Brahman.

2(Brahman is that) from which the origin, &c. (i.e. the origin, subsistence, and dissolution) of this (world proceed).

3(The omniscience of Brahman follows) from its being the source of Scripture.

4But that (Brahman is to be known from Scrip- ture), because it is connected (with the VedAnta-texts) as their purport.

5On account of seeing (i.e. thinking _ being attributed in the Upanishads to the cause of the world; the pradhdna) is not (to be identified with the cause indicated by the Upanishads; for) it is not founded on Scripture.

6If it is said that (the word ‘seeing’) has a figurative meaning, we deny that, on account of the word Self (being applied to the cause of the world),

7(The pradhana cannot be designated by the term ‘Self’) because release is taught of him who takes his stand on that (the Sat).

8And (the pradhana cannot be denoted by the word ‘Self’) because there is no statement of its having to be set aside.

9On account of (the individual Soul) going to the Self (the Self cannot be the pradhana).

10And because it is directly stated in Scripture (therefore the all-knowing Brahman is the cause of the world).

11(The Self) consisting of bliss (is the highest Self) on account of the repetition (of the word ‘ bliss,’ as denoting the highest Self).

12If (it be objected that the term Anandamaya, consisting of bliss, can) not (denote the highest Self) on account of its being a word denoting a modifica-

13And because he is declared to be the cause of it, (i.e. of bliss; therefore maya is to be taken as denoting abundance.)

14Moreover (the 4nandamaya is Brahman be- F 2

15(The Self consisting of bliss is the highest Self.) not the other (i.e. the individual Soul), on account of the impossibility (of the latter assum p- tion).

16And on account of the declaration of the difference (of the two, the A4nandamaya cannot be the transmigrating soul).

17And on account of desire (being mentioned as belonging to the 4nandamaya) no regard is to be had to what is inferred, (i.e. to the pradhana inferred by the Sankhyas.)

18And, moreover, it (i.e. Scripture) teaches the joining of this (i. e. the individual soul) with that, (i.e. the Self consisting of bliss), on that (being fully known).

19The one within (the sun and the eye) (is the highest Lord), on account of his qualities being declared *.

20And there is another one (i.e. the Lord who is different from the individual souls animating the sun, &c.), on account of the declaration of distinc- tion.

21For the same reason breath (is Brahman).

22The ‘light’ (is Brahman), on account of the mention of feet (in a passage which is connected with the passage about the light).

23If it be objected that (Brahman is) not (denoted) on account of the metre being denoted; (we reply) not so, because thus (i.e. by means of the metre) the direction of the mind:(on Brahman) is declared ; for thus it is seen (in other passages also).

24And thus also (we must conclude, viz. that Brahman is the subject of the previous passage), be- cause (thus only) the declaration as to the beings, &c. being the feet is possible.

25The objection that (the Brahman of the former passage cannot be recognised in the latter) on account of the difference of designation, is not valid because in either (designation) there is nothing contrary (to the recognition).

26Praza (breath) is Brahman, that being under- stood from a connected consideration (of the passages referring to prava).

27If it be said that (Brahman is) not (denoted) on account of the speaker denoting himself; (we reply that this objection is not valid) because there is in that (chapter) a multitude of references to the interior Self.

28The declaration (made by Indra about himself, viz. that he is one with Brahman) (is possible) through intuition vouched for by Scripture, as in the case of Vamadeva.

Adhyaya 1, Pada 2

29(That which consists of mind is Brahman) be- cause there is taught what is known from everywhere.

30And because the qualities desired to be ex- pressed are possible (in Brahman; therefore the passage refers to Brahman).

31On the other hand, as (those qualities) are not possible (in it), the embodied (soul is) not (denoted by manomaya, &c.).

32And because there is a (separate) denotation of the object of activity and of the agent.

33On account of the difference of words.

34And on account of Smvzti. Smriti also declares the difference of the embodied Self

35If it be said that (the passage does) not (refer to Brahman) on account of the smallness of the abode (mentioned), and on account of the denotations of that (i.e. of minuteness); we say, no; because (Brahman) has thus to be contemplated, and be- cause the case is analogous to that of ether.

36If it is said that (from the circumstance of Brahman and the individual soul being one) there follows fruition (on the part of Brahman); we say, no ; on account of the difference of nature (of the two).

37The eater (is the highest Self) since what is

38And on account of the topic under discussion. That the highest Self only can be the eater referred to

39The ‘two entered into the cave’ (are the in- dividual soul and the highest Self), for the two are (intelligent) Selfs (and therefore of the same nature), as it is seen (that numerals denote beings of the same nature).

40And on account of the distinctive qualities (mentioned).

41The person within (the eye) (is Brahman) on account of the agreement (of the attributes of that person with the nature of Brahman).

42And on account of the statement of place, and so on.

43And on account of the passage referring to that which is distinguished by pleasure (1. e. Brah- man).

44And on account of the statement of the way of him who has heard the Upanishads.

45(The person within the eye is the highest), not any other Self; on account of the non-perma- nency (of the other Selfs) and on account of the im- possibility (of the qualities of the person in the eye being ascribed to the other Selfs).

46The internal ruler over the devas and so on

47And (the internal ruler is) not that which the Smrzti assumes, (viz. the pradhana,) on account of the statement of qualities not belonging to it.

48And the embodied soul (also cannot be under- stood by the internal ruler), for both also (i.e. both

49That which possesses the attributes of invisi- bility and so on (is Brahman), on account of the declaration of attributes.

50The two others (i.e. the individual soul and the pradhana) are not (the source of all beings) be- cause there are stated distinctive attributes and

51And on account of its form being mentioned.

52Vaisvanara (is the highest Lord) on account of the distinction qualifying the common terms (Vaisva-

53(And) because that which is stated by Smr7ti (i.e. the shape of the highest Lord as described by Smriti) is an inference (i. e. an indicatory mark from which we fer the meaning of Sruti).

54For the same reasons (the Vaisvanara) cannot be the divinity (of fire), or the element (of fire).

55Gaimini (declares that there is) no contradic- tion even on the assumption of a direct (worship of the highest Lord as Vaisvanara).

56On account of the manifestation, so Asmara- thya opines.

57On account of remembrance; so BAdari opines.

58On the ground of imaginative identification (the highest Lord may be called pradesamiatra), Gaimini thinks; for thus (Scripture) declares.

59Moreover they (the G§balas) speak of him

Adhyaya 1, Pada 3

60The abode of heaven, earth, and so on (is Brahman), on account of the term ‘ own,’ i.e. Self.

61And on account of its being designated as that to which the Released have to resort.

62Not (i.e. the abode of heaven, earth, &c. can- not be) that which is inferred, (i. e. the pradhana), on account of the terms not denoting it.

63(Nor) also the individual soul (prazabhr‘t).

64On account of the declaration of difference.

65On account of the subject-matter.

66And on account of the two conditions of stand- ing and eating (of which the former is characteristic of the highest Lord, the latter of the individual soul).

67The bhaman (is Brahman), as the instruction about it is additional to that about the state of deep sleep (i.e. the vital air which remains awake even in

68And on account of the agreement of the attributes (mentioned in the text).

69The Imperishable (is Brahman) on account of (its) supporting (all things) up to ether.

70This (supporting can), on account of the command (attributed to the Imperishable, be the work of the highest Lord only).

71And on account of (Scripture) separating (the

72On account of his being designated as the object of sight (the highest Self is meant, and) the same (is meant in the passage speaking of the medi- tation on the highest person by means of the syllable Om).

73The small (ether) (is Brahman) on account of the subsequent (arguments).

74(The small ether is Brahman) on account of N 2

75And on account of the supporting also (attri- buted to it), (the small ether must be the Lord) because that greatness is observed in him (accord- ing to other scriptural passages).

76And on account of the settled meaning.

77If it be said that the other one (i.e. the indi- vidual soul) (is meant) on account of a reference to

78If it be said that from the subsequent (chapter it appears that the individual soul is meant), (we point out that what is there referred to is) rather (the individual soul in so far) as its true nature has become manifest (i.e. as it is non-different from

79And the reference (to the individual soul) has a different meaning.

80If it be said that on account of the scriptural

81On account of the acting after (i. e. the shining after), (that after which sun, moon, &c. are said to shine is the highest Self), and (because by the light) of him (all this is said to be lighted).

82Moreover Smriti also speaks of him (i.e. of the pragvia Self as being the universal light).

83On account of the term, (viz. the term ‘lord’ applied to it) the (person) measured (by a thumb) (is the highest Lord).

84But with reference to the heart (the highest Self is said to be of the size of a span), as men are entitled (to the study of the Veda).

85Also (beings) above them, (viz. men) (are qualified for the study and practice of the Veda), on account of the possibility (of it), according to Badaréyaza. |

86If it be said that (the corporeal individuality of the gods involves) a contradiction to (sacrificial) works; we deny that, on account of the observation of the assumption (on the part of the gods) of several (forms).

87If it be said (that a contradiction will result) in respect of the word; we refute this objection on the ground that (the world) originates from the word, as is shown by perception and inference.

88And from this very reason there follows the eternity of the Veda.

89And on account of the equality of names and forms there is no contradiction (to the eternity of the word of the Veda) in the renovation (of the world); as is seen from Sruti and Smr‘ti.

90On account of the impossibility of (the gods being qualified) for the madhu-vidy4, &c.. Gaimini (maintains) the non-qualification (of the gods for the Brahma-vidya).

91And (the devas, &c. are not qualified) on account of (the words denoting the devas, &c.) being (used) in the sense of (sphere of) light.

92Badardyawa, on the other hand, (maintains) the existence (of qualification for Brahma-vidya on the part of the gods); for there are (passages indicatory of that).

93Grief of him (i.e. of Ganasruti) (arose) on account of his hearing a disrespectful speech about himself ; on account of the rushing on of that (grief) (Raikva called him Sfidra); for it (the grief) is pointed at (by Raikva).

94And because the kshattriyahood (of Ganasruti) is understood from the inferential mark (supplied by his being mentioned) later on with Kaitraratha (who was a kshattriya himself).

95On account of the reference to ceremonial purifications (in the case of the higher castes) and on account of their absence being declared (in the case of the Sidras).

96And on account of (Gautama) proceeding (to initiate GAbala) on the ascertainment of (his) not being that (i.e. a Sddra).

97And on account of the prohibition, in Sm ti, of (the Stidras’) hearing and studying (the Veda) and (knowing and performing) (Vedic) matters.

98(The praza is Brahman), on account of the trembling (predicated of the whole world).

99The light (is Brahman), on account of that (Brahman) being seen (in the scriptural passage).

100And (on account of the designation) (of the highest Self) as different (from the individual soul) in the states of deep sleep and departing.

101And on account of such words as Lord, &c.

Adhyaya 1, Pada 4

102If it be said that some (mention) that which is based on inference (i. e. the pradhana) ; we deny this, because (the term alluded to) refers to what is con- tained in the simile of the body (i. e. the body itself) ; and (that the text) shows.

103But the subtle (body is meant by the term avyakta) on account of its capability (of being so designated).

104(Such a previous seminal condition of the world may be admitted) on account of its dependency on him (the Lord) ; (for such an admission is) according to reason.

105And (the pradhana cannot be meant) because

106And there is question and explanation relative to three things only (not to the pradhana).

107And (the case of the term avyakta) is like that of the term mahat.

108(It cannot be maintained that aga means the

109But the (elements) beginning with light (are

110In the case of (the text of) some (the K4zvas) where food is not mentioned, (the number five is made full) by the light (mentioned in the preceding mantra).

111(Although there is a conflict of the VedAnta- passages with regard to the things created, such as) ether and so on; (there is no such conflict with regard to the Lord) on account of his being re- presented (in one passage) as described (in other passages), viz. as the cause (of the world).

112On account of the connexion (with passages treating of Brahman, the passages speaking of the Non-being do not intimate absolute Non-existence).

113(He whose work is this is Brahman), because (the ‘ work’) denotes the world.

114If it be said that this is not so, on account of the inferential marks of the individual soul and the chief vital air; we reply that that has already been explained.

115But Gaimini thinks that (the reference to the individual soul) has another purport, on account of

116(The Self to be seen, to be heard, &c. is the highest Self) on account of the connected meaning of the sentences.

117(The circumstance of the soul being repre- sented as the object of sight) indicates the fulfil-

118(The initial statement identifies the individual soul and the highest Self) because the soul when it will depart (from the body) i$ such (i.e. one with the highest Self) ; thus Audulomi thinks.

119(The initial statement is made) because (the highest Self) exists in the condition (of the individual soul); so Kasakvztsna thinks.

120(Brahman is) the material cause also, on account of (this view) not being in conflict with the promissory statements and the illustrative in- stances.

121And on account of the statement of reflection (on the part of the Self).

122And on account of both (i.e. the origin and the dissolution of the world) being directly de- clared (to have Brahman for their material cause).

123(Brahman is the material cause) on account of (the Self) making itself; (which is possible) owing to modification.

124And because Brahman is called the source.

125Hereby all (the doctrines concerning the origin of the world which are opposed to the Vedanta) are explained, are explained.

Adhyaya 2, Pada 1

126If it be objected that (from the doctrine ex- pounded hitherto) there would result the fault of there being no room for (certain) Smvztis; we do not admit that abjection, because (from the rejection of our doctrine) there would result the fault of want of room for other Smr‘tis.

127And on account of the non-perception of the

128Thereby the Yoga (Sm~‘ti) is refuted.

129(Brahman can)not (be the cause of the world) on account of the difference of character of that, (viz. the world) ; and its being such, (i.e. different from Brahman) (we learn) from S-ripture.

130But (there takes place) denotation of the super- intending (deities), on account of the difference and

131But it is seen.

132If (it is said that the effect is) non-existent (before its origination); we do not allow that because it is a mere negation (without an object).

133On account of such consequences at the time

134Not so ; as there are parallel instances.

135And because the objections (raised by the Sankhya against the Vedanta doctrine) apply to his view also.

136If it be said that, in consequence of the ill. foundedness of reasoning, we must frame our con clusions otherwise ; (we reply that) thus also there would result non-release.

137Thereby those (theories) also which are not accepted by competent persons are explained.

138If it be said that from the circumstance of (the objects of enjoyment) passing over into the enjoyer (and vice vers4) there would result non-distinction (of the two) ; we reply that (such distinction) may exist (nevertheless), as ordinary experience shows.

139The non-difference of them (i.e. of cause and effect) results from such terms as * origin’ and the like.

140And because only on the existence (of the cause) (the effect) is observed.

141And on account of that which is posterior (i. e. the effect) being that which is.

142If it be said that on account of being denoted as that which is not (the effect does) not (exist before it is actually produced) ; (we reply) not so, (because

143From reasoning and from another Vedic passage.

144And like a piece of cloth.

145And as in the case of the different vital airs.

146On account of the other (i.e. the individual soul) being designated (as non-different from Brah- man) there would attach (to Brahman) various faults, as, for instance, not doing what is bene- ficial.

147But the separate (Brahman, i.e. the Brahman separate from the individual souls) (is the creator) ; (the existence of which separate Brahman we learn) from the declaration of difference.

148And because the case is analogous to that of stones, &c. (the objections raised) cannot be

149If you object on the ground of the observation of the employment (of instruments) ; (we say), No; because as milk (transforms itself, so Brahman does).

150And (the case of Brahman is) like that of gods and other beings in ordinary experience.

151Either the consequence of the entire (Brah- man undergoing change) has to be accepted, or else a violation of the texts declaring Brahman to be without parts.

152But (this is not so), on account of scriptural passages, and on account of (Brahman) resting on Scripture (only).

153For thus it is in the (individual) Self also, and various (creations exist in gods', &c.).

154And because the objection (raised against our view) lies against his (the opponent's) view likewise. i

155And (the highest divinity is) endowed with all (powers) because that is seen (from Scripture).

156If it be said that (Brahman is devoid of powers) on account of the absence of organs ; (we reply that) this has been explained (before).

157(Brahman is) not (the creator of the world), on account of (beings engaging in any action) having a motive.

158Inequality (of dispensation) and cruelty (the Lord can)not (be reproached with), on account of

159If it be objected that it (viz. the Lord's having regard to merit and demerit) is impossible on account of the non-distinction (of merit and demerit, previous to the first creation); we refute the objection on the ground of (the world) being without a beginning.

160(The beginninglessness of the world) recom- mends itself to reason and is seen (from Scripture).

161And because all the qualities (required in the cause of the world) are present (in Brahman).

Adhyaya 2, Pada 2

162That which is inferred (by the Sankhyas, viz. the pradhana) cannot be the cause (of the world), on account of the orderly arrangement (of the world) being impossible (on that hypothesis).

163And on account of (the impossibility of) ac- tivity.

164If it be said (that the pradhana moves) like milk or water, (we reply that) there also (the motion is due to intelligence).

165And because (the pradhana), on account of there existing nothing beyond it, stands in no rela- tion ; (it cannot be active.)

166Even if we admit (the Sankhya position refuted in what precedes, it is invalidated by other ob- jections) on account of the absence of a purpose (on the part of the pradhana).

167And, again, (the pradhdna cannot be active) because the relation of principal (and subordinate matter) is impossible (between the three guwas).

168And moreover (the Sénkhya doctrine) is ob- jectionable on account of its contradictions.

169Or (the world may originate from Brahman)

170In both cases also (in the cases of the advzshéa inhering either in the atoms or the soul) action (of the atoms) is not (possible); hence absence of that (viz. creation and pralaya).

171And because in consequence of samavaya being admitted a regressus in infinitum results from parity of reasoning.

172And on account of the permanent existence (of activity or non-activity).

173And on account of the atoms having colour, &c., the reverse (of the Vaiseshika tenet would take place); as thus it is observed.

174And as there are difficulties in both cases.

175And as the (atomic theory) is not accepted (by any authoritative persons) it is to be disregarded altogether.

176(If there be assumed) the (dyad of) aggregates with its two causes, (there takes place) non-estab- lishment of those (two aggregates).

177If it be said that (the formation of aggregates may be explained) through (Nescience, &c.) standing in the relation of mutual causality; we say ‘No, because they merely are the efficient causes of the origin (of the immediately subsequent links).

178(Nor can there be a causal relation between Nescience, &c.), because on the origination of the subsequent (moment) the preceding one ceases to be.

179On the supposition of there being no (cause ; while yet the effect takes place), there results con- tradiction of the admitted principle; otherwise simultaneousness {of cause and effect).

180Cessation dependent on a sublative act of the

181And on account of the objections presenting themselves in either case.

182And in the case of space also (the doctrine of

183And on account of remembrance.

184(Entity) does not spring from non-entity on account of that not being observed.

185And thus (on that doctrine) there would be an accomplishment (of ends) in the case of non- active people also.

186The non-existence (of external things) cannot be maintained, on account of (our) consciousness (of them).

187And on account of their difference of nature

188The existence (of mental impressions) is not possible (on the Bauddha view) on account of the absence of perception (of external things).

189And on account of the momentariness (of the

190And on account of its general deficiency in probability.

191On account of the impossibility (of contra- dictory attributes) in one thing, (the Gaina doctrine is) not (to be accepted).

192And likewise (there results from the Gaina doctrine) non-universality of the Self.

193Nor is non-contradiction to be derived from the succession (of parts acceding to and departing from the soul), on account of the change, &c. (of the soul).

194And on account of the permanency of the final (size of the soul) and the resulting permanency of the two (preceding sizes) there is no difference (of size, at any time).

195The Lord (cannot be the cause of the world), on account of the mappropriateness (of that doc- trine).

196And on account of the impossibility of the connexion (of the Lord with the souls and the

197And on account of the impossibility of ruler- ship (on the part of the Lord).

198If you say that as the organs (are ruled by the soul so the pradh4na is ruled by the Lord), we deny that on account of the enjoyment, &c.

199And (there would follow from that doctrine) either finite duration or absence of omniscience (on the Lord’s part).

200On account of the impossibility of the ori- gination (of the individual soul from the highest Lord, the doctrine of the Bh4gavatas cannot be accepted).

201And (it is) not (observed that) the instrument is produced from the agent.

202Or (if) in consequence of the existence of knowledge, &c. (Vasudeva, &c. be taken as Lords), yet there is non-exclusion of that (i.e. the objection raised in Sitra 42).

203And on account of contradictions.